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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of two separate but related
studies on the notion of presupposition as it occurs in
philosophy and linguistics. In the first study I examine
the theory of logical presupposition found in the work of
Gottlob Frege. In the second I examine the theories of
Deirdre Wilson and Lauri Karttunen. These theorists
reject the notion of logical presupposition in favor of
pragmatic and non-logical conceptions. There are impor-
tant problems with all three theories. Frege's theory
fails to account for the presuppositions of compound
sentences. Wilson's and Karttunen's fail to demonstrate
conclusively that the presuppositions of simple sentences
and their negations are non-logical.
FREGE'S THEORY OF PRESUPPOSITION
Frege's theory of presupposition is a consequence of
his more general semantic theory. In Part 1 I show how
two different notions of presupposition can be recon-
structed from his semantics; one applies directly to
sentences, and the other applies directly to thoughts.
This distinction is used to clarify Frege's discussion
of presupposition in "On Sense and Reference."
In Part 2 I maintain that a speaker who utters a
sentence with a false presupposition typically succeeds
in making a statement. I argue against those who inter-
pret Frege as denying this and show how a proper under-
standing of his semantics eliminates one of the main
problems that have led theorists to erroneous interpre-
tations.
In Part 3 I examine the relationship between negation
and presupposition. I show that Frege's account of inter-
nal negation is inadequate and must be supplemented with
an account of external negation. However, when ex-
ternal negation is introduced, his theory of logical
presupposition conflicts with his theory of truth.
Finally, I show that Frege's theory makes incorrect
predictions about the presuppositions of compound
sentences. This undermines his view that sentences
are special kinds of "proper names".
In the essay on Frege I also consider certain
issues that apply to any theory of logical presuppo-
sition. I argue that logical presupposition in natural
languages should not be defined in terms of what is
entailed by a sentence and its negation. I also argue
that redundancy theories of truth and falsity conflict
with theories of logical presupposition.
TWO THEORIES OF NON-LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION
In the second essay I investigate Wilson's and
Karttunen's theories of non-logical presupposition.
These theorists hold the following two theses:
.A. Theories of natural language require an
account of non-logical presupposition.
B. The notion of logical presupposition should
be eliminated from theories of natural
language.
(A) is correct, but the arguments for (B) are not
conclusive.
In Part 1 of this essay I present Karttunen's
notion of presupposition that applies to conjunctions,
disjunctions, and conditionals. In Part 2 I argue that
this notion is non-logical, but that this result is
compatible with restricted theories of logical presup-
position based on simple sentences and their negations.
In Part 3 I examine the importance of negation for such
theories and evaluate Wilson's argument that negative
sentences do not bear logical presuppositions.
Parts 4 and 5 are concerned with the pragmatic
accounts of Wilson and Karttunen. In Part 4 I demon-
strate that Wilson's theory is incorrect and argue that
it cannot be repaired. In Part 5 i indicate several
difficulties with Karttunen's view and propose modifi-
cations to resolve them.
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FREGE'S THEORY OF PRESUPPOSITION
PART 1
WHAT IS FREGE'S THEORY OF PRESUPPOSITION?
13
Many philosophers and linguists are currently attempting
to construct theories of presupposition for natural language.
The aim of a theory of presupposition is to explain a
special class of inferences that arise from the use of a
wide variety of different sentence types and constructions.
Among the facts that such theories attempt to explain is
why assertively uttering (la) or (lb) is normally taken
to commit the speaker to the truth of (ic).
1. a. The founder of the university is a Republican.
b. The founder of the university is not a
Republican.
c. Exactly one person founded the university.
According to many theories of presupposition, (a)
and (b) bear a logical relation to (c). Such theories
claim that (c) expresses a necessary condition for (a) and
(b) to be either true or false. According to these theories,
(a) and (b) logically presuppose (c).
The notion of logical presupposition has long been a
controversial one in philosophy. Recently the controversy
has intensified as philsophers and linguists have tried to
incorporate accounts of presupposition into comprehensive
empirical theories of natural language. Contemporary
theorists have brought new data to this controversy--e.g.,.
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(2-4). As in the case of (1), a speaker who assertively
utters (a) or (b) is normally taken to be committed to
the truth of (c).
2. a. All of John's children are asleep.
b. Not all of John's children are asleep.
c. John has children.
3. a. I realized that the grass needed cutting.
b. I did not realize that the grass needed cutting.
c. The grass needed cutting.
4. a. It was John who was elected.
b. It was not John who was elected.
c. Someone was elected.
Philosophers and linguists have tried to develop theories
of presupposition that account for sentences like (1-4).
Unfortunately, competing theories have proliferated, and
little agreement has been secured.
One reason for the present confusion and controversy
is that theories of presupposition often arise from
fundamentally different conceptions of semantics and
pragmatics. Consequently, there is a need to examine basic
assumptions underlying alternative accounts. In this paper,
I will investigate one of the most important accounts of
presupposition--namely, the one that emerges from the work
of Gottlob Freqe.
Frege was the first modern theorist to deal with pre-,
supposition in natural language. Although he was concerned
with this notion, he did not give it much special attention.
In fact, natural language was not his central concern.
One of his primary objectives was to construct a scien-
tific language that would avoid what he took to be logical
imperfections in natural languages. Along the way he
developed a semantic theory that accounts for many features
of natural language, including facts involving the notion
of presupposition. However, he didn't give a formal
definition of presupposition, nor did he explore a wide
range of data to determine all of the different kinds of
presupposition that there might be.'
*The lack of prominence that Frege gives to presuppo-
sition makes his account of this notion easy to miss. This
may explain why some philosophers seem not to have noticed
it at all. For example, in his discussion of Frege in
"On Denoting," Russell failed to mention Frege's theory
of presupposition even though it was directly relevant to
Russell's central concerns.2 Moreover, in "On Referring"
Strawson was apparently unaware that the theory of presup-
position that he introduced into the philosophy of language
1Although Frege believed (1) to be an instance of presupposition,
he did not consider other possible candidates like those in (2-4).
2Although Russell saw that Frege's distinction between
sense and reference solves some of the problems that motivated the
theory of descriptions, he did not see that Frege's theory of presup-
position also resolves Russell's puzzle about the present King of
France.
See Russell, "On Denoting," in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert
C. Marsh (New York: Capricorn Books, 1956), pp. 45-47.
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had a precursor in the work of Frege.3
Frege's lack of emphasis had another effect.
Philosophers who have tried to characterize his view
have tended to focus almost entirely on the brief
sections in which he talks explicitly about presupposi-
tion, most notably the famous section in "On Sense and
Reference" where he discusses the examples (5) and (6).4
5. Kepler died in misery.
6. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery.
There are two shortcomings with this approach. First, as
I will try to show, Frege's explicit comments on presuppo-
sition in "On Sense and Reference" are fragmentary and
incomplete; second, by focusing on these limited remarks,
one is apt to overlook the relationship between Frege's
account of presupposition and his general semantic theory.
In this essay, I will adopt a different approach. I
will begin with Frege's compositional semantics and show
how two different theories of presupposition can be
reconstructed from it. I will then turn to Frege's
3This is not, of course, to say that Frege's and Strawson's
theories of presupposition are identical.
Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Translations from
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Peter Geach and Max
Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. 68-70.
Here and throughout I speak of Frege's views about English. Al-
though he wrote in German and never explicitly considered English, I
will assume that what he said about German he would also have said
about English.
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explicit remarks on presupposition in which he apparently
vacillates between the two theories. Finally, I will
point out a number of difficulties that plague both
Fregean views.
II. Frege's Semantics
An important notion in Frege's semantic theory is
the notion of a singular term, or as he puts it, "a
proper name." The class of such expressions includes both
ordinary proper names like 'Bertrand Russell' and singular
definite descriptions like 'the author of Ivanhoe'. All
ordinary proper names and singular definite descriptions,
including those which fail to designate are proper names
5for Frege. Thus, 'the greatest prime number' is a
Fregean proper name even though there is no greatest
prime.
One of Frege's central theses is that the meaning
(sense) of a proper name is distinct from its referent.
We have already seen one reason for holding this when
we noted that there are meaningful proper names (e.g.,
In what follows I will use "refer" and "designate" inter-
changeably.
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'the greatest prime number') that fail to refer to any-
thing. However, the distinction is also motivated for
terms that have a referent. 'The first planet visible in
the evening sky' is coreferential with 'the first planet
visible in the morning sky', but their meanings are
different. Thus, it cannot be that the sense of each of
these expressions is identical with its referent. Of
course, to have shown this is not to have shown that the
sense of neither of these names is identical with its
referent.6 However, if the sense of one of the expres-
sions is distinct from its referent, then it is reasonable
to hold that the sense and referent of the other are
also distinct. Thus, this argument leads to the conclu-
sion that for proper names generally, sense and reference
are not- identical. 7
6This point is made by Richard Cartwright in "Propositions Again."
Richard Cartwright, "Propositions Again," Nous, No. 2. (1968)
The argument given here is a reconstruction of Frege's account.
His own argument is based on a comparison of true sentences of the form
(i) a= a
(ii) a= b
Frege claims that although sentences of the form (i) and (ii) may
have different "cognitive values," this difference cannot be attri-
buted to any difference in reference (each sentence being true).
Rather it is the result of the different "cognitive values" of the
names that occupy the places of 'a' and 'b'. Thus, he concludes that
the "cognitive value" of an expression is distinct from its
reference.
Three points should be noted about this argument. First,
although it is presented as an answer to a puzzle about identity,
19
Frege also distinguished between simple and compound
proper names. Examples of the former in English are:
'France', '2', '3', and 'John'. Examples of the latter are:
'the king of France', the'sum of 2 and 3', and 'the father
of John'. Com'pound proper names result from combining a
term or terms with an expression that stands for a
function (e.g., 'the king of ', 'the sum of
and ', 'the father of ') 9 The reference of
the entire compound is the value of the function denoted
by its function sign at the arguments designated by the
proper names that occur in it. What confirmed this
any two sentences differing only in singular term position would
do just as well. Second, if, in addition to abstracting away
from any particular sentence form, we render Frege's "cognitive
value" as meaning or sense, then we have the argument given above
in the text. Third, although the conclusion of the argument is
that each proper name has a sense that is distinct from its
reference, important problems arise when this thesis is applied
to ordinary grammatically proper names (like 'Aristotle'). These
problems are discussed by Kripke in "Naming and Necessity," Semantics
of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman,
(Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel Publishing Co., 1972). Here he argues
that grammatically proper names do not have meaning in Frege's
sense, but rather are "rigid designators." Fortunately, the differ-
ence between Kripke and Frege is irrelevant to our present
concerns and need not be considered here.
8Gottlob Frege, "Function and Concept," Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege, pp. 24-25; 31-32.
9The account of the formation of compound proper names
will be extended in Section VI.
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analysis for Frege was the fact that substituting
coreferential terms in a compound proper name preserves
reference. For example, 'the father of Cicero' refers to
the same man as 'the father of Tully'.10
The thesis that the reference of a compound proper
name is a function of the reference of its parts was
10Of course, expressions that stand for function signs (like
'the father of ') not only denote functions, but also express
senses. Similarly, just as substitution of coreferential terms
in a compound proper name preserves reference, so substitution of
synonymous terms in such an expression preserves meaning. However,
this fact did not lead Frege to say that the sense of an expression
such as 'the father of ' is, like its referent, a function.
Instead, he says that the sense of a compound proper name is in some
way composed of the senses of its parts.
It is important for what follows to state this thesis a
little more carefully. Frege held that each compound proper name
can be exhaustively analyzed into an expression P that stands for a
function, and expressions al,.. an that purportedly designate
arguments of the function. Let R be a function that assigns reference
to expressions. We can now reconstruct two of Frege's theses about
the reference of compound proper names. (Since some expressions
fail to designate anything, R is a partial function.)
Thesis 1: There is a function f such that for all compound proper
names , R(a) = f (R(P),<R(81),...,R(an)>)
where P, 81.***. 8n is an exhaustive analysis of a.
Thesis 2 is stronger than thesis 1. In thesis 2 the relevant function
f is identified as the application function. This function is
defined as follows:
The Application Function: For all functions g and arguments
al,...,an, App(g,<al,...,an>) = g(al,...,an)-
Thesis 2: R(ca) = App (R(P),<R,(B1),...,R(ýn)>)
where P, B1 ,...,e n is an exhaustive analysis of a.
Some of the arguments that follow require thesis 2. Consequently,
in what follows when I refer to Frege's thesis that the reference of
a compound proper name is a function of the reference of its parts, I
will have thesis 2 in mind. I am indebted to George Boolos for a
discussion of this point.
a central tenet of Frege's semantic theory which played
an important role in the development of other semantic
views. Having adopted this thesis, Frege observed that
in a large number of cases, the truth value of a sentence
is a function of the reference of its constituents.
For example, replacing singular terms in (7) with other
coreferential expressions preserves truth value.
7. a. John kissed Mary.
b. New York is larger than Boston.
c. Socrates is wise.
d. 2 is odd.
This was one of the factors which suggested to Frege that
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sentences are themselves a special kind of compound
proper name. According to this view, truth and falsity
are the referents of true and false sentences respectively,
and predicate expressions denote functions that take
arguments into truth values. For example, the predicate
is odd' denotes a function that assigns truth to each
of the integers 1, 3, 5, 7,... and falsity to every other
integer. Therefore, '2 is odd' refers to the False.13
12 Here, and in what follows, I use "sentence" as short for
"declarative sentence."
F13rege argues for this analysis in "Function and Concept,"
pp. 28-31, and in "On Sense and Reference," pp. 62-65. It is in the
latter that the argument receives fullest expression, where it
proceeds in two stages. Frege first argues that if a sentence has
For Frege, sentences are not the only things that have
truth value. Senses of sentences, or, as he would say,
"thoughts" can also be either true or false. Consider,
for example, the claim that Plato believed that two plus
three equals five. According to Frege, what Plato believed
was neither the English sentence, "Two plus three equals
a reference, its reference is not its meaning (or sense). This
is established by noting that replacement of one constituent in a
sentence by another which has the same reference but a different
sense alters the meaning of the entire sentence. Thus, if the
reference of an expression is a function of the reference of its
parts, then it cannot be that for every sentence S, the meaning of
S = the reference of S. Since it would be arbitrary to hold that
the referents of only some sentences = their meanings, it is
natural to conclude that for all sentences S, the meaning of S f
the reference of S.
, Next, Frege tries to show that sentences do, in fact, refer
and, in particular, that they refer to truth values. Here he leans
heavily on the preservation of truth value in cases of substitution
under coreference and also on what he takes to be the consequences
of reference failure in compound singular terms and sentences. With
regard to the latter, he claims that just as a compound singular
term lacks reference when one of its constituents does, so a sentence
lacks truth value if one of its constituents fails to refer (p. 62).
Though one may doubt that we have clear intuitions about lack of
truth value (as opposed to falsity), the form of the arguments
employed by Frege is clear. In each case his justification for
construing sentences as proper names is that it allows him to
bring a large class of data under a single generalization. (Church
makes this justification explicit in Chapter 1 of his Introduction
to Mathematical Logic, Vol. 1, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1956), p. 29. There he adopts a Fregean view of
sentences "as a means of simplifying and unifying the theory.")
An additional argument of a similar form can be found in
"Function and Concept," pp. 30-31. There Frege argues that predicates
denote functions. His justification for this analysis is that it
allows the notions of concept and relation to be reduced to the
independently needed notion of a function.
five," nor its Greek equivalent, but rather the thought
that is expressed by these sentences. Since what Plato
believed is true, thoughts, as well as sentences, can
have truth values.
Of course, to say that a thought is true (false) is
not to say that it refers to truth (falsity). Expressions
refer; thoughts do not. This means that the relationship
between a true thought and truth, on the one hand, and
a true sentence and truth, on the other, is not the same.
Since sentences are proper names for Frege, the relation
which the thought that 2 + 3 = 5 bears to truth is
that which holds between the sense of a proper name and
the referent of that name. Although Frege had no name
for this relation, it is clear that it occupied an
important place in his system. The sense of a proper
name is that by which we determine the reference of the
name. In fact, Frege sometimes referred to the sense of
a name as "the mode of presentation" of its referent.14
Thus, whether or not a given sentence refers to truth
depends upon the thought that it expresses.
Let us now turn to some consequences of Frege's
compositional semantics. We have already seen that a
proper name may fail to designate anything; that the
14 In Church's terminology, the sense of a name is "a concept
of" the denotation of the name. Introduction to Mathematical Logic,
Vol. 1, p. 6.
reference of a compound proper name is a function of the
reference of its parts; and that sentences are compound
proper names. From this it follows that a sentence con-
taining a proper name lacking a referent must itself
lack a referent. Such a sentence is truth-valueless.
Consider, for example, a simple sentence of subject/
predicate form. Suppose that the subject lacks a referent
and that the predicate denotes a function f. In such a
case, there is no such thing as the value of f at the
argument designated by the subject for there is no such
argument at all. Hence, the sentence must be truth-
valueless. Of course, this does not mean that it fails
to express a thought, but rather that the thought expressed
is also truth-valueless.
This situation is illustrated by sentence (8).
8. The greatest prime number is odd.
Here the function f denoted by the predicate is one which
assigns the integers 1, 3, 5, 7, ... truth and all
other integers falsity. However, since the.subject of (8)
fails to refer to anything, thereis nothing for f to
assign a truth value. Therefore, (8) fails to have a
truth value.
In this example, we were concerned with a simple
sentence--one which did not contain another sentence as
25
one of its constituents. What about compound sentences?
In particular, what about sentences formed from other
sentences with the help of truth functional connectives?
We can illustrate the relevant facts by concentrating on
'not'.
According to Frege, 'not' is a truth functional
sentential operator. Thus, the truth value of rnot S
is a function of the truth value of S. Since sentences
are proper names for Frege, truth functional sentential
operators are treated in exact analogy with ordinary
predicates. Both take arguments and denote functions into
truth values. In particular, the operator 'not' denotes
a function that takes the truth values truth and falsity
respectively into the values falsity and truth.15 Thus,
if a sentence S lacks a reference--i.e., is truth-
valueless--then rnot S must also lack a referent, since
there is no argument for the function denoted by 'not'
to assign a truth value. Analogous results hold for
each of the other truth functional connectives. What this
means is that reference failure anywhere in a compound
sentence deprives the entire sentence of truth value.1 6
This result has important consequences to which I will
return later on.
15
Frege, "Function and Concept," pp. 33-35.
16Compound sentences with non-truth functional elements also
obey this principle. These sentences will be discussed in Section V.
III. Two Notions of Presupposition
We are now in a position to construct an account of
presupposition from Frege's semantic theory. On this
account presupposition is a logical relation that is
defined in terms of truth value. Central to the account
is the claim'that certain sentences (and thoughts),
together with their negations, are neither true nor
false. The theory of presupposition is an attempt to
explain how this is possible and to predict when such
truth-valuelessness arises.
Frege's'compositional semantics implicitly incorpor-
ates just such a theory. We have seen that for Frege both
sentences and thoughts can be truth-valueless. We have
also been given an account as to when such truth-valueless-
ness arises. All that is needed to turn this into a theory
of presupposition is the notion of a thought T' being a
necessary condition for a sentence S (or thought T) to
17have a truth value. T' is that which is presupposed.
17Textual support for the view that the entities that are
presupposed are thoughts can be found in the passage in "On Sense
and Reference" in which Frege discusses the sentence 'After the
separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria
quarrelled'. He says
"...it is surely sufficiently clear that the sense is not to be
taken as having as a part the thought that Schleswig-Holstein
was once separated from Denmark, but that this [namely the
thought] is the necessary presupposition in order for the expres-
sion 'After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark'
to have any reference at all." (p. 71) (my emphasis)
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S (or T) is that which does the presupposing. A given
sentence (or thought) has a truth value if and only if
all of the thoughts that it presupposes are true.
Actually, there are at least two different notions
of presupposition that can be reconstructed from Frege's
semantics--one pertaining directly to sentences, the
other to thoughts. I will first examine the relation that
holds between sentences and thoughts.
9. Definition 1: Sentential Presupposition
A sentence S presupposes a thought T in a
language L iff the rules of L require that T
be true if S is to have a truth value in L.
To say that the rules of L require that T be true in
order for S to have a truth value is to say that, given
these rules, the truth of T is a necessary condition for
S to be either true or false. Thus, if S presupposes
T in L, then the truth of T follows from a statement of
the rules of L together with the claim that S is either
true or false in L.
The definition of sentential presupposition,
together with the claim that English incorporates a
Fregean semantics, entails the following version of what
I will call "the Frege rule."1 8
18
In a fully developed theory, this rule would have to be modified
28
10. The Frege Rule
For all declarative sentences S of English and
expressions a, if a is a proper name in S, and 8
is the quote name of a, then S presupposes (in
English) the thought expressed by 58 has
S19
a referent (in English)
(11) follows from the Frege rule as a special case.
to take into account the possibility that a proper name might be
ambiguous or might have different referents in different sentences.
One reason for modifying the rule in this way will be discussed in
Section V.
The terminology "the Frege rule" is Sylvain Bromberger's.
'
9The clause stipulating that a is the quote name of a
is needed for a technical reason involving the nature of corner
quotes. Where y is an expression ry has a referen-t is the sentence
that consists of 4 followed by 'has a referent'. If y = 'France', then
ry has a referent is 'France has a referent'. Since expressions,
not countries, have referents, this sentence is false. On the
other hand, if y is the quote name of 'France' (i.e., if y =
"''France''), then ry has a referent' is ''France' has a referent'.
This sentence is true.
We want the Frege rule to provide us with instances like (i).
(i) 'France is a country' presupposes (in English) the
thought expressed by ''France' has a referent (in
English)'.
(10) does this. However, if (10') rather than (10) were adopted, then
(ii) rather than (i) would be an instance of the Frege rule.
10'. For all declarative sentences S of English and expres-
sions a, if a is a proper name in S, then S presupposes
the thought expressed by ra has a referent (in English) .
(ii) 'France is a country' presupposes (in English) the
thought expressed.by 'France has a referent (in English)'.
For this reason, the Frege rule is formulated as (10) rather than
(10').
11. For all sentences S of English and expressions a,
if a is a proper name in S, B is the quote name
of a, and T is the thought expressed by 8
has a referent (in English)', then both S
and rNot S! presuppose T (in English).
Finally, the Fregean semantics of negation yields (12),
which is a central characteristic of virtually all accounts
220of presupposition.
Conditions analogous to (12) follow from Frege's semantics
for other truth functional connectives (e.g., 'and', 'or', 'if
then', and 'if and only if'). This point is independent of another
feature of the theory that I have developed thus far--namely that
all.presupposition failure is traced back ultimately to a failure
of reference on the part of some subsentential constituent. In
fact, the only type of presupposition that Frege was concerned with
was referential presupposition. However, nothing in his central
semantic views dictates that this is the only type of presupposition
that there is. Thus, nothing dictates that all presupposition failure
be traceable back to the failure of some subsentential constituent
to refer.
For example, 'the King of France' lacks a referent even though
the proper name occurring in argument position successfully refers.
On Frege's account this must be due to the failure of the function de-
noted by the 'King of ' to assign its argument a value. Thus,
lack of argument is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for
lack of reference. There is no reason why the same should not
hold for sentences.
One class of sentences that might be treated in this manner are
"factives" like "Ford knows that the earth is flat." If the function
denoted by 'know' is defined only over true propositions, then the
alleged failure of both this sentence and its negation to have a truth
value would be predicted. Although this is not the analysis that Frege
suggests for such sentences, ("On Sense and Reference," pp. 75-76)
there is nothing in his central semantic views that precludes it. Thus,
there is no need for a Fregean to force all presuppositions into a
referential mode.
I am indebted to Sylvain Bromberger for a discussion of this
point.
12. For any sentence S of English and thought T, if
S presupposes T (in English), then so does mot S .
The Fregean theory of sentential presupposition
characterizes a relation that holds between sentences and
thoughts. For example, if English incorporates a Fregean
semantics, then the sentence 'France is a country' pre-
supposes the thought that 'France' has a referent (in
English).21 On this analysis, the sentence 'France is a
country' can have a truth value only if the presupposed
thought is true--i.e., only if 'France' really does refer.
In what follows, I will refer to (9-12) as "Frege's
theory of sentential presupposition" (relativized to
English). If his semantics of English is correct, then
many sentences carry such presuppositions. However, there
is a different presupposition relation that can be recon-
structed from Frege's semantics--one in which the entities
that do the presupposing are thoughts.
13. Definition 2: Propositional Presupposition
A thought T presupposes a thought T' iff the
truth of T' is a necessary condition for T to
have a truth value. 2 2
2 1Here I assume that the rules of English specify that 'France' is
a (Fregean) proper name in 'France is a country'. Thus, the rules re-
ferred to in the definition of sentential presupposition [(9) above]
include the syntactic rules of the language.
2 2Given a propositional presupposition, we could, of course,
31
It should be noted that this definition makes no
mention of what is required by the rules of any language.
This is because, for Frege, thoughts are not linguistic
objects, but rather are what sentences of a language are
used to express. The same thought may be expressed by
sentences of different languages and the logical relations
that hold between thoughts are independent of the sentences
that express them.23
We have already seen that thoughts as well as
sentences can be truth-valueless. Frege's compositional
theory of reference specifies the structure of sentences
and states the conditions under which they are truth-
valueless. What we need to complete our theory of
also define a derivative relation holding between sentences--i.e.,
A sentence S presupposes a sentence S' in a language L
iff S expresses a thought T in L and S' expresses a thought
T' in L and T presupposes T'.
The difference between the various definitions will be pointed out in
the next section.
23According to Frege, sentences enter into logical relations
only in a derivative sense. He makes this clear in "The Thought: A
Logical Inquiry" in Philosophical Logic, edited by P. F. Strawson,
(United States: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.17-3& Here he holds
that
(i) The job of logic is to discover the laws of truth.
(ii). Thoughts are the primary (proper) bearers of truth value.
(iii) To say that a sentence is true is to say that the
thought it expresses is true.
See especially pp. 17-20 in the article.
For comments about the ability of expressions in different
languages to express the same sense, see "On Sense and Reference.,"
pp. 58-59, and "Concept and Object," Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege, eds. Geach and Black, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960),pp.
42-55.
propositional presupposition is a similar account of the
structure of thoughts and a specification of the conditions
under which they are truth-valueless.
Fortunately, the materials for such an account are
ready at hand. Just as sentences are constructed out of
expressions, so, Frege maintains, thoughts are constructed
24
out of senses of expressions. Similarly, just as the
relationship between a Fregean proper name and its referent
is the key to understanding sentential presupposition, so the
relationship between the sense of a proper name and the re-
ferent of that name is basic to the Fregean theory of proposi-
tional: presupposition. Consider, for example, the expression
'the only even prime number'. For Frege, this is a
24
"The world of thoughts has a model in the world of sentences,
expressions, words, signs. To the structure of a thought
there corresponds the compounding of words into a
sentence ("Negation," p. 123)."
"For not all parts of a thought can be complete; at least
one must be 'unsaturated', or predicative; otherwise they
would not hold together. For example, the sense of the
phrase 'the number 2' does not hold together with that of
the expression 'the concept prime number' without a link.
We apply such a link in the sentence 'The number 2 falls
under the concept prime number'; it is contained in the words
'falls under' which need to be completed in two ways--by a
subject and an accusative; and only because their sense
is thus 'unsaturated' are they capable of serving as a
link. Only when they have been supplemented in this
twofold respect do we get a complete sense, a thought
("Concept and Object," p. 54)."
See also "Negation," in Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,
eds. Geach and Black, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. 117-136.
proper name that has a sense--S--and a referent--2.
S, in effect, "picks out" or "presents" the referent.
It is in virtue of the fact that the name expresses S
that it refers to the number 2.
This point can be made perfectly general. A
proper name a refers to an object 0 iff a expresses a
sense that presents or picks out 0. Moreover, what
object is picked out by a sense does not depend upon
which name expresses it. Consequently, two names with the
same sense must always refer to the same object; however,
a single object may be designated by names with different
25
senses. In fact, a sense may pick out an object even
if there is no linguistic constitutent which expresses it.
Thus, according to Frege, the sense of 'the only even
prime number' must have picked out 2 long before people
began speaking languages at all.26
Finally, it should be pointed out that for Frege,
the sense of the proper name 'the only even prime number'
is not the same as the sense of any predicate. Frege
believed that senses of proper names are different in kind
25Frege, "On Sense and Reference,".p. 58.
26This follows from the fact that for Frege thoughts (and
hence their constituents) are "timeless, eternal, and unchanging"
(Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," p. 37).
Also see Frege, "Negation," p. 134.
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from senses of predicate expressions. The former he called
"complete," the latter "incomplete." For example, the
thought that the only even prime is less than three is a
complete sense which is somehow composed out of the
incomplete sense of the predicate and the complete sense
of the subject.27
We can now formulate a Frege rule that applies
to thoughts.
14. The Frege Rulet
For all thoughts T and complete senses S,
if S is a proper constituent of T, and T'
is a thought the truth of which is a necessary
and sufficient condition for S to pick out
28(present) a referent,then T presupposes T'.
27
For Frege, the only expressions with complete senses are
proper names. See Frege, "Concept and Object," especially pp. 54-55.
2 8Frege Rulet could also be stated this way:
For all thoughts T and complete senses S, if S is a proper
constituent of T, and T' is a thought that is true in all and
only those possible worlds in which S picks out or presents
a referent, then T presupposes T'.
A consequence of the Frege Rule t is that it is possible for a thought
to have a truth value only if each of the complete senses that it con-
tains presents a referent. Thus, it might seem that the rule could
be stated more directly as (14').
14'. For all thoughts T and complete senses S, if S is a
proper constituent of T, then T presupposes the thought
that S presents a referent.
Unfortunately, (14') is ill-formed. To understand it, we must
The analogues of (11) and (12) in the case of propositional
presupposition are (15) and (16).
make sense of expressions of the form (i).
(i) For all N, x, the thought that X ... (where 'N' stands
in the place of nouns like 'senses', 'men', etc)
However, we can't make sense of such expressions. For example, we
cannot make sense of (ii).
(ii) For all men, x, the thought that x is a philosopher...
In (ii) we are purportedly quantifying over men. What then is the
thought that x is a philosopher for Frege as value?
Note, Frege = the author of "On Sense and Reference" = the
founder of the predicate calculus. Thus, if it makes sense to talk
about the thought that x is a philosopher (where the value of
'x' is an individual man), then the thought that x is a philosopher
must be the same for Frege, the author of "On Sense and Reference" and
the founder of the predicate calculus as values. What is this
thought? Is it (iii), (iv), or (v)?
(iii) Frege is a philosopher.
(iv) The author of "On Sense and Reference" is a philosopher.
(v) The founder of the predicate calculus is a philosopher.
There is no clear answer to this question. Each of these thoughts
might be said to be about Frege (and hence to be about the author
of "On Sense and Reference" and the founder of the predicate calculus).
Thus, we might admit that each thought says of Frege (the author of
"On Sense and Reference" and the founder of the predicate calculus)
that he is a philosopher. However, none is the thought that x is
a philosopher for Frege as value, just as none is the thought that
x is a philosopher for the author of "On Sense and Reference" as
value. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Richard
Cartwright, "Identity and Substitutivity," Identity and Individuation,
ed. Milton K. Munitz, (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp.
129-133.
This suggests that constructions of the form (i) are ill-formed.
Since (14') contains a construction of this form, it must be rejected.
For this reason, I have formulated the Frege Rulet as (14) rather than
(14').
Note, it would not help to replace 'the thought that S presents
a referent' in (14') with 'every thought to the effect that S presents
a referent'. Although we might be able to make sense of a rule formu-
lated in this way, such a rule would be incorrect. Not every thought
that S presents a referent is a necessary condition for a thought con-
taining S to be either true or false. For example, the thought expressed
by (vi) could have been true even if the thought expressed by (vii)
36
15. For all thoughts T and complete senses S, if
S is a proper constituent of T, and T' is a
thought the truth of which is a necessary and
sufficient condition for S to pick out (present)
a referent, then both T and the negation of T
presuppose T'.
16. For any thoughts T and T', if T presupposes T',
then so does the negation of T.29
The Fregean theory of propositional presupposition
characterizes a relation that holds between thoughts.
For example, according to Frege, (17) expresses a
complete sense S that is a proper constituent of the
thought expressed by (18).
17. The founder of the predicate calculus
18. The founder of the predicate calculus was a
great philosopher.
had been false.
(vi) The thirty-eighth President of the United States is a
Republican.
(vii) The sense of the subject of (vi) of footnote 28 of this
paper presents a referent.
A Republican could have been President even if I had never written
this footnote.
29
S2 9imilar conditions hold for conjunctions, disjunctions,
conditionals, and biconditionals.
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A necessary and sufficient condition for S to pick out a
referent is for exactly one person to have founded the
predicate calculus.30 Consequently, the Frege Rulet
predicts that the thought expressed by (18) presupposes
the thought expressed by (19).
19. Exactly one person founded the predicate
calculus.
According to Frege, the truth of this thought is a
necessary condition for the thought expressed by (18)
to be either true or false. 31
.30S picks out a person in a possible world W if and only if
that person (and that person alone) founded the predicate calculus
in W.
313 Before leaving this section, I should point out two facts
about the theory of propositional presupposition reconstructed
here. First, the definition of propositional presupposition has
the consequence that every thought trivially presupposes all
necessary truths. Second, although Frege Rulet is not formulated
to predict that necessary truths are presupposed, it does predict
that if T presupposes T', and T'' is logically equivalent to T',
then T presupposes T''. Thus, Frege Rulet predicts that the thought
expressed by (17) presupposes the thought expressed by (i).
(i) Exactly one person founded the predicate calculus and
everything is self-identical.
In this paper, I will not be concerned with these two features of
the Fregean theory.
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IV. Frege's Explicit Remarks on Presupposition
One advantage of distinguishing two different rela-
tions of presupposition is that it allows us to make sense
of some of Frege's explicit remarks. Although he does not
offer a formal definition of presupposition, he does mention
the notion in certain passages. The place where he talks
about presupposition most explicitly and at greatest
length is in the famous section in "On Sense and Reference"
where-he considers sentence (20).32
20. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery.
According to Frege, this sentence says of a certain
man that he died in misery. (21) must therefore be a
proper name that designates Kepler.
21. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits
The problem that worried Frege was that (21) is a subordinate
32
The translation of Frege's sentence into English is somewhat
problematic. The key point is that the subject in (20) is to be
taken as having the force of a singular definite description. This
is clear in German.
"Der die elliptische Gestalt der Planeten bahen entdeckte,
starb in Elend."
clause. Thus, one might think that, like other subordinate
clauses that he examines in the essay, it designates
either a truth value or a thought. Frege argues that
this is not so.
He first suggests that (21) doesn't express a
thought because "The grammatical subject 'whoever' has
no independent sense and only mediates the relation with
the consequent clause 'died in misery.' "33  However, he
realizes that this observation is not enough, since
"One might object that the sense of the whole [i.e.,
(20)1 does contain a thought as its part, viz that there
was somebody who discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits; for whoever takes the whole to be
true cannot deny this part. 34  It is in response to this
objection that Frege explicitly invokes the notion of
presupposition.
This is undoubtedly so: [i.e., that one cannot affirm (20)
and deny that someone discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits] but only because otherwise the dependent
clause 'whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary
orbits' would have no reference. If anything is asserted
there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or
compound proper names used have reference. If one therefore
asserts [(22)]
[22.] Kepler died in misery.
there is a presupposition that the name 'Kepler' designates
something; but it does not follow that the sense of the
33
Frege., "On Sense and Reference," p. 69.
34Ibid.
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sentence 'Kepler died in misery' contains the thought that
the name 'Kepler' designates something. If this were the
case, the negation would have to run not
[23.] Kepler did not die in misery
but
(24.1 Kepler did not die in misery, or the name 'Kepler'
has no reference.35
Frege regards this consequence as absurd. Thus, he concludes
that the thought expressed by (22) does not contain the
thought that 'Kepler' has a referent.
Frege runs a similar argument for (20).
Now languages have the fault of containing expressions which
fail to designate an object (although their grammatical form
seems to qualify them for that purpose) because the truth of
some sentence is a prerequisite. Thus, it depends on the truth
of the sentence:
(25.] There was someone who discovered the elliptic form
of the planetary orbits
whether the subordinate clause
[21.] Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits
really designates an object or only seems to do so while having
in fact no reference. And thus it may appear as if our
subordinate clause contained as a part of its sense the thought
that there was somebody who discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits. If this were right the negation would run:
[26.] Either whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits did not die in misery or there
was nobody who discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits.36
Since he also regards this consequence as absurd, Frege
concludes that the thought expressed by (20) does not
35Ibid
Ibid.
36 Ibid, pp. 69-70.
contain the thought that there was someone who discovered
the elliptic form of the planetary orbits.
Later I will evaluate this argument and ask whether
the data that Frege cites establishes the need for positing
a relation of presupposition. For the present, however,
I wish only to determine what sort of presupposition
he is talking about.
The two examples we are given are:
27. a. Kepler died in misery.
b. The name 'Kepler' has a referent (in
English).
28. a. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits died in misery.
b. Someone discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits.
Each of these pairs is supposed to be an instance of
presupposition. However, there is something odd about this.
What is presupposed in (27) says something about language--
in particular about the name 'Kepler'. In (28), on the
other hand, the presupposed thought says nothing about
language, but rather makes a claim about the non-linguis-
tic world. How can this be?
The problematic instance here seems to be (28). Early
in the passage Frege says that "If anything is asserted
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there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple
or compound proper names used have reference."37
(27) is an example of just this sort. Thus, what we
expect in the second case is not (28b) but (28c).
28. c. The expression 'whoever discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits'
has a referent (in English).
It is important to realize that the thoughts
expressed by (28b) and (28c) are not equivalent. Surely
someone (e.g., Kepler) could have discovered that the
planets have elliptic orbits even if the expression
(21) had never existed. Thus, the thought expressed by
(28b) does not entail the thought expressed by (28c);
nor is there an entailment in the other direction.
Imagine a possible world W just like the actual world ex-
cept that in W the English word 'elliptic' means 'circular';
and the planets have circular orbits. Suppose further that
in W there is someone who discovered the circular form of
the planetary orbits. Since 'whoever discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits' means the same thing
in W as 'whoever discovered the circular form of the plane-
tary orbits' does in the actual world, the former designates
37Ibid, p. 69.
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something in W and the thought expressed by (28c)
is true in W. However, there is no one who discovered
the elliptic form of the planetary orbits in W since, by
hypothesis, the planets have circular orbits in that world.
Thus, the thought expressed by (28c) does not entail the
thought expressed by (28b).
The principle upon which this argument is based is
trivial but true. The connection between a linguistic
38
expression and its meaning is contingent. The word
'elliptic' could have had a sense and reference different
from the sense and reference that it actually has. Thus,
the truth of the thought expressed by (28b) is not a
necessary (or sufficient) condition for the truth of the
thought expressed by (28c); nor should this be surprising.
Since the thought expressed by (28b) is about non-linguistic
reality, we should not expect it to have significant
consequences for linguistic facts.
We are left then with our original question. Why is
there a discrepancy between Frege's two examples of
presupposition? It may be that he failed to noticed the
difference between (28b) and (28c), or that he thought them
equivalent. If so, his mistake was an uncharacteristic one.
38This is evidenced by the fact that individual words in
English sometimes undergo a cha~ge in meaning and that different
speakers of English sometimes assign different senses to individual
words or phrases.
He begins "On Sense and Reference" by distinguishing
sentences like (29) and (30).
29. The morning star is the evening star.
30. 'The morning star' is coreferential with
'the evening star'.
He recognizes the former to be about the world and to
express genuine non-linguistic knowledge. He holds the
latter to be about signs and to express "no proper
knowledge."3 9 It follows that on his view (29) and (30)
are not equivalent. Consequently, his failure to distin-
guish (27) and (28) in talking about presupposition is
surprising.
What happened, I think, is that in the passages
quoted above, Frege uncritically slipped back and forth
between the notions of sentential and propositional
presupposition. (27) [but not (28)] is an instance of
sentential presupposition. (28) (but not (27)] is an
instance of propositional presupposition. Let's see why
this is so.
27. a. Kepler died in misery.
b. The name 'Kepler' has a referent (in English).
28. a. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery.
b. Someone discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits.
"On Sense and Reference," p. 57.39Frege ,Frege,
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First consider sentential presupposition. The sentence
(27a) presupposes (in English) the thought expressed by (27b).
This follows automatically from Frege's semantics and is pre-
dicted by the sentential version of the Frege rule. (28), on
the other hand, is not predicted by this rule. Moreover, even
if we suppose that English incorporates a Fregean semantics,
the truth of the thought expressed by (28b) is not
required in order for sentence (28a) to have a truth value.
All that is necessary is for (21) to have a referent.
21. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits
We have already seen that this could have been the case even
if no one had discovered the elliptic form of the planetary
orbits. Thus, sentence (28a) does not presuppose the thought
expressed by (28b).40
Next consider propositional presupposition. Surely
Kepler could have died in misery even if he hadn't been
named 'Kepler'. He could have died in misery even if nothing
had been named 'Kepler'. Consequently, the thought expressed
by (27b) is not a necessary condition for the truth, let
40This argument assumes that the rules of language mentioned in
the definition of sentential presupposition [(9)] include Frege's
compositional semantic principles, but not individual rules specifying
the meaning of particular vocabulary items. Frege's semantics
requires proper names to have referents in order for sentences
containing them to have a truth value. It does not specify the sense
and reference of syntactically simple expressions. The main reason
for making this assumption is that it allows me to pinpoint the-
source of Frege's confusion regarding (27) and (28).
alone the truth'or falsity of the thought expressed by (27a).
Therefore, (27) is not an instance of propositional presup-
position. All that remains to be shown is that (28) is.
Let S be the sense of (21). Although S is expressed
by (21), we can consider S irrespective of which expression
might, in some possible world, be used to express it. S
picks out someone in any such world if and only if that
person (and that person alone) discovered the elliptic
form of the planetary orbits in that world. Thus, the
thought expressed by (31) is true in all and only those
worlds in which S picks out a referent. The truth of this
thought is a necessary and sufficient condition for S
to pick out a referent.
31. Exactly one person discovered the elliptic
form of the planetary orbits.
Consequently, Frege Rulet predicts that the thought
expressed by (28a) presupposes the thought expressed by
(31). 'Since the thought expressed by (31) entails the
thought expressed by (28b), and since the set of pre-
suppositions of a thought is closed under entailment, 41
41Here and throughout I use 'entails' in the same way that Van
Frassen uses 'necessitates'.
entails
A thought T (ct a thought T' iff the truth of T' isnecessitates
a necessary condition for the truth of T.
This definition together with the definition of propositional pre-
supposition has the consequence that the set of presuppositions of
a thought is closed under entailment--i.e., if T1 presupposes T2 , and
T2 entails T3, then T1 presupposes T3.
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the thought expressed by (28a) also presupposes the
thought expressed by (28b). Thus, (28a,b) is an instance
of propositional presupposition. 42
What this analysis shows is that the apparent confusion
in Frege's explicit remarks results from failing to
distinguish two different but closely related notions of
presupposition. Although both notions are implicit in his
semantics, Frege never formalized them and consequently
ran them together. 43
42
It should also be clear that (28) but not (27) is an
instance of the derivative notion of presupposition defined in
footnote 22.
43Another passage in which this happened is the following:
"The sense of the sentence 'After Schleswig-Holstein was separated
from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled' can also be rendered
in the form 'After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from
Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled.' In this version it is
surely sufficiently clear that the sense is not to be taken as
having as a part the thought that Schleswig-Holstein was once
separated from Denmark, but that this [i.e., the thought] is
the necessary presupposition in order for the expression 'after the
separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark' to have any
reference at all." (Frege, "On Sense and Reference," p. 71)
(my emphasis)
Here in talking about expressions, Frege puts himself on the linguistic
level. However, what he claims to be presupposed is not a necessary
condition for the expression to have a referent, but rather for the
thought in question to have a truth value. In short, in specifying
the entity that does the presupposing, Frege here seems to have in mind
sentential presupposition; however, the presupposition he gives arises
from propositional presupposition.
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It should not be thought, however, that because
Frege failed to distinguish these two notions that only
one of them is truly Fregean. If his semantics is
correct, then there can be no question as to which relation
is "real" or which theory is correct. Of course, Frege
did hold that thoughts are the primary bearers of truth
value and that sentences are either true or false only
derivatively. Consequently, he would probably have
claimed that thoughts are the primary bearers of
presupposition and that the most significant notion of
presupposition is propositional. Still, if his semantics
is correct, then both sentential and propositional theories
of presupposition are also correct and both relations
have many instances. In comparing the two theories, we
must simply take care not to confuse them.44
Let L be a language for which a Fregean semantics holds,
and let L* be the set of thoughts expressed by the language. Since
both theories of presupposition are constructed from the same
semantics, any phenomena about L (or L*) that can be explained by
one theory can be explained by the other, together with a specifica-
tion of which expressions express which senses. Consequently,
there can be no question of a Fregean accepting one theory and
rejecting the other.
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V. Customary Reference, Indirect Reference, and
Presupposition
One aspect of Frege's semantics about which I have
so far said nothing is his theory of oblique contexts
and his distinction between customary and indirect
reference. An example of an oblique context is provided
by the verb 'believe'.
32. Frege believed that the universal set
contains every set.
Sentences like this are a problem for the theory of
presupposition that we have developed thus far. The
problem is that (32) is true. However, since there is
no universal set, it might seem that the proper name 'the
universal set' lacks a referent in this sentence, and hence,
that Frege's semantic theory must incorrectly characterize
(32), and the thought expressed by it, as truth-valueless.
As we shall see, Frege's distinction between direct
and indirect reference allows him to avoid this incorrect
prediction. For him, an oblique context is one in which
expressions refer not to what they normally designate, but
45
rather to their customary senses. Thus, the referent of
45Frege, "On Sense and Reference," pp. 59; 65-67.
Frege, "On Sense and Reference," pp. 59; 65-67.
50
'the 38th President of the United States' in (33) is not
the same as its referent in (34).
33. The 38th President of the United States is a
Republican.
34. Many people believe that the 38th President of
the United States is a Republican.
In (33), the proper name carries its customary sense and
refers to its customary referent--Gerald Ford. In (34),
according to Frege, it designates its customary sense,
which is said to be its indirect or oblique referent.
Frege never mentioned presupposition as motivating
the- distinction between customary and indirect reference.
He had, however, several independent reasons for making
this distinction. First, he held that what (34) reports
to be believed is not a sentence, but a thought. Thus,
the sentential complement in (34) must somehow be seen as
making reference to its own sense. Because of this, it
was natural for him to conclude that the constituents of
the complement also designate their own senses.
Second, the distinction between customary and indirect
reference is important for Frege's theory of compositional
semantics. According to this theory, the referent of a
compound proper name (and in particular the truth value of
a sentence) is a function of the reference of
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its parts. However, consider sentences
like (35-37).
35. Jones believes that the head of the Mafia is a
criminal.
36. Jones' neighbor is the head of the Mafia.
37. Jones believes that his neighbor is a criminal.
If 'the head of the Mafia' had its customary reference
in (35) and (37), then Frege's compositional principle
would incorrectly predict that the truth of (35) and (36)
is a sufficient condition for the truth of (37).46 Frege
avoids this falsehood by postulating that the referents
of the proper names in the complements of (35) and (37)
are their customary senses. Thus, according to Frege,
substitution of synonymous expressions is guaranteed to
preserve truth value in oblique contexts; substitution
of expressions with the same customary reference is not.47
46I am following Frege here in considering only the opaque
interpretation of these sentences.
47
Although Frege did not explicitly offer this argument, he
clearly grasped the essential issue (Frege, "On Sense and Reference,"
pp. 67-68). Further, it should not be thought that his distinction
between customary and indirect reference was merely an expedient to
handle apparent cases in which substitution of coreferential expres-
sions fails to preserve truth value. Frege recognized that there are
contexts in which such substitution fails even though the expressions
in question carry their customary sense and reference. For example,
although (i), (ii), and (iii) are true, substitution of (iii) for
One consequence of Frege's view is that when we
speak of the reference of an expression, we must relativize
our remarks to particular contexts. There simply is no
such thing as the referent of 'the 38th President of the
United States'. Instead, we must speak of at least two
different designata--its direct and indirect referents.
This in turn requires a slight modification in the
statement of Frege's theory of sentential presupposition.
38. The Frege Rule
For all declarative sentences S of English
and expressions a, if a is a proper name in S,
a is the quote name of a, and S' is the quote
name of S, then S presupposes (in English)
the thought expressed by r8 has a referent (in
English) in the sentence s1. 48
(ii). in (i) does not preserve truth.
(i) Because ice is less dense than water, it floats on water.
(ii) Ice is less dense than water.
(iii) Iron is denser than water.
(iv) Because iron is denser than water, it floats on water.
Nevertheless, Frege maintained that the expressions in (i) and (iv)
occur with their customary sense and reference (For Frege's account
of these sentences, see Frege, "On Sense and Reference," pp. 76-78).
The objects of propositional attitudes, on the other hand, were regarded
to be thoughts on independent grounds (See Frege, "The Thought: A
Logical Inquiry").
48(38) provides us with instances like (i) and (ii).
(i) 'Transylvania is a country' presupposes (in English) the
thought expressed by ''Transylvania' has a referent (in
English) in the sentence 'Transylvania is a country'.'
(ii) 'Many people believe that Transylvania is a country' pre-
This modification of. the Frege rule, together with Frege's
distinction between direct and indirect reference, allows
him to account for (32). According to the modified
Frege Rule s, what sentence (32) presupposes is not that
'the universal set' has a referent, but rather that it has
a referent in (32). This presupposition is satisfied since
in this context 'the universal set' designates its customary
sense. Thus, for Frege, sentences of the form 'A believes
that ...a...' have presuppositions, but their presupposi-
tions are guaranteed not to fail.4 9
In the case of thoughts the situation is slightly
different. In "On Sense and Reference" Frege holds that
in addition to a distinction between customary and indirect
reference, there is also a distinction between customary and
indirect sense. For example, he says that
The case of an abstract noun clause, introduced by 'that',
includes the case of indirect quotation, in which we have seen
the words to have their indirect reference coinciding with
what is customary their sense. In this case, then, the
subordinate clause has for its reference a thought, not a
truth value; as sense not a thought but the sense of the words
'the thought that ...' which is only a part of the thought
supposes (in English) the thought expressed by
"Transylvania' has a referent (in English) in the
sentence 'Many people believe that Transylvania is
a country'.'
According to Frege's semantics, the presupposed thought is true in (ii)
and false in (i).
49Except for the presupposition that the subject of 'believe'
has a reference.
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in the entire complex sentence.50
(my emphasis)
If the indirect sense of an expression is distinct from
its customary sense, then there is no need to relativize
the notion of the referent presented by a sense to the context
in which the sense occurs. Thus, there is no need to
modify the propositional version of the Frege rule.
On the other hand, it might be claimed that there
really is no distinction between direct and indirect
sense. If so, then the sense of an expression in an
oblique context like (32) must be seen as presenting
itself. On this view, the propositional version of the
Frege rule would have to be modified in just the way that
the sentential version was. Hwoever, whether or not one
distinguishes between customary and indirect sense,
the basic fact about presupposition and propositional
attitudes remains. For Frege, the thought expressed by
a sentence of the form 'A believes that ... ' has presup-
positions, but its presuppositions are guaranteed not
to fail. 51
50Frege, "On Sense and Reference," p. 66. See also pp. 74,
77-78.
51Again, with the exception of the presupposition corresponding
to the subject of the verb 'believe'.
PART 2
PRESUPPOSITION AND ASSERTION
VI. Presupposition and Assertion
If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition
that the simple or compound proper names used have reference. If
one therefore asserts 'Kepler died in misery,' there is a presup-
position that the name 'Kepler' designates something.. 52
In this passage, Frege uses the notion of assertion
about which I have so far said nothing. Several philsophers
have taken the passage as indicating that, for Frege, acts
of asserting a thought or assertively uttering a sentence
are the entities that do the presupposing.53  Since
acts are different from both sentences and thoughts, it
might seem that this interpretation must inevitably conflict
with my own. This is not so. The interpretation of Frege
presented thus far is capable of accommodating acts of
assertion as bearers of presupposition. However, I would
hold that such acts presuppose thoughts only in a derivative
sense. Given sentential and propositional presupposition,
we can define the notions applying to assertion as follows:
5252Frege, "On Sense and Reference," p. 69.
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e.g., Max Black, "Presupposition and Implication," Models and
Metaphors, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), and Richard
Garner, "'Presuppositions' in Philosophy and Linguistics," Studies in.
Linguistic Semantics, edited by Charles J. Fillmore and D. Terence
Langendoen, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), pp. 23-44.
39. An act of assertively uttering a sentence S
presupposess a thought T iff S presupposes T.
40. An act of asserting a thought T presupposes t a
thought T', iff T presupposes T'.
Not all interpreters of Frege would be happy with
this account. Black and Garner, for example, seem to
hold that acts of assertion presuppose thoughts (or "states
of affairs") in some primary sense and that the penalty
for presupposition failure is that no assertion gets made.5 4
Black sums up his interpretation by saying that "when
the presupposition is not the case, we have no assertion,
but only the utterance of a form of words . .. "55 This
consequence is not predicted by (39) and (40).
There is no reason to accept the interpretation given
by Black and Garner. For one thing, the view they
attribute to Frege is patently false. Imagine a student
ignorant of Russell's paradox assertively uttering, "The
set of all (and only) non-self-membered sets has many
members." Are we to say, on the grounds that there is no
such set (or on the grounds that 'the set of all (and
only) non-self-membered sets' does not have a referent),
54For closely related views, see J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), and D. Terence Langendoen and Harris
B. Savin, "The Projection Problem for Presupposition," Studies in
Linguistic Semantics, pp.55-62.
5 5Black, "Presupposition and Implication," p. 51.
that the student has failed to assert anything--i.e.,
that he has made no statement and hence claimed nothing
at all? Of course not. To be sure he has failed to
say something true. If Frege is correct, he has failed
to say anything which is either true or false. But this
just shows that it is possible to assert a proposition
which, on Frege's view, is truth-valueless.
There is no indication that Frege would have denied
this. Aside from the passage quoted above, I know of no
textual evidence which supports Black and Garner. Moreover,
the above passage can easily be interpreted without claiming
that,, for Frege, presupposition failure results in there
being no assertion at all. What he wanted to explain was
why, even though the thought expressed by (28a) does not
contain the thought expressed by (28b), one cannot affirm
the former and deny the latter.
28. a. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits died in misery.
b. Someone discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits.
His explanation was that the former thought presupposes
rather than contains the latter and that anyone who
asserts a thought is thereby committed to that which is
required in order for it to be true. Here, the reference
to assertion is simply to rule out instances like those
in which a person merely entertains a thought, puts forth
a thought by way of giving an example, or presents a
thought in the way that an actor does in performing a
play. A commitment to that which is presupposed comes
about when one has undertaken a commitment to that which
does the presupposing. This is precisely what happens
in the case of assertion. 56
Why, then, have some interpreters of Frege been led
to erroneous views about the consequences of presuppo-
sition failure? One factor may be an uncertainty about
what he means when he says that one thought does not
contain another. Since the thought expresed by (28a)
conveys the information expressed by (28b), it might seem
that the former thought must somehow include the latter.
However, according to Frege, the thought expressed by
(28a) does not have the form (41).57
It should be clear that we can construct a notion of a
speaker's presupposition from the notions of presupposition we have
already defined--e.g.,
A speaker S presupposes a thought T iff S asserts a thought T'
which presupposes T.
It also does not have the form (i) or (ii).
(i) Exactly one person discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits, and he died in misery.
(ii) At least one person discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits and at most one person discovered the ellip-
tic form of the planetary orbits and each person who disco-
vered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in
misery.
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41. Someone discovered the elliptic form of. the
planetary orbits and he died in misery.
Hence, the information expressed in (28b) is not present
as one conjunct of a conjunction. How, then, is it included?
Some theorists have resolved this question by
attributing to Frege a complex view of the nature of
thoughts. On this view, the thought expressed by (28a)
does contain a constituent thought. However, the thought
expressed)by (28a) is divided into two components--one
which constitutes the presupposition (i.e., the thought
that exactly one person discovered the elliptic form
of the planetary orbits) and one which constitutes the
assertion (i.e., the claim that this individual died
in misery). According to this interpretation, the two
components are not on a par. If a sentence is negated,
what is negated is not the entire thought that it expresses,
but only the assertion. The two components also play
different roles in determining the content of what is said.
The presupposition, though not contributing to the
assertion, is said to be a necessary condition for an
utterance of the sentence to succeed in making any
assertion at all.
In recent years this view has become very influential.
For many theorists it has provided the model for under-
standing presupposition.58 For example, a sentence like
(42) has commonly been assumed to assert the thought
expressed by (43) and presuppose the thought expressed
by (44).
42. Sam stopped smoking on January 1st.
43. After January ist, Sam did not smoke.
44. Before January ist, Sam smoked.
If the thought expressed by (44) is true, then assertive-
ly uttering (42) is said to make the assertion expressed
by (43). However, if the thought expressed by (44) is
untrue, then assertively uttering (42) is supposed to
make no assertion whatsoever.
Application of this model to sentences like (45)
yields similar results.
45. The man in the next room is a philosopher.
If there is exactly one man in the next room, then an
assertive utterance of (45) is supposed to make the
assertion that he is a philosopher. However, if there
is not exactly one man in the next room, then such an
utterance fails to assert anything.
58
For example, see: Charles Fillmore, "Types of Lexical
Information," Studies in Syntax and Semantics, edited by F. Kiefer,
(Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1969) and "Verbs of Judging: An
Exercise in Semantic Description," Studies in Linguistic Semantics;
D.T. Langendoen and H.B. Savin, "The Projection Problem for Presuppo-
sitions;" and J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory.
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In addition to adopting this model, some theorists
have attributed it to Frege. Jerrold J. Katz apparently
59takes this view. According to him, Frege holds that
sentences like (27a) express thoughts which
contain a condition that referential occurrences of
names designate and that this condition is not part of their
assertion. In the case of. [27a], the presuppositional condition
is that the occurrence of the name "Kepler" has a referent, and
the assertion (whose statement depends on "Kepler" having. a
referent) is no more than that the referent is someone who
died in misery.60
Katz says that he is adopting a position close to Frege's
in holding that "The presupposition of an assertion
will be taken to be a condition found in the meaning
of the sentence expressing the proposition.'61
Katz presents this doctrine as an alternative to
Russell's theory of definite descriptions. On this
theory (again quoting Katz),
I say 'apparently' because the section in Semantic
Theory on presupposition is unclear in certain respects. For
example, in some passages, Katz says that assertions carry
presuppositions. In others he seems to indicate that the
bearer of presuppositions is the entire proposition, of which
the assertion is only a part. Similarly, it is not clear to
me whether he means that presupposition failure results in
there being no assertion at all or only in there being no
assertion which is either true or false.
60Katz, Semantic Theory, p. 129.
61Ibid, p. 130.
. . . sentences of the form 'The so-and-so is P' are to be
understood as a conjunction with essentially three conjuncts:
'There is something which -is a so-and-so', 'It is unique in
being a so-and-so', and 'It has the property P'. . . Sentence
[46] is regarded as the assertion (47], while [48] is regarded
as the assertion [49] .62
46. The present King of France is bald.
47. There is something which is a present King of
France and which is unique in being such
and which is bald.
48. The President of the United States is under
six feet tall.
49. There is something which is a president of the
United States and which is unique in being such
and which is under six feet tall.
Frege, on the other hand, is said to hold that, in the
case of a sentence like (46)
. . . the existence of an individual who is unique in being
king of France at the time of the utterance is logically prior
to and taken for granted in the statement, which is the
assertion that that individual is bald. If there is no such
individual, then there is no such statement since there is no
one of whom the predication "is bald" or "is not bald" can
hold.63
Finally, Katz claims that
A Fregean analysis says that the three conjuncts that form
"separate but equal" components in a Russellian analysis . . .
are ordered. They are not each on a par with one another as
62 Ibid, p. 131.
6 3Ibid
.
individual clauses in the formulation of the truth conditions;
rather, the first two components, the existential and the
uniqueness clauses, jointly comprise a condition that is
ordered logically prior to the third component, the predicative
clause, and forms the condition under which it can express a
true or false assertion.64
In a moment I will argue that this is an inaccurate
interpretation of Frege. At this time, however, one
problem with it should be noted. Katz seems to maintain
that the assertion component of a thought is separate
from its presupposition component. He also seems to hold
that what one asserts by assertively uttering a sentence
S is the assertion component of the thought expressed
by S.. One consequence of this view is that there is
often no way of saying what assertion is made by assertive-
ly uttering a given sentence (i.e., for many sentences S
there is no sentence S' that expresses that which one
asserts when one assertively utters S).
For example, what is the assertion made by asser-
tively uttering (48)?
48. The President of the United States is under
six feet tall.
It cannot be the thought that is expressed by this sentence
64Ibid, p. 132-133. Additional passages which indicate
that Katz interprets Frege as proposing a division of thoughts into
presupposition and assertion components can be found on pages 135,
136, and 141 of Semantic Theory.
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since this thought includes both presupposition and
assertion. Katz tells us that the existence and unique-
ness claims contained in this thought are not part of
the assertion component, but rather constitute presup-
positions. Thus, the only remaining candidates for the
assertion seem to be those expressed by 'is under six
feet tall', 'X is under six feet tall', and 'He is
under six feet tall'.
The first two of these are not complete sentences
of English and do not express thoughts. The third
appears to be more promising. However, it is indefinite
and in need of supplementation. Presumably, it won't do
to say that a speaker who assertively utters (48) makes
the same assertion as a speaker who assertively utters
(50)--namely the assertion that he is under six feet tall.
50. The governor of California is under six feet tall.
However, if we claim that assertively uttering (48) and
(50) respectively make the assertions that the President
of the United States is under six feet tall and that the
governor of California is under six feet tall, then we
will have come full circle, having again lumped assertion
and presupposition together.
One possible response to this difficulty is suggested
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by an early view of Russell's. On this view, people (and
other objects in the "real" world) are constituents of
certain propositions. Thus, one might define the notion
of the assertion corresponding to a sentence (of the form 'The
so-and-so is P') as consisting of the so-and-so (the
actual object) together with the sense of the predicate
expression. Presupposition failure would then result
in there being no assertion at all in this sense, because
if there were no so-and-so, then one of the constituents
necessary to make up the assertion would be missing.
Whatever the merits of this view, it is clearly
not Fregean. For Frege, thoughts do not contain objects
as constituents, but are made up entirely of senses.
Thus, such newly defined "assertions" could be neither
Fregean thoughts nor parts of such thoughts. Moreover,
on the view just outlined, it would be necessary to
distinguish between the newly defined notion of the
assertion corresponding to a sentence and our ordinary notion
of assertion. For example, there is no assertion,in
the sense just defined, corresponding to the sentence,
"The set of all (and only) non-self-membered sets has
many members." Nevertheless, the thought expressed by
this sentence may be the content of an assertion--i.e.,
it is possible to assert that the set of all (and only)
non-self-membered sets has many members. But then it is
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hard to see that the new notion of assertion does any
work at all.
This can be made clearer by contrasting the above
erroneous interpretation with Frege's actual analysis.
The fact which gave rise to the interpretation was that
thoughts like those expressed by (28a) and (48) convey
the information present in (51) and (52) respectively.
28. a. Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery.
48. The President of the United States is under
six feet tall.
51. Exactly one person discovered the elliptic form
of the planetary orbits.
52. There is exactly one president of the United
States.
What made this seem problematic was Frege's contention that
the former thoughts do not contain the latter. The above
interpretation resolved this apparent difficulty by
claiming that the thoughts expressed by (51) and (52) are
parts of the thoughts expressed by (28a) and (48). However,
since they are presuppositions, they are not contained in
the assertion component of the relevant thoughts.
All of this is foreign to Frege. He does not accept
an analysis in which the thought expressed by (48) is
divided up into separate Russellian parts--not even when
68
those parts are said to be in different "components."
Rather, (48) is a subject-predicate sentence which is
analyzed as having the form (53).
53. P f(n)
Since (48) does not contain a constituent sentence, but
rather a (non-sentential) compound proper name, the
thought that it expresses does not contain a constituent
thought, but rather the sense of a (non-sentential)
compound proper name. Nevertheless, this thought
conveys the information that there is a president of
the United States. It does so because the function f,
presented by the sense of the expression 'the President.
of ', is defined as assigning presidents to
countries that have them. A necessary condition for
the thought expressed by (48) to be true is that f assign
a value to the argument--the United States. Therefore,
assertion of this thought conveys the information that
the United States has a (unique) president.
Essentially, the same analysis works for (28a). There
is, however, a new wrinkle. Compound proper names like
54. Whoever discovered the elliptic *form of the
planetary orbits
and
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55. The man who discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits
are not most naturally analyzed as the result of combining
a singular term with a function sign. To give the
structure of these expressions, we need to introduce
a new process for forming compound proper names. This
process involves the Fregean notions of a complex
predicate and a second level function.65
A complex (one place) predicate is an expression
that is formed from a sentence by removing one or more
occurrences of the same proper name--e.g.,
56. a. died in misery.
b. discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits.
c. a is a man and a discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits.
d. is shorter than Sam and taller
than Bill.
e. Sam is a brother of
f. Bill gave to Susan.
g. a killed a .
Like all predicates, these express senses and denote
functions whose values are truth values. Second level functions,
65
For further discussion of these notions, see Frege's
Begriffsschrift, Chapter 1, translated by P. T. Geach in Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Geach and Black, especially pp. 12-20.
See also Frege, "Function and Concept," Writings of Frege, esp. pp.
35-41; and Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Chapters
2 and 3, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
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on the other hand, are functions that take functions
as arguments. Such functions, together with complex
predicates, constitute the core of Frege's account of
quantification.6 6
For example, on Frege's view, the quantifier
'everyone' denotes a second level function which takes
the functions denoted by predicates as arguments and
gives either truth or falsity as value. Thus a
sentence like
57. Everyone likes Susan.
is seen as constructed from the quantifier 'everyone'
and the complex predicate 'likes Susan'. The latter
denotes a function that assigns truth to all and only
those who like Susan. The former ('everyone') denotes a
function that assigns truth to all and only those functions
which assign truth to each of their arguments. Conse-
quently, Frege correctly accounts for the fact that (57)
is true if and only if everyone likes Susan.
In addition to second level functions whose values
are truth values, Frege also recognizes second level
functions whose values are not truth values. One such,
function is the definite description operator. We
may represent this operator as (58), and the result of
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Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Chapter 2.
combining it with a complex (one place) predicate as (59).
58. Lx
59. ixDx (where ',x' represents the one place
predicate)
'tx' is like a quantifier in that it combines with a
complex predicate. However, it is unlike a quantifier
in that the resulting expression is not a sentence but a
(non-sentential) compound proper name. The function
denoted by 'ix' takes as argument a function denoted by a
(one place) predicate and gives as value the unique
object that satisfies the predicate.6 7 If there is no
such object, then, in natural language, the compound
proper name lacks a referent.
We can now handle compound proper names like (55).
55. The man who discovered the elliptic form
of the planetary orbits
This expression is seen as formed from the complex predi-
cate (56c) and the definite description operator (repre-
sentence by 'the').
56. c. a is a man and a discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits
67i.e., the unique objectwhich the function denoted by the
predicate assigns truth.
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On this analysis, (60) is seen as having the logical form
(61).
60. The man who discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits died in misery.
61. TixDx (where 'T' represents the predicate
'died in misery' and 'tx' represents
the complex predicate (56c))
The key point here is that although the subordinate
clause can be seen as formed from a sentence, it is not
itself a sentence, but a complex predicate. Consequently,
just as (60) does not contain a constituent sentence, but
rather a complex predicate, so the thought expressed by
(60) does not contain a constituent thought, but rather
the sense of a complex predicate. Nevertheless, this
thought conveys the information that exactly one man
discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits.
It does so because the function f, presented by the
sense of (56c), is defined as assigning truth to all and
only those men who discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits;because the second level function denoted
by the definite description operator assigns a value to
only those functions which assign truth to exactly one
object. A.necessary condition for the thought expressed
by (60) to be true is that the function denoted by the
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definite description operator assign a value to f.
Therefore, assertion of this thought conveys the infor-
mation that exactly one man discovered the elliptic form
of the planetary orbits.68
The upshot of all of this is a confirmation of
my earlier interpretation of Frege regarding the
relationship between presupposition and assertion; and
a refutation of the interpretations of Black, Garner, and
Katz. Presupposition failure does not lead to there
being no assertion at all. Moreover, when Frege claimed
that the thought expressed by (28a) does not contain the
thought expressed by (28b), he meant just what he said; not
that the thought contains separate assertion and presuppo-
68
Frege hints at the possibility of this kind of analysis when
he says:
"Adjective clauses also serve to construct compound proper names,
though, unlike noun clauses, they are not sufficient by themselves
for this purpose. The adjective clauses are to be regarded as
equivalent to adjectives. Instead of 'the square root of 4 which
is smaller than 0' one can also say 'the negative square root of 4'.
We have here the case of a compound proper name constructed from
the expression for a concept with the help of the singular definite
article. This is at any rate permissible if the concept applies to
one and only one.single object.
"Expressions for concepts can be so constructed that marks of a
concept are given by adjective clauses as, in our example, by the
clause 'which is smaller than 0'. It is evident that such an
adjective clause cannot have a thought as sense or a truth value
as reference, any more than the noun clause could. Its sense, which
can also be expressed in many cases by a single adjective, is only
a part of a thought. Here, as in the case of the noun clause,
there is no independent subject and therefore no possibility of
reproducing the sense of the subordinate clause in an independent
sentence. (Frege, "On Sense and Reference," pp. 70-71)" (my emphasis)
69
Pages .56-57 in the text.
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sition components. We can see this because our
account of his theory of presupposition is grounded
in his general semantics. The failure of some interpre-
ters to arrive at the same conclusion seems to be the
result of concentrating too much on his brief remarks
in "On Sense and Reference" and paying too little
attention to his overall semantic theory. This failure
is made more significant by the fact that many contemporary
theorists of presupposition have adopted essentially the
view that Katz attributes to Frege. We have seen that,
at least in the case of existential presupposition, there
is no' need to do so. 71
70r ( l x x? does not contain rx x0 . Thus, Frege concludes
that the thought expressed by ry (ixcDx)t does not contain the
thought expressed by r3 x xI .
71See Deirdre Wilson, Presupposition and Non-Truth-Conditional
Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975), for arguments against
this version of the presupposition-assertion distinction in the
case of non-existential and compound sentences.
PART 3
PRESUPPOSITION, NEGATION, AND TRUTH
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VII. Presupposition and Negation
We come now to a topic that is vital to any theory
of presupposition--the relationship between presupposition
and negation. One reason why this relationship is
important is that it provides a basis for distinguishing
presupposition from entailment. Like most theorists
of logical presupposition, Frege holds that presupposition
is always preserved under negation--i.e., if A presupposes
B, then the negation of A does so as well. Entailment,
on the other hand, is not always preserved. Although
there are instances in which both A and the negation of A
entail B, this is the case only when B is either logically
presupposed by A or is a necessary truth.72
Historically, this fact has provided the chief test
for logical presupposition. To show that A logically
presupposes some contingent proposition B, most theorists
have tried to demonstrate that B is a necessary condition
for the truth of both A and its negation.73 Frege himself
2Although logical presupposition is a different relation
from entailment, every instance of the former is also an instance of
the latter. See footnote 41 for my definition of entailment.
It might be thought that we could determine whether or not
A logically presupposes B simply by finding out if B is a necessary
condition not only for the truth, but also for the falsity of A. The
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argued in this way when he claimed that (22) presupposes
that the name 'Kepler' has a referent.
22. Kepler died in misery.
He said that if this were not so, then
the negation would have to run not
[23.] Kepler did not die in misery
but
[24.] Kepler did not die in misery, or the name 'Kepler'
has no reference.74
He argued that this is absurd since
That the name 'Kepler' designates something is just as
much a presupposition for the assertion
[22.] Kepler died in misery
as for the contrary assertion (i.e., (23)].75
Despite its importance, the relationship between
presupposition and negation is often treated much too
casually. Consider, for example, the Fregean theory of
sentential presupposition that I have explicated thus far.
In presenting this theory, I have had occasion to refer to
'not Sl where S is any sentence. However, mot S1 is not
always grammatical. If S is 'The present King of
problem is that we have no reliable intuitions distinguishing
falsity from truth-valuelessness. Consequently, some other test is
needed. Negation has been thought to provide this test. This assumes
that whereas negation carries falsity into truth, it preserves
truth-valuelessness.
747Frege, "On Sense and Reference," p. 69.
75Ibid.
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France is wise' then 'not S' is 'not' followed by 'the
present King of France is wise'--i.e., *'Not the present
King of France is wise'. 7 6  Since this sentence is
ungrammatical in English, (12) must be modified.77
12. For any sentence S of English and thought T,
if S presupposes T (in English), then so
does not S .
12. a. For any sentence S of English and thought T,
if S presupposes T (in English), then so
does the grammatical negation of S.
(12a) arises from (12) by replacing 'rnot S1' with 'the
grammatical negation of S'. The virtue of this replacement
lies in its vagueness. (12a) doesn't purport to say
anything about the syntax of negation. All it claims is
that whatever sentence counts as the grammatical negation
of S shares the presuppositions of S.
(12a) exploits the division of labor between
syntactic and semantic theories. However, it requires
76
I prefix '*' to a sentence to indicate that it is ungrammatical.
77
In a fully developed theory principles like (12) or (12a)
would have to be modified to take into account the relativization of
Fregean referential presupposition to context discussed in Section V.
However, since this point is irrelevant to the issue involving
negation that I want to discuss now, I have used (12) and (12a) to
simplify the discussion. The relativization of referential presup-
position to context will become relevant to the discussion of negation
only in the latter half of this section and in Section IX. In both
of these cases I will make explicit reference to such relativization
where it is needed.
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every sentence that presupposes something to have
exactly one grammatical negation. This is problematic.
Both (63)and (64) are grammatical negations of (62).
62. The present King of France is wise.
63. It is not the case that the present King of
France is wise.
64. The present King of France isn't wise.
Thus, not every sentence has a unique grammatical negation.78
We can put aside these grammatical worries by adopting
(12b).
12. b. For any sentence S of English and thought T,
if S presupposes T (in English), and S' is
a grammatical negation of.S, then S' presup-
poses T (in English).
(12b) has all the virtues of its predecessor without its
vices. What it tells us is that every grammatical negation
of a sentence S shares the presuppositions of S.
At this point a different question arises. Is it
the case that all grammatical negations of .a sentence
78Note, a proponent of (12a) cannot deny that rit is not the case
that S1 is a grammatical negation of S. If (i) has any grammatical
negations at all, then (ii) is one of them.
(i) The present King of France is wise and the present Queen
of France is beautiful.
(ii) It is not the case that the present King of France is
wise.and the present Queen of France is beautiful.
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are logically equivalent? Although (12b) might lead one
to expect that the answer is 'yes', it is easy to see that
79for Frege, the answer must be 'no'.
Consider again (62), (63) and (64).
62. The present King of France is wise.
63. It is not the case that the present King of
France is wise.
64. The present King of France isn't wise.
Because Frege defines presupposition in terms of truth
value gaps, he regards (62) and (64) (and the thoughts
expressed by them) as being neither true nor false.
Thus, he is committed to the truth of (65).
65. The thought that the present King:of France
is wise is not true.
However, if (65) is true, then (66), (67) and (63) must
also be true.
66. That the present King of France is wise is not
true.
67. It is not true that the present King of France
is wise.
79According to (12b), each grammatical negation of S shares
the presuppositions of S. Thus, if S is truth-valueless, then
each grammatical negation of S must also be truth-valueless. But
this is not true.
63. It is not the case that the present King of
France is wise.
If this argument is sound, then (63) is true, and (64)
is truth-valueless. Since both count as grammatical
negations of (62), then some sentences have non-equivalent
80grammatical negations.
It seems to me that Frege has to accept this conclusion.
However, since this conclusion might trouble proponents
of logical presupposition, I will look at the argument
just given a little more closely. In what follows I
will construct what seems to me to be the strongest case
a theorist like Frege might make for rejecting the argu-
ment. Although an initially plausible case can be made
on Frege's behalf, I will argue that it ultimately fails.
The argument just given rests on three premises.
68. Premise 1: If (65) is true, then so is (66).
69. Premise 2: If (66) is true, then so is (67).
70. Premise 3: If (67) is true, then so is (63).
In general, our intuitions about the distinction between
truth and untruth are reliable. Insofar as we are
guided by these intuitions in evaluating sentences (63-67),
80For arguments similar to the one just given, see Deirdre
Wilson, ibid, pp. 44-45; and Michael Dummett, "Truth," in Philosophi-
cal Logic, pp. 53-54.
premises (1-3) seem to be acceptable. Thus, if one of
the premises were to be rejected, it would have to be
as the result of a general argument that forced us to
abandon an otherwise plausible assumption.
In the case of premises 1 and 3, I know of no
such argument. Premise 2 is somewhat more problematic.
A possible argument that might be used against it is
based on the distinction between semantical predicates
and statement operators that is drawn by Quine in "Three
Grades of Modal Involvement." Quine's example of a seman-
tical predicate is the verb 'is necessary'. His example
of a statement operator is the adverb 'necessarily'.
For Quine, the former attributes necessity to sentences
and hence is attachable to names of sentences. For example,
each of the sentences in (71) is well-formed and each
attributes necessity to that which is named by the
subject of the verb 'is necessary'.
71. a. The sentence 'Nine is greater than five'
is necessary.
b. 'Nine is greater than five' is necessary.
c. The first sentence on page 157 of Ways of
Paradox is necessary.
Examples like these are to be distinguished from those
in (72).
72. a. Necessarily nine is greater than five.
b. Necessarily mathematicians are rational.
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c. Necessarily bicyclists are two-legged.
Here, we don't have a semantical predicate but rather a
statement operator. The adverb 'necessarily' attaches
not to names of sentences but to sentences themselves.
Quine notes that in this respect 'necessarily' functions
like negation. Thus, the expressions in (73) are ill-
formed in the same way that the expressions in (74) are.
75. a. *Necessarily 'Nine is greater than five'
b. *Necessarily 'Squares are four-sided'
c. *Necessarily 'Mathematicians are rational'
.76. a. *Not 'All philosophers are empiricists'
* b. *Not 'Many linguists have studied Frege'
c. *Not 'Many politicians are honest'
The distinction between semantical predicates and
statement operators to which Quine draws attention is
both real and important. The specific use to which he
puts this distinction in discussing modal logic is not
relevant to us. What is relevant is the possibility that
this distinction might be used to cast doubt on (69) (Premise
2), and more generally, that it might be used in arguing
for (75).
75. Sentences of the form (76) are not equivalent to-
sentences of the form (77).
76. That S is true.
77. It is true that S.
Suppose that someone were to maintain that sentences
of the form (76) contain a semantical predicate 'is true',
whereas sentences of the form (77) contain a statement
operator 'it is true that'. Anyone taking this line would
have to hold that expressions occupying the place of 'that
S' in sentences of the form (76) are names of sentences or
thoughts. This would be no problem for Frege since he
holds that, in general, noun clauses introduced by
'that' designate thoughts. On this analysis, the
expressions making up the subject in (66) would name
their own senses.
66. That the present King of France is wise is
not true.
Consequently, as in the case of belief sentences, there
would be no possiblity of presupposition failure and
(66) would come out true. However, if 'it is true that'
is a statement operator like 'not', then the sentences
to which it is appended need not be seen as designating
thoughts, but rather can be seen as designating truth
81
If sentences of the form (76) are false when the corresponding
sentences of the form (77) are truth-valueless, then sentences of the
form (i) would be true (on Frege's account of negation) when the
corresponding sentences of the form (ii) are truth-valueless.
(i) That S is not true.
(ii) It is not true that S.
If this is the case, then (on Frege's account of negation)
(69) (Premise 2) is false.
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values. On this analysis, 'it is true that' is a truth
functional operator mapping truth onto truth, and falsity
onto falsity. Thus, the context
78. It is true that . . .
will be non-oblique. But if this is the case, then (79)
will be truth-valueless, and Frege's account of negation
will predict that (67) is also truth-valueless.
79. It is true that the present King of France is
Wise.
67. It is not true that the present King of France
is wise.
Consequently, there is a way of construing (66) and (67)
so that the former is true and the latter is not.82
What can be said for this analysis? First, the
expression 'is true' is clearly a grammatical predicate
in sentences of the form 'That S is true'. This is not
so obvious in sentences of the form 'It is true that S'.
Thus, the supposition that 'is true' has a different
semantic function in the two cases might seem to have a
foundation in (surface) grammatical structure. Second,
the set of expressions that can occur in the frame '
82
I am indebted to Richard Cartwright for pointing out this
possiblity to me.
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is true' is not identical with the set of expressions that
can occur in the frame 'It is true (that) '.
Non-sentential noun phrases can be subjects of 'is true'.
Such noun phrases cannot follow 'it is true (that)'.
80. a. The sentence 'The earth is round' is true.
b. 'The earth is round' is true.
c. The proposition that the earth is round is
true.
d. The first sentence in this essay is true.
81. a. *It is true (that) the sentence 'The earth
is round'.
b. *It is true (that) 'The earth is round'.
c. *It is true (that) the thought that the
earth is round.
d. *It is true (that) the first sentence in
this essay.
These examples might be seen as providing evidence
for the following generalization:
82. Expressions occupying the place of 'a' in
well-formed sentences of the form
a is true
are names of sentences or thoughts. Expressions
occupying the place of 'B' in well-formed
sentences of the form
It is true that $
are not names of sentences or thoughts.
If (82) is correct, then, for Frege, the context 'That
is true' will be oblique, whereas the context 'it
is true that ' will not. On this analysis, sen-
tences following 'it is true that' do not name sentences
or thoughts. For Frege, such sentences would name truth
values. Consequently, That S is true would not be
equivalent to rIt is true that S1 . Although these
sentences would be true together, the former would be
false whenever the latter were truth-valueless. Thus
rThat S is not true1 would be true whenever tIt is not
true that S were truth-valueless.
This is, I think, the best case that Frege could
make for rejecting the conclusion that (63) and (64)
differ in truth value.
63. It is not the case that the present King of
France is wise.
64. The present King of France isn't wise.
Unfortunately, the analysis that would allow him to
reject this conclusion won't stand up.
First consider the argument for (82). It is based on
the fact that non-sentential noun phrases can be subjects
of 'is true', but cannot follow 'it is true that'. However,
if this fact justifies (82), then the fact that non-senten-
'is incorrect'
'is unprovable'tial noun phrases can be subjects of 'is plausible'
'is plausible'
'is unbelievable')
88
fincorrect
unprovablebut cannot follow 'it is unprovable that' ought toplausible
unbelievablel
justify (83).83
83. Expressions occupying the place of 'c' in well-
formed sentences of the form
unprovable Jcorrect is i plausible
ýunbelievable)
are names of sentences or thoughts. Expressions
occupying the place of '8' in well-formed
sentences of the form
rincorrect
It is unprovable that 8
unbelievable)
- are not names of sentences or thoughts.
(83) has unacceptable consequences when combined
with other aspects of Frege's semantics. If he were to
adopt it, then the subject of (84) would be seen as
83Relevant data is provided by sentences like (i)-(iii) below.
In these sentences I use 'adj' to stand for 'incorrect', 'unprovable',
'plausible', and 'unbelievable'. A set is ordinary if and only if
it is non-self-membered.
(i) (a) The sentence 'The set of all non-ordinary sets is
ordinary' is adj.
(b) 'The set of all non-ordinary sets is ordinary' is adj.
(c) The proposition that the set of all non-ordinary. sets
is ordinary is adj.
(d) John's thesis is adj.
(ii) (a) *It is adj (that) the sentence 'The set of all non-
ordinary sets is ordinary'.
(b) *It is adj (that) 'The set of all non-ordinary sets is
ordinary'.
(c) .*It is adj (that) the proposition that the set of all
non-ordinary sets is ordinary.
(d) *It is adj (that) John's thesis.
(iii) It is adj that the set of all non-ordinary sets is ordinary.
designating its own sense.
84. That the set of all non-ordinary sets is
incorrect
unprovableordinary is plausible"plausible
unbelievable
Consequently, the thought expressed by this sentence would
neither presuppose nor entail that there is a set of all
(and only) non-ordinary sets. (85), on the other hand,
would not be oblique.
(incorrect
85. It is unprovable that the set of allplausible
tunbelievable
non-ordinary sets is ordinary.
According to (83), (86) does not name a sentence or a
thought in (85).
86. The set of all non-ordinary sets is ordinary.
If Frege were to accept (83), then, given the rest of his
semantics, he would have to hold that the expressions
in (86) have their customary sense and reference. This
analysis predicts that the thought expressed by (85)
presupposes (and hence entails) that there is a set of
all (and only) non-ordinary sets. Since this prediction
is incorrect, Frege must reject (83). Since the argument
for (82) parallels the argument for (83), the argument
for (82) must also be rejected.84
This result undermines the rationale for regarding
sentences of the form 'That S is (not) true' and 'It is
(not) true that S' as non-equivalent. If they are
equivalent, then (67) is true and my original argument
goes through.
67. It is not true that the present King of France
is wise.
Finally, there is an independent reason for claiming
that (67) and (63) are true.
63. It is not the case that the present King of
France is wise.
This reason is based on sentences of the form (87) and (88).
87. Since P, Q
88. Q because P
The thoughts expressed by such sentences entail the thoughts
expressed by sentences occupying the places of 'P' and
'Q'. Now notice that (89) and (90) are true.
84My argument doe not show that (82) is incorrect. Rather
it shows that Frege must reject the argument for (82).
89. Since there is no King of France, it is not
true
true cas that the present King of France is wise.
90. It is not truecase that the present King of
France is wise because there is no King of France.
Since (89) and (90) are true, (67) and (63) must also
be true. 85  Consequently, if (64) is truth-valueless,
we must conclude that some sentences have non-equivalent
86
negations.
64. The present King of France isn't wise.8 7
This result applies to virtually all truth value
gap theories of presupposition. Curiously, it is something
that many theorists--Frege included--seem to have ignored.88
85The idea for this argument was suggested by Wilson, Presuppo-
sitions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, p. 26.
86This argument can obviously be generalized to cover other cases.
It might be claimed that, in addition to (89) and (90), (i)
and (ii) are also true.
(i) Since there is no King of France, the present King of France
isn't wise.
(ii) The present King of France isn't wise because there is no
King of France.
If these sentences are true, then either sentences like (64) do not
have failing logical presuppositions, or they are ambiguous. If the
former is the case, then the chief motivation for a theory of logical
presupposition is eliminated. If the latter iS the case, then (64)
has two interpretations--one in which it has failing presuppositions
and one in which it does not. This is the view that would be adopted
by proponents of logical presupposition. According to it, (64) occurs
in (i) and (ii) with an interpretation that it shares with (63).
8888For Frege's views on negation, see "Function and Concept,"
pp. 33-35; and "Negation" esp. pp. 131-135 in Writings of Frege.
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What it shows is the need to distinguish between two
kinds of negative sentences. Sentences like (64) are
instances of what has been called "internal negation."
According to theories of logical presupposition,
these sentences suffer from presupposition failure
whenever their corresponding affirmatives do. Sentences
like (63), on the other hand, are instances of what has
been called "external negation." These sentences
never suffer from presupposition failure.
In this discussion I have focused on sentential presupposi-
tion. However, similar points can be made regarding propositional
presupposition. The above argument shows that the thoughts
expressed by (63) and (64) are not equivalent. Hence, it is also
necessary to distinguish between two different kinds of negative
thoughts. Thoughts like those expressed by (64) are examples of
"internal negation" and are seen as having failing presuppositions
whenever their corresponding affirmatives do. Thoughts like those
expressed by (63), on the other hand, are examples of "external
negation" and are characterized as never suffering from presuppo-
sition failure. For more on this, see Section VIII.
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VIII. Internal Negation and the Definition of
'Presupposition'
In Section IX I will explore the implications of the
distinction between internal and external negation for
Frege's semantics. However, the importance of this dis-
tinction is not confined to Fregean views. The need to
separate these two kinds of negation has consequences for
virtually all truth value gap theories. One such conse-
quence concerns the way in which presupposition is
defined. Some theories, like the Fregean theory expli-
cated thus far, define presupposition directly in terms of
the conditions necessary for a sentence (or thought) to
have a truth value. The relationship between presupposi-
tion and negation is then derived from independent princi-
ples of the theory. Other theories define this notion
differently, building into the definition the claim that
a sentence (or thought) and its negation(s) share the
same presuppositions.
91. A sentence S (thought T) presupposes a
sentence S' (thought T') iff both S(T) and
the negation(s) of S(T) logically entail S'(T')90
90For present purposes, the distinction between sentences and
Whatever other difficulties there may be with this
definition, it is useless unless we are told what con-
stitutes the negation(s) of a given sentence or thought.
The distinction between internal and external negation
makes the definition problematic. As it stands, it
fails to make the distinction. Moreover, it is not
obvious that it can be successfully disambiguated.9 1
Consider sentential presupposition. If "the
negation(s) of S" in (91) is taken to mean "the external
negation(s) of S," then the definition must be rejected
since it predicts that all and only necessary truths
can be presupposed. 92  On the other hand, if "the negation(s)
of S" is taken to mean "the internal negation(s) of S,"
thoughts is unimportant. No matter how (91) is read, the point
about negation holds. It should also be noted that defenders of
definitions like this typically go on to claim that anything
entailed by both a sentence (thought) and its negation is a
necessary condition for the sentence (thought) to be either true
or false. For an example of this kind of view, see E. Keenan,
"Two Kinds of Presupposition in Natural Language," Studies in Linguis-
tic Semantics, pp. 45-46.
91This point was discovered independently by Fred Katz (personal
communication).
92 rIt is not the case that S- is true iff S is not true.
Consequently, if S' is a necessary condition for the truth
of both S and rIt is not the case that S , then S' is a necessary
truth.
See J. J. Katz, "On Defining 'Presupposition'," Linguistic
Inquiry, Volume 4, No. 2.
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then the definition predicts that every sentence that
has a presupposition must also have an internal negation.
This is questionable.
Consider sentence (92).
92. The present King of France is wise and the
present Queen of France is beautiful.
According to a theory of logical presupposition, the
conjuncts of (92) have failing presuppositions and hence
are truth-valueless. Thus, it would seem that the entire
conjunction must also have failing presuppositions and
must itself be truth-valueless. However, the most
natural negation of (92) is (93).
true93. It is not case} that the present King ofthe case
France is wise and the present Queen of France
is beautiful.
Since it is doubtful that (93) can be construed as
anything other than an external negation, it is not clear
that (92) has any internal negation at all.
There are, of course, other sentences that might be
thought to be internal negations of (92). Any such
sentence would have to be true if and only if (92) is
false; false if and only if (92) is true; and truth-value-
less if and only if (92) is truth-valueless. However,
not all sentences in this category would naturally be
regarded as negations of (92). For example, if the
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truth table for conjunction is (94), then (95) has the
truth functional properties we are looking for.
94. and
T
F
*
T F * (T F'*' means 'truth-valueless'.)
T F *
F F *
* * *
95. The present King of France is a king, and the
present Queen of France is a queen, and it is
not the case that both the present King of
France is wise and the present Queen of France
is beautiful.
Nevertheless, I suspect that proponents of definitions
like (91) would not regard (95) as an internal negation.
There are other less farfetched examples that might
be claimed to be true if and only if (92) is false;
false if and only if (92) is true; and truth-valueless
if and only if (92) is truth-valueless. Two such
candidates are (96) and (97).93
96. Either the present King of France isn't wise,
or the present Queen of France isn't beautiful.
97. It is false that the present King of France is
wise and the present Queen of France is beautiful.
93In Section X, I argue that disjunctions are true if and only
if one of their disjuncts is true. If this is correct, and if the
truth table (94) is adopted, then (96) cannot be an internal negation
of (92) (since (96) can be true even if one of the conjuncts of (92)
is truth-valueless). Sentences like (97) are also discussed in greater
detail in Section X.
However, even if these sentences have the relevant
truth functional properties, it is not obvious that they
are negations of (92) in any interesting sense. (96)
is syntactically neither a negation nor a conjunction,
but rather a disjunction. (97) doesn't even contain a
negation operator. Thus, if we require the notion of an
internal negation of an English sentence to have intuitive
syntactic content, then (96) and (97) are not internal
negations of (92).
This points up the central problem with definitions
like (91). Such definitions invoke the notion of
negation as if it were both familiar and precise. This
would be understandable if we were talking about standard
logical systems in which the negation of a sentence is
formed by prefixing '-' to it. However, the rules
involving negation in English are much more complex.
Sometimes the negative element is found in the verb phrase;
other times it is prefixed to a sentence. Sometimes it
substitutes (in surface form) for a quantifier; in other
cases, it is embedded in the frame ' it is
true that'.
the case
98. a. The book in the corner is new.
b. The book in the corner isn't new.
99. a. All of the books in the corner are new.
b. .- ot all of the books in the corner are new.
100. a. Some linguists are philosophers.
b. No linguists are philosophers.
101. a. It sometimes rains.
b. It never rains.
102. a. Some linguists are in the kitchen and some
philosophers are in the living room.
b. It is not the case that some linguists are
in the kitchen and some philosophers are
in the living room.
The requirement that theories of logical presupposition
distinguish between internal and external negation
complicates matters still further. Moreover, it is not
clear that there is any need to pair every sentence
with an internal negation. Conceivably, there might be
some independent theoretical reason for doing so. However,
none has ever been demonstrated. Unless such a case can
be made, definitions like (91) should be rejected.
It is not so much that these definitions are incorrect
as that they are unnecessarily problematic and obscure.
In their place a proponent of logical presupposition could
adopt a Fregean definition in which presupposition is
defined directly in terms of the conditions necessary for
a sentence (or thought) to have a truth value. The
relationship between presupposition and negation could
then be left open and defined by independent principles of
the theory. Viewed from this perspective, the question
"Do all sentences with failing presuppositions have negations
with failing presuppositions?" demands interpretation
rather than a straightforward 'yes' or 'no'. If one
places few constraints on what counts as a negation of
a sentence, then the question is trivial and the answer
is 'yes'. On the other hand, if one restricts the
notion of negation more sharply, then the question
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becomes interesting and, I suspect, the answer is 'no'.
94The question assumes, of course, that there are logical
presuppositions.
95In this section I have again focused on sentences rather than
thoughts. The reason for this is that structural notions like
negation aremost easily discussed at the level of expressions.
Assuming that there are logical presuppositions, the question of
whether or not every thought with a failing presupposition has a
negation with a failing presupposition is even more obscure than
the corresponding question for sentences. In general, our only
guide to the structure of thoughts is the structure of the
sentences that express them. Since this correspondence is itself
problematic, the task of determining whether or not the thought
expressed by (92) has an internal negation involves all the problems
already discussed and then some.
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IX. External Negation, Frege's Theory of Reference,
and Truth
Distinguishing two different types of negative
sentences (or thoughts) also has interesting consequences
for Frege's semantic theory. Instances of what I have
called "internal negation" share the presuppositions of
their corresponding affirmatives. These instances are
unproblematic for Frege since his theory predicts that
presupposition is preserved under negation. It is external
negations like (103) that cause problems.
true103. It is not {the } that the present Kingthe case
of France is wise.
We have already seen that Frege's truth value gap theory
commits him to the truth of (103) . Thus (103) must not
have any failing presuppositions. There are two ways in
which this might come about. Either (103) has no
presuppositions at all, or else all its presuppositions
are satisfied. To see what is involved in the choice
between these two alternatives, we must look more closely
at Frege's theory of direct and indirect reference.
First, suppose that the expressions in (103) occur
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with their customary sense and reference. If this is
correct, then at least one of Frege's central semantic
views must be given up.
104. Sentences are compound proper names whose
customary referents are truth values.
105. The reference of a compound proper name is
a function of the reference of its constituents.
106. The proper name 'the present King of France'
has no customary referent.
If the present King of France' lacks a referent in (103),
then Frege's theory falsely predicts that the complement
clause lacks a referent also and hence that entire
sentence is truth-valueless. Since we know that (103)
is true, at least one of these assumptions must be
abandoned.
We could give up either (104) or (105) or both,
allowing ourselves to define a negation operator that
takes sentences with no truth value into truths. If
this were done, then sentences like (103) would be seen
as having no presuppositions. However, this would
scarcely have appealed to Frege since he viewed both
(104) and (105) as central tenets of his semantic theory.
Alternatively, we might try rejecting (106). For
example, we might adopt an artificial convention in which
the proper name 'the present King of France' is assigned
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some arbitrary referent like the null set, or the number
zero. Frege himself suggested that in a perfectly constructed
Lnmguage proper names should be assigned referents in this
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way. However, for him, this meant that such languages
would be bivalent. Moreover, he held that natural
languages are not perfectly constructed and that
expressions like 'the present King of France' really do
fail to refer--a natural conclusion since speakers of
English don't use such expressions to talk about zero
or the null set.
.This leads us to consider the possibility that (103)
is an' oblique context in which expressions designate
their customary sense. If this is the case, then 'the
present King of France' has a reference in (103), as
does the complement clause. Under this alternative,
(103) has presuppositions, but its presuppositions are
satisfied. Thus, we are not forced to the incorrect
conclusion that (103) is truth-valueless.
It might, of course, be objected that
96Frege, "On Sense and Reference," p. 70. Frege held that
languages that allow the possibility of reference failure are not
logically perfect languages. The imperfection that he seems to
have had in mind involves the statement of formal rules of
inference in giving an effective characterization of the notion of
proof. If singular terms (constants, definite descriptions,
etc) were allowed to lack reference, then rules like Universal
Specification and Existential Generalization would require
considerable complication.
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107. It is not {true that ...c...the case
is an ordinary rather than an oblique context on the
grounds that substitution of terms with the same cus-
tomary reference preserves truth value. In this respect,
(107) differs from belief contexts and from other
contexts which are typically characterized as oblique.
However, this argument against the obliqueness of (107)
is weak. The same kind of substitution that preserves
truth value in sentences of the form (107) also preserves
truth value in sentences of the form (108).
108. '...c...' is a true sentence.
But we know that expressions occupying the place of 'a'
in sentences of the form (108) do not have their customary
reference. The fact that similar substitution preserves
truth value in sentences of the form (107) is therefore
no proof that they are not oblique.
One might even construct an argument on Fregean
grounds that (107) must be an oblique context. For
example, Frege holds that (109) reports that Jones
believes a certain thought.
109. Jones believes that the present King of
France is wise.
Similarly, it might be claimed that (103) says that a
104
certain thought is untrue. If so, the complement clause
must name its own sense, and its constituents must also
name their senses.
There are, then, some grounds for holding that (107)
is an oblique context. Unfortunately for Frege, although
this result would allow him to save (104-106) above, it
conflicts with what he says about truth
One might be tempted to regard the relation of the
thought to the True not as that of sense to reference,
but rather as that of subject to predicate. One can,
indeed, say: 'The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is
true.' But closer examination shows that nothing more
has been said than in the simple sentence '5 is a prime
number.' The truth claim arises in each case from the form
of the declarative sentence, and when the latter lacks its
usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage,
even the sentence 'The thought that 5 is a prime number
-is true' contains only a thought and indeed the same thought
as the simple '5 is a prime number' . 9 7 (my emphasis)
In this passage Frege appears to be advocating a kind of
redundancy theory of truth, according to which (110) and
(111) express the same thought.
110. The present King of France is wise.
111. It is true that the present King of France
is wise.
Since (110) doesn't predicate truth of anything, (111)
is supposed not to predicate truth of anything either.
Oni difficulty created by this theory is that it
97
Ibic, p. 64.
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undermines the argument that (107) is oblique. This
argument assumes that (103) says a certain thought
isn't true. However, if (111) doesn't affirm that this
thought is true, (103) can hardly be said to deny that
it is. The problem is that the redundancy theory predicts
that (111) is an ordinary rather than an oblique
context. Since it cannot be maintained that (103) is
oblique and (111) is not, Frege's theory of truth
conflicts with the view that the expressions in (103)
designate their indirect rather than their customary
reference.9 8
The upshot of this is that external negations are a
serious problem for Frege. If he holds that they
create oblique contexts, then he must give up his
redundancy theory of truth. If he claims that they are
non-oblique, then he must give up at least one of his
central semantic views.
98Note also that if (111) is oblique, it is possible to
construct an argument that (110) and (111) differ in truth value.
If (111) is oblique, then there will be no reference failure in
the complement clause. If the predicate 'is true' is defined
over the thought in question (and there is no reason in Frege's
semantics why it shouldn't be) then (111) will have a truth
value--false--even though (110) is truth-valueless.
A version of this argument is given by Dummett in "Truth,"
Philosophical Logic, edited by P.F. Strawson, p. 53.
106
X. Redundancy Theories and the Characterization
of Negation
The argument just given might suggest a stronger
conclusion--that generally (and not just in the case of
Frege (truth value gap theories conflict with redundancy
theories of truth.99  In her book Presupposition and
Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, Deirdre Wilson argues
for just such a thesis. She attempts to demonstrate
that if a theory of logical presupposition is correct,
then sentences of the form
112. It is true that S
cannot share the presuppositions of sentences occupying
99In addition to Frege, redundancy theories of truth have
been held by F. P. Ramsey in "Facts and Propositions," in Truth,
edited by George Pitcher, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1964),pp.6-17;A. J. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic, (New
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1936); and P. F. Strawson in "Truth,"
in Truth, pp. 32-53. Although there are different versions of the
redundancy theory, most proponents of this theory hold that in
uttering assertively ~It is true that Sl one asserts the statement
expressed by S; moreover, one asserts no other statement. Whether
or not an utterance of a sentence of the form 'It is true that S'
carries any other illocutionary force is a question that will not
concern us.
Note, the fact that both Frege arid Strawson have advocated redun-
dancy views of truth is interesting since both are leading exponents
of logical presupposition. If redundancy theories conflict with
theories of logical presupposition, then the work of several
philosophers will be affected.
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the place of 'S'. If this is the case, theories of
logical presupposition cannot be combined with redundancy
theories of truth.
Wilson's argument is based upon the interaction of
logical presupposition and a specially defined notion
of entailment.
113. Strong Entailment
"A sentence S entails another sentence P
iff if S is true P must also be true and if
P is false, S must also be false."1 00
114. Logical Presupposition
A sentence S logically presupposes a sentence
P iff the truth of P is a necessary condition
for S to have a truth value.10 1
The central premise upon which her argument is based is
(115).
115. No sentence Q which is capable of being false
can be both strongly entailed and logically
presupposed by the same sentence P.102
10 0Wilson, Presupposition and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
p. 4.
101
This is a simplification of Wilson's definition (ibid, p. 16).
Her definition brings in extra clauses about negation that are
irrelevant for our purposes.
In giving Wilson's argument I will follow her practice of
talking about sentences rather than thoughts. The same argument
could be reconstructed (perhaps more neatly) for thoughts. For Wilson
a sentence S entails (presupposes) a sentence S' if and only if
the statement expressed by S entails (presupposes) the statement
expressed by S'. Hence, no issue of principle is involved in
talking about sentences rather than thoughts here.
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This premise is easily established, for if any such
sentence Q were false, then P would have to be both false
and truth-valueless. This is impossible.1 03
It is important not to confuse (115) with (116).
116. No sentence Q which is capable of being untrue
can be both strongly entailed and logically
presupposed by the same sentence P.
Although (115) is demonstrably true, (116) is not. Suppose
that P both strongly entails and logically presupposes Q,
and that Q is truth-valueless. From this we can conclude
only that P is truth-valueless--not that it is also false.
No contradiction is forthcoming. Thus, if a sentence is
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capable of being truth-valueless, but not false, then
it may be both strongly entailed and logically presupposed
by the same sentence. It is important to bear this in
mind when evaluating Wilson's argument.
Wilson states her argument as follows:
If It is true that S presupposes what S presupposes, then
It is true that S presupposes that S has a truth value,
according to my definition of presupposition. But it seems
to me demonstrable that It is true that S (strongly] entails,
rather than presupposes, that S has a truth value. Both sides
of the entailment relation seem to be satisfied. First, if
It is true that S is true, then clearly S has a truth value must
also be true. Second, if S has a truth value is false, equally
clearly S has a truth value must be false. But if It is true that
S [strongly] entails that S has a truth value, it cannot, as I
have repeatedly emphasized, simultaneously presuppose it if, asl05
seems to be true, S has a truth value is a contingent sentence.
10 3Ibid, p. 24.
10 4According to theories of logical presupposition, there are
such sentences. For example, 'The greatest odd number is prime'.
10 5Ibid, p. 46.
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This argument includes three major premises, each
of which is true.
117. For any sentence S, if rIt is true that S1
sharesthe presuppositions of S, then it presup-
poses rthat S has a truth valuel.
118. For any sentence S, It is true that Si
strongly entails rthat S has a truth valuel.
115. No sentence which is capable of being false can
be both strongly entailed and logically
presupposed by the same sentence.
We have already seen that (115) is true. (117) results
from the fact that every sentence logically presupposes
that 'it has a truth value. This is obvious since a
necessary condition for a sentence to have a truth value
is simply that it have a truth value. (118) is also
true. It could be denied only if a sentence of the form
(112) is truth-valueless when the corresponding sentence
of the form (119) is false.
112. It is true that S
119. That S has a truth value
However, it would be most implausible to claim that
sentences of the form (112) carry logical presuppo-
sitions that sentences of the form (119) do not.10 6
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We may assume that for any sentence S
110
Consequently, Wilson's premises (115, 117, and 118) must
each be accepted as true.
Nevertheless, her argument does not go through.
To arrive at the desired conclusion a fourth premise
must be added.
120. If S logically presupposes a contingent
sentence Q, then rThat S has a truth value'
is capable of being false.
Wilson slurs over this, confusing it with (121).
121. If S logically presupposes a contingent
sentence Q, then rThat S has a truth value1 is
contingent, and hence capable of being untrue.
(121) is uncontroversial. However, it is not what is needed.
rThat S has a truth value'
is equivalent to
rither it is true that S or it is false that S .
We may also assume that a disjunction has a truth value only if at
least one of its disjuncts does. Finally, it is natural to suppose
that for any sentence S
rt is true that 57
and
rt is false that SI
have the same logical presuppositions; hence, one of them has a truth
value if and only if the other one does. From these assumptions, it
follows that if a sentence of the form (119) is false, then the
corresponding sentence of the form- (112) is also false. Thus,
Wilson's premise (118) .is true.
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(120), on the other hand, would allow-Wilson to draw her
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conclusion. However, it cannot be established
without begging the question.
Note first that for any sentence S
"That S has a truth value"
is equivalent to
tEither it is true that S or it is false that S1.
If S is true or false, then the entire disjunction is true.
On the other hand, if S is truth-valueless, then anyone
who believes that
It is true that S7
and
It is false that S'
share the presuppositions of S will hold that these
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sentences are also truth-valueless. However, if both
disjuncts of a disjunction are truth-valueless, then it
is natural to conclude that the entire disjunction is
truth-valueless. Thus for any sentence S
107 (115, 117, 118, and 120) entail that either there are no
contingent logical presuppositions or, if S logically presupposes a
contingent sentence Q, then rIt is true that S1 does not share the
presuppositions of S. This is tanitamount to the claim that theories of
logical presupposition cannot be combined with redundancy theories of truth.
108This is the position Wilson wishes to argue against. Hence,
it cannot simply be assumed to be incorrect.
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Either it is true that S or it is false that S
and
That S has a truth value'
are not capable of being false, but rather must be either
true or truth-valueless. Consequently, the necessary
premise (120) cannot be established, and Wilson's
argument collapses.
One difficulty with Wilson's argument was that it
relied heavily on intuitions about truth values--in
particular, intuitions about the distinction between
falsity and truth-valuelessness. When these intuitions
are pressed, it is clear that a theorist who holds both
a redundancy theory and a theory of logical presupposition
has sufficient room to maneuver. Since his claims about
truth-valuelessness cannot be falsified by direct appeal
to intuition, some other line of argument must be found
to show that theories of logical presupposition conflict
with redundancy theories of truth. For this reason,
it is useful to turn our attention to negation.
If a redundancy theory of truth is combined with
a theory of logical presupposition, then external negations
of the form (122) do not have the logical structure
(123) (where 't' is defined by (124)).
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122. It is not true that S
123. "(t(s))
124. S t(s)
true true
false false
* false
The virtue of this analysis is that it allows us
to handle instances of internal and external negation
with only one negation operator--the one defined in (125).109
125. A
true
false
*
false
true
*
However, this analysis
theory of truth since,
truth-valueless -It is
combination of a truth
view of truth leads to
negative elements--the
defined in (126).110
is incompatible with a redundancy
according to (124), when S is
true that S1 is false. Thus, the
value gap theory and a redundancy
the postulation of two different
one defined in (125) and the one
109
Larry Horn adopts this analysis in his thesis, "On the
Semantic Properties of Logical Operators in English," (Ph.d. dissertation,
U.C.L.A., 1972) p. 10.
110 assume that an internal negation operator in a theory of
-A
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126. A
true
false
*
A
false
true
true
This result allows one to combine a redundancy
theory of truth with a theory of logical presupposition,
but only at the cost of accepting two negation operators.
If these operators are incorporated into a contemporary
linguistic theory, a further problem arises. One of
the tasks of such a theory is to characterize the class
of entailments of sentences of natural language. If
there are logical presuppositions, then the distinction
between internal and external negation is relevant to
this task. Consequently, positing two negation operators
would force the linguist to specify the environments
in which each can appear.
Sentences of the form (127) and (128) are unambiguous
examples of external negation.
127. It is not true that S
128. That S is not true
logical presupposition would be a sentential (rather than a
predicate) operator. This assumption is made to handle the
(alleged) logical presuppositions of sentences like (i)-(iii).
(i) John didn't know that you left.
(ii) Bill doesn't regret mowing the lawn.
(iii) Not many people like my neighbor.
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Thus, a linguistic theory that posits two negation
operators must specify that the internal negation operator
cannot occur in the frames 'It is true that S' and
'That S is true'. The linguist can do little more
than list the relevant environments. For example, he
cannot claim that the internal negation operator never
precedes the adjective 'true'.
129. a. Stalin's assertion that the Communist party
represents the will of the people is true.
b. Stalin's assertion that the Communist party
represents the will of the people is not true.
c. Stalin asserted that the Communist party
represents the will of the people.
130. a. Stalin's last assertion is true.
b. Stalin's last assertion is not true.
c. Stalin asserted something.
If there are any logical presuppositions at all, then
the (a) and (b) statements above logically presuppose
the corresponding (c) statements. This would be impos-
sible unless the (b) statements were internal negations.
Consequently, a linguistic theory that includes both
a redundancy theory of truth and a theory of logical
presupposition must specify restrictions on the occurrence
of the internal negation operator. Unless these restric-
111I am indebted to Richard Cartwright for this point.
PAGES (S) MISSING FROM ORIGINAL
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131. It is not the case that S
132. It is false that S
When S is truth-valueless, rIt is not the case that S9
is true whereas TIt is false that !7 is not. Thus, a
redundancy theory of falsity must claim that sentences
of the form (132) express the same thoughts as internal
negations.
Let us suppose that the redundancy theory has the
following as consequences.
133. For any English sentence S, the sentence rIt
is true that SP expresses the same thought as S.
134. For any English sentence S, the sentence r:t
is false that S7 expresses the same thought as
an internal negation of S.
For the present argument, the important principle is
(134). In some cases this principle might appear plausible.
For example, (62) and (64) seem to be internal negations
of one another.
62. The present King of France is wise.
64. The present King of France isn't wise.
(134) predicts that (64) expresses the same thought as (135).
135. It is false that the present King of France is
wise.
118
In other cases, the principle is implausible.
92. The present King of France is wise and the
present Queen of France is beautiful.
97. It is false that the present King of France is
wise and the present Queen of France is beautiful.
(134) predicts that (97) expresses the same thought as
some internal negation of (92). However, we cannot
evaluate this claim until we determine what constitutes
an internal negation of (92). This is the same problem
that we encountered earlier in Section VIII. Until the
notion of the internal negation of an English sentence
is defined, (134) is unclear.
However, the problem is deeper than this. For
example, one might simply stipulate that (96) is to
count as an internal negation of (92).
96. Either the present King of France isn't wise or
the present Queen of France isn't beautiful.
Alternatively, one might reformulate (134). The important
thing about a redundancy theory of falsity is not what it
says about internal negation. What is important is that
sentences of the form 'It is false that S' be seen as-
expressing the same thoughts as sentences that do not
involve attributions of falsity.
Is there an appropriate sentence that can be paired
with (97)? The only candidate in English that is even
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remotely plausible is (96). I will argue that if a
theory of logical presupposition is correct, then (96) and
(97) are not logically equivalent. Hence, they do not
express the same thought.
My argument contains three premises.
Premise 1
Under a theory of logical presupposition, the
thought expressed by (92) logically presupposes
that there is a unique King and Queen of France.
Each conjunct of this thought carries one of these
presuppositions. Since both conjuncts are asserted, it is
natural to assume that each of the presuppositions remains
in force.
Premise 2
(97) is true if and only if (92) is false.
If (92) is either true or truth-valueless, then (97) is
not true.
Premise 3
A disjunction is true if and only if one of its
disjuncts is true.
This is the central premise in the argument. It predicts
that (96) would be true if there were no Queen of France,
but there were a (unique) King of France and he was wise.
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In this situation, (96) would be true and (97) would not.115
Thus, if a theory of logical presupposition is correct,
then (96) and (97) are not logically equivalent.
The reasons for adopting premise 3 rest ultimately
on intuitions. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this
premise is true and that any adequate theory of presup-
position must be compatible with it. Consider (136)
and (137).
136. Either the post office or the police station
in the next town will be open.
137. Either the post office in the next town will
be open, or the police station in the next
town will be open.
Each of these sentences suggests that there is both a
post office and a police station in the next town. Anyone
assertively uttering them in normal circumstances would
be thought to believe that the next town contained both
facilities. However, this suggestion does not have the
force of a logical relation. Suppose that you were to
utter assertively either sentence and I were to say, "No,
I'll bet you are wrong." If the post office in the next
town were open, then you would win the bet no matter
1 5That (97) would be untrue follows from premises 1 and 2.
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whether the town contained a police station or not. Since
you could not have won the bet unless what you said
was true, the thoughts expressed by (136) and (137)
are true rather than truth-valueless 116 (in such a
situation).
The same conclusion can be reached by considering
the role of disjunctions in deductive arguments. For
example, a mathematician might reason as follows: "Either
the set is empty or it contains the only number with
property P. Since I have already demonstrated that there
is no such number, we must conclude that the set is
empty." In reasoning this way, the mathematician is
trying to construct a sound argument. If a disjunction
carried the logical presuppositions that are attri-
buted to its disjuncts, then his argument could not be
sound. Having proven that there is no unique number with
the property P, the mathematician would also have proven
that his initial (disjunctive) claim is untrue. However,
this is not the case. Since the mathematician's premises
are not contradictory, a theory of logical presupposition
must not attribute the presuppositions of individual
116 For attempts to explain the suggestions of sentences like
(136) and (137), see L. Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound
Sentences,"in Linguistic Inquiry 4 (Spring 1973): 169-194; and
"Presuppositions and Linguistic Context," in Theoretical Linguistics 1
(1974): 182-194. See also Deirdre Wilson, Presupposition and Non-Truth-
Conditional Semantics, Chapter 5.
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disjuncts to the entire disjunction.117
For reasons like this, I see little hope of
combining redundancy theories of truth (and falsity)
with theories of logical presupposition. The combination
looks plausible only so long as one restricts one's
attention to the truth of simple sentences. When one
tries to construct a tAeory of falsity and recognizes
the distinction between internal and external negations,
three problems become apparent. First, the account of
negation becomes complex and ad hoc. Second, the redundancy
theory of falsity is rendered unclear. Third, the
behavior of certain compound sentences (e.g., disjunctions)
makes it impossible to eliminate certain attributions of
falsity. In the face of these difficulties, we must
conclude that redundancy theories conflict with theories
of logical presupposition.
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For similar arguments, see Wilson, Presupposition and
Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, pp. 28-30; 79-83.
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XI. Presupposition and Compound Sentences
The conflict between Frege's account of presupposi-
tion and his view of truth is not the most significant
problem for his overall semantic theory. The easiest
way to resolve it is simply to give up the redundancy
theory of truth. Unlike his account of presupposition,
this theory is not basic to his compositional semantics
and could be abandoned without fundamentally altering
the total system. He did not have to appeal to it in
"On Sense and Reference," at all. He does so in the
course of arguing that the relationship between a true
thought and truth is that of sense to reference, rather
than that of "subject to predicate."1 1 8 The redundancy
theory is introduced to defeat this latter alternative.
According to Frege, truth is an object rather than a
sense or a concept. Like other objects, it cannot be
predicated of anything. However, this doesn't commit him
to a redundancy theory. He could have maintained that
'is true' denotes a function that assigns the object truth
to true sentences and thoughts, and the object falsity to
all other sentences and thoughts. Had he done so, he
S1 1 8 ee Frege's quoted remarks on p. 104 of the text.
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could have held that the thoughts expressed by sentences
of the form 'It is true that S' are not identical with
the thoughts expressed by the corresponding sentences
of the form 'S'. For example, he could have held that
the thought expressed by (111) is false even though the
thought expressed by (110) is truth-valueless.
110. The present King of France is wise.
111. It is true that the present King of France
is wise.
In short, Frege could have retained all that is essential
to his semantics without ever worrying about the redundancy
theory at all. 11 9
A much more serious objection arises in connection
with compound sentences formed with sentential connectives.
His theory of compositional semantics predicts that
reference failure anywhere in such a sentence leads to
truth-valuelessness and that the logical presuppositions
of constituent sentences carry over to become logical
presuppositions of the compound sentences. I have argued
that this prediction is incorrect in the case of disjunctions.
Although disjunctions typically suggest that the presup-
positions of the individual disjuncts are fulfilled, they
do not logically presuppose this. Many compound sentences
1 9For a different discussion of the redundancy theory, see
Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," Philosophical Logic, pp. 18-22.
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120do not even carry suggestions.
138. If there is a (unique) King of France, then the
King of France is one of the few remaining
monarchs in Europe.
139. Either there is no (unique) King of France, or
the King of France is wise.
Since these sentences are true rather than truth-valueless,
Frege's theory of compositional semantics is incorrect.
This means that at least one of the following
two principles must be false.
140. The reference of a compound proper name is
a function of the reference of its parts.
141. Sentences are compound proper names that
refer to truth values.
The most likely candidate for rejection is (141). It
should be noted, however, that even if it is given up,
either (142) or (143) (or both) must also be rejected.
142. Predicates denote functions whose values
are truth values.
143. Sentential connectives denote functions whose
arguments and values are truth values.
Once these principl4s are abandoned, a theory of
120See Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences" and
"Presuppositions and Linguistic Context," for a discussion of such
cases.
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presupposition no longer emerges automatically from a
theory of compositional semantics, but rather must be
motivated on its own terms. With the exception of negation,
it is unlikely that sentential connectives will provide
such motivation. Even in the case of negation, the
situation is problematic.
Frege argued that the thought expressed by (144)
logically presupposes the thought expressed by (146)
on the grounds that both it and the thought expressed by
(145) entail the thought expressed by (146).
144. The man who discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits died in misery.
145. The man who discovered the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits didn't die in misery.
146. Someone discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits.
A theory of logical presupposition together with an
account of internal negation predicts these (alleged)
entailments. However, this is not the only possible
account. Russell's theory makes the same predictions
121
without positing truth value gaps. The cost of
121On Russell's theory (144) expresses the same thought as (i),
and (145) is ambiguous between (ii) and (iii).
(i) Exactly one man discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits, and he died in misery.
(ii) Exactly one man discovered the elliptic form of the
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his theory is that expressions of the form 'the a' are
no longer treated as genuine singular terms. However,
one can account for the entailments in question without
either accepting this consequence or positing logical
presupposition. The easiest way to do so is to claim
that English contains a negative predicate-making
operator thatifs involved in the construction of predicates
of the form '[aP]'. Such a predicate is satisfied by
all and only the objects thatdo not satisfy the original
predicate P. Finally, a subject-predicate sentence is
said to be true if and only if the subject expression
122designates an object which satisfies the predicate.
Since both this theory and Russell's theory account for
the (alleged) entailments cited by Frege, his argument
involving negation does not establish the need for
positing a relation of logical presupposition.
This is not to say that either of these two alternatives
planetary orbits, and he didn't die in misery.
(iii) It is not the case that exactly one man discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits, and he died in
misery.
(145) entails (146) on the reading it shares with (ii).
122
I am indebted to Fred Katz for pointing out the possibility
of this analysis (personal communication). Note, if (i45) has a
reading in which it does not entail (146), it might be seen as
ambiguous between the logical forms (i) and (ii).
(i) [1D]1 xMx (ii) -,(DtxMx)
('D' represents 'died in misery' and 'M' represents
'is a man who discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits'.)
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to Frege is ultimately correct, Before any account of
negation is accepted, a much wider range of data must
be examined. This data should include both instances of
so-called "factive presupposition,"l23 which have been
used to defend a theory of logical presupposition, and
sentences like
147. The present King of France isn't wise!
France has no king.
which Deirdre Wilson has used to argue that negations
give rise to suggestions rather than entailments.1 24
The import of these remarks is that a theory of
logical presupposition can be motivated neither by
appeal to general principles of compositional semantics
125
nor by the usual "brisk little arguments" involving
negation. If such a theory is to be motivated at all,
it must be as one part of an overall theory which explains
a wide variety of inferences--inferences that arise from
the use of referring (and other) expressions and are
sanctioned by conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals
123For a description of "factives" and "factive presupposition,"
see Paul and Carol Kiparsky, "Fact," in Semantics, edited by D. D.
Steinberg and L. A. Jakobovits, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971); pp. 345-369.
124For Wilson's argument, see Presuppositions and Non-Truth-
Conditional Semantics, pp. 25-30; 48-55.
125The term is Strawson's from "Identifying Reference and Truth-
Values," Semantics, pp. 86-99.
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as well as negations. Frege never developed an adequate
theory of this type. He was more interested in constructing
the theory of an ideal formal language than he was in
giving a detailed empirical account of the structure of
natural languages. Still, if his compositional semantics
purports to explain how natural languages actually
work, the predictions about logical presupposition show
the theory to be false.
TWO THEORIES OF NON-LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION
PART 1
INTRODUCTION
132
In recent years the development of modern generative
grammar has sparked new interest in a host of problems
formerly the exclusive preserve of philosophers of language.
One of these problems is the construction of a theory of
presupposition. The aim of such a theory is to explain a
special class of inferences--for example, to explain why
assertively uttering either (la) or (lb) would normally
be taken to commit the speaker to the truth of the
statement expressed by (ic).
1. a. The man in the next room is a doctor.
b. The man in the next room isn't a doctor.
c. There is a man in the next room.
Philosophers have long been aware of facts like
these and have developed theories to account for them.
Frege, for example, constructed a semantic theory in which
reference failure leads to truth-valuelessness. On his
view, the proposition expressed by (lc) is a necessary
condition for the propositions expressed by (la) and (lb)
to be either true or false. 1 Russell, on the other hand,
denied this. According to him, (la) expresses the same
See Frege, "On Sense and Reference," Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and
Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 68-71.
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proposition as (2a), and (lb) is ambiguous between (2b)
and (2c).
2. a. There is exactly one man in the next room,
and he is a doctor.
b. It is not the case that there is exactly
one man in the next room and he is a doctor.
c. There is exactly one man in the next room
and he isn't a doctor.
On Russell's view, bivalence is preserved, and (lb)
licenses the inference to the proposition expressed by
(Ic) on only on of its readings.2
Although the dispute between Frege and Russell would
now be seen within the context of an empirical theory of
natural language, it did not prompt philosophers to
search for more data to decide the issue. One reason for
this may be that the distinction between description and
regimentation of natural language has not always appeared
crucial to them. Frege and Russell were primarily concerned
with the foundations of mathematics, the development of
mathematical logic, and the use of logical apparatus to
resolve philosophical problems. Where the working of
natural language seemed directly relevant to these
2See Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Logic and Knowledge,
edited by Robert C. Marsh (New York: Capricorn Books, 1971), pp. 39-56;
and "Descriptions," Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, edited
by Leonard Linsky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), pp.
95-110.
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concerns, it received substantial attention. Otherwise,
it did not.
Morerecently, the dispute about the nature of
reference and referring expressions has been revived
in the work of P. F. Strawson. 3  Like Frege, Strawson
holds that reference failure in sentences like (la) and
(lb) leads to truth-valuelessness and that the statement
expressed by (ic) is a necessary condition for the state-
ments expressed by (la and b) to be either true or false.
Unlike Frege, his view does not arise from a commitment
to formal semantics, but rather from a concern with the
nuances of meaning and variety of distinctions found
in ordinary linguistic usage. Nevertheless, Strawson's
interests are primarily philosophical. His investigations
take place within the framework of a general philosophical
program--"the use theory of meaning"--and the examples
that he analyzes are selected because of their broader
philosophical significance.
In the case of presupposition, Strawson expanded our
awareness of the range of facts that need to be accounted
for. In addition to the inferences exemplified in (1), we
3See P.F. Strawson, "On Referring," Readings in the Philosophy of
Language, edited by Jay F. Rosenberg and Charles Travis (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 175-194; "A Reply
to Mr. Sellars," Truth, edited by George Pitcher (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 88-92; and "Identifying
Reference and Truth Values," Semantics, edited by Danny Steinberg and
Leon Jakobovits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 86-99;
and Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1971r.
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must explain why assertively uttering (3a, b, or c) is
normally taken to commit the speaker to the truth of
the statement expressed by (3d).
3. a. All of John's children are asleep.
b. Not all of John's children are asleep.
c. None of John's children are asleep.
d. John has children.
According to Strawson, the statements made by (3a-c)
logically presuppose the statement made by (3d). Hence,
the truth of the latter is a necessary condition for
the former to be either true or false.4  Strawson is
interested in examples like these because he believes
that they throw light on the relationship between
Aristotelian logic, modern logic, and natural language.
Recently the situation has changed. Many contemporary
theorists see the task of accounting for data like
(1-3) as part of an effort to construct an empirical
linguistic theory. This shift in perspective has had
several important consequences.
When accounts of presupposition are incorporated
into broader linguistic theories, they interact with
4As in the case of singular terms, there has been controversy on
this, point. For example, WilfriedSellars has claimed that the statement
made by (3a) does not entail, but only suggests, the statement made
by (3d). Wilfried Sellars, "Presupposing," Presuppositions in
Philosophy and Linguistics, edited by J.S. Petofi and D. Franck (Frank-
furt: Athenaum Verlag, 1973), pp. 173-192.
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other components of these theories in surprising and
interesting ways. This interaction has led different
theorists to draw a variety of conclusions. For example,
Chomsky has recently abandoned the view that the
semantic interpretation of a sentence is determined
entirely at the level of deep syntactic structure; 5
McCawley has argued that natural language quantifiers
are predicates in underlying structure; 6 and Keenan has
maintained that not all languages are equal in ex-
7
pressive power.
In each case, these conclusions have been moti-
vated at least in part by appeal to presupposition.
Moreover, in Jerrold Katz's most recent version of
semantic theory, the definitions of many important
properties and relations (e.g., analyticity and entail-
ment) depend heavily on the notion of presupposition.8
Chomsky, "Deep Structure, Surface Structure and Semantic Inter-
pretation," Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar, (The Hague:
Mouton, 1972); and "Some Empirical Issues in the Theory of Trans-
formational Grammar," ibid.
6James McCawley, "A Program for Logic," Semantics of Natural
Language, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel
Publishing Co., 1972), pp.'498-544.
7
Keenan has maintained in "Logic and Language" that there are
languages L1 and L2 such that there is something that can be asserted
by a speaker of L1 that cannot be asserted by a speaker of L2 . Keenan,
"Logic and Language," Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences 102, no. 3 (Summer 1973): 185-194.
Katz, Semantic Theory, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
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It should be emphasized that this is a short list
of contexts in which presupposition plays a significant
role. The notion is all but ubiquitous in contemporary
linguistic literature. Hence, it is important that an
adequate theory of presupposition be developed.
The shift in emphasis from philosophic to linguistic
concerns has also enlarged the class of data bearing on
theories of presupposition. In addition to (1) and (3),
it is commonly agreed that this data includes examples
like the following.
4. a. {Not} many of Dean's friends were loyal.
b. Dean has friends.
knows5. a. John { knows that the earth is round.doesn't know
b. The earth is round.
6. a. Paul { regrets mowing the lawn.doesn't regret
b. Paul mowed the lawn.
7. a. It { was } the President that ordered the
wasn't
bombing.
b. Someone ordered the bombing.
8. a. It { was } the bombing that was ordered by
wasn't
the President.
b. The President ordered something.
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9. a. Bill stopped } smoking.didn't stop
b. Bill has smoked.
10. a. U.C.L.A. ( WO the national cham-didn't win
pionship again last year.
b. U.C.L.A. has won the national championship.
11. a. It { s likely that Bill's sister willisn't
find out what he has been doing.
b. Bill has a sister.
12. a. If all of John's children are intelligent,
then intelligence isn't hereditary.
b. John has children.
13. a. If intelligence is hereditary, then none of
John's children are intelligent.
b. John has children.
14. a. Either intelligence isn't hereditary, or
none of John's children are intelligent.
b. John has children.
15. a. Either not all of John's children are in-
telligent, or intelligence isn't hereditary.
b. John has children.
Various theorists would characterize this data
quite differently, but most would agree that assertively
uttering any'of the (a) sentences in normal circumstances
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and without special qualification would sanction an
inference to the statement expressed by the corresponding
(b) sentence. In some of these examples the (a) statement
entails9 the (b) statement. In others, assertively
uttering (a) may only suggest the truth of the statement
expressed by (b). However, in either case these
examples differ from (16-19).
16. a. If John has intelligent children, then
intelligence isn't hereditary.
b. John has children.
17. a. If intelligence is hereditary, then John
doesn't have intelligent children.
b. John has children.
18. a. Either intelligence isn't hereditary, or
John doesn't have intelligent children.
b. John has children.
19. a. Either John doesn't have intelligent children,
or intelligence isn't hereditary.
b. John has children.
9Here and throughout I use 'entails' in the same way that Van
Frassen uses 'necessitates'.
A { entails B iff the truth of B is a necessary condition
necessitates
for the truth of A.
Note: on this definition, entailment and logical presupposition are
not mutually exclusive. Although the two relations are different, every
instance of logical presupposition is also an instance of entailment.
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Although (16-19) differ minimally from (12-15),
assertively uttering one of (16a-19a) does not sanction
an inference to the corresponding (b) statement. A
theory of presupposition must explain why this is so. It
must also tell us whether or not the relationship between
(a) and (b) is the same in examples (1, 3-15).
The introduction of new data by linguists has led
to the construction of interesting views of presupposition.
Two of the most important of these views are those of
Lauri Karttunen and Deirdre Wilson.10  Both Karttunen
and Wilson have attacked traditional theories of logical
presupposition and have developed alternative accounts
that purport to explain a wide range of data. According
to both theorists, this data falls into two very different
classes. In one class the relevant inferences are
entailments. In the other, they are not. For example,
statement (la) entails statement (lc). The statements
expressed by (12a-15a), on the other hand, do not entail
the statements expressed by (12b-15b).11  Still, assertively
10These views are developed in greatest detail in: Karttunen,
"Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," Linguistic Inquiry 4 (Spring
1973): 169-194; Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context,"
Theoretical Linguistics 1 (1974): 182-194; and Deirdre Wilson,
Presupposition and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics (London: Academic
Press, 1975).
1 Karttunen is not as explicit about this as Wilson is; however,
this' thesis seems to be implicit in his account. See Part 5 below.
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uttering (12a-15a) in normal circumstances and without
explicit qualification is taken to commit the speaker
to the truth of statements (12b-15b). According to
Karttunen and Wilson, a theory of presupposition must
explain this phenomena and predict the full range of
cases in which this special type of inference is sanctioned.
Wilson and Karttunen agree that entailments are to be
accounted for semantically, whereas suggestions like those
in (12-15) are to be accounted for pragmatically.
However, their positive theories are very different.
According to Wilson, the inferences arising from the use of
negative sentences like (ib), (3b, c) and the negative
versions of (4a-lla) are pragmatic and are explained by
Grice's maxims of conversation. The inferences arising
from the use of (12a-15a) are explained by general
principles of evidence and confirmation. Wilson posits
no notion of presupposition, logical or non-logical.
Instead she claims to account for all of the relevant
data with concepts and principles that are needed
independently.
Unlike Wilson, Karttunen does not use independent
principles of conversation or confirmation. He argues
that a special contextual theory of presupposition is
required. On this view, traditional accounts of
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presupposition are replaced by a pragmatic theory of the
interaction of sentences and background assumptions in
communicative situations. Karttunen's theory specifies
a special set of constraints that sentences of different
forms place on the linguistic contexts in which they
can be appropriately uttered.
In this essay I will examine the views of both
Karttunen and Wilson. First I will take up their attack
on logical presupposition, which, I shall argue, is
partly, but not completely, successful. For purposes of
analysis it is important to distinguish two different
theses.
A. Theories of natural language -require an account
of non-logical presupposition.
B. The notion of logical presupposition should be
eliminated from theories of natural language.
I will argue that thesis A is correct, but that B is
uncertain. Although there are problems facing any theory
of logical presupposition, the arguments given by Wilson
and Karttunen for abandoning logical presupposition are
inconclusive.
Second, -I will demonstrate that Wilson's and Karttunen's
positive accounts of non-logical presupposition are
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inadequate. Last, I will propose a modification of
Karttunen's theory that avoids many of the difficulties
of the original and that is capable of accounting for
a significant range of data. I hope that the result will
be the development of a coherent framework within
which to compare different theories of presupposition
and the formulation of the assumptions and consequences
of certain viable candidates for such a theory.
II. Presupposition and Compound Sentences12
Traditional accounts of presupposition were motivated
chiefly by appeal to simple sentences and their negations.
Contemporary accounts, like those of Karttunen and Wilson,
center on more complex cases. One class of sentences
that is crucial to their theories consists of sentences
formed with sentential connectives. Particularly
important are disjunctions and conditionals.
We have already seen that in some cases (e.g., (12-15))
12I will use the term 'compound sentence' to refer to sentences
formed with sentential connectives 'and', 'or', and 'if, then'.
For the present, negation is not included in this list, but rather
will be considered separately.
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assertively uttering a disjunction or a conditional gives
rise to certain inferences. What does this have to do
with presupposition? To answer this question we must
look more carefully at the cases in which such inferences
arise.
13Where a sentence A has been said to presuppose a
sentence B, a disjunction or conditional containing A
typically implicates B.14  Where A has been said not
to presuppose, but rather to entail B, there is no
such implicature. Thus, the implicaturesl5 carried by
13
For convenience I will sometimes speak of sentences as
entailing or presupposing one another. A sentence S entails a
sentence S' just in case the proposition expressed by S entails the
proposition-expressed by S'. The case of presupposition is more
difficult. When logical presupposition is in question, sentences
bear presuppositions only in a derivative sense--i.e., S logically
presupposes S' if and only if the proposition expressed by S
logically presupposes the proposition expressed by S'. Where the
presupposition is non-logical, sentences rather than propositions
may be more natural bearers of presupposition. This point will be
discussed in more detail in Parts 4 and 5.
14Shortly we will see that this principle must be modified in
several ways. However, the point at issue here--namely the relevance
of presuppositions to the implicatures carried by compound sentences--
will not be affected.
15
Here and in what follows I use the terms 'implicatures' and
'implicates' in a way that is neutral between a variety of semantic
and pragmatic relations--e.g., entailment, logical presupposition,
conversational implicature, and so on. The important point is that
if a sentence A implicates B, then assertively uttering A in normal
circumstances and without qualification typically is taken to commit
the speaker to the truth of B. The question of why this commitment
arises and what type of commitment it is will be the subject of
further investigation later in this essay.
It should also be noted that in this section I will be concerned
exclusively with two classes of implicatures of compound sentences--
implicatures that arise from the presuppositions of simple constituent
sentences and implicatures that are inherited from compound constituent
sentences.
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disjunctions and conditionals are relevant to the
construction of a theory of presupposition.1 6
For example, the sentences in (20) are typically
said to presuppose the corresponding sentences in (21).
is20. a. The man in the next room {. i a doctor.isn't
Allb. { All of the men following us are armed.Not all
c. {It's Susan who's got the jewels.It's not
d. Sam { quit working on January ist.didn't quit
knew
e. Bill { knew that the experiment woulddidn't know
fail.
21. a. There is a man in the next room.
b. There is at least one man following us.17
c. Someone has the jewels.
d. Sam worked before January ist.
e. The experiment failed.
The sentences in (22), on the other hand, do not presuppose
but rather entail their counterparts in (21).
16The first theorist to emphasize this point was Lauri
Karttunen.
17There is a stronger statement that might also be said
to be presupposed--namely, that there is more than one man
following us. However, it will be convenient to stick with
the weaker presupposition for the moment.
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22. a. There is a man in the next room and he is
a doctor.
b. There is an unarmed man following us.
c. Susan has the jewels.
d. Sam worked before, but not after, January Ist.
e. Bill's prediction that the experiment would
fail was correct.
The sentences in (20) and (22) behave differently
when embedded in compound sentences. If one of the
former is a constituent of a disjunction or a conditional,
then assertively uttering the entire compound sentence
normally sanctions an inference to the corresponding
statement in (21).
23. a. If the man in the next room is a doctor, then
we are lucky.
(There is a man in the next room.)
b. If not all of the men following us are armed,
then our plan will succeed.
(There is at least one man following us.)
c. If it is Susan who's got the jewels, then
we will recover them quickly.
(Someone has the jewels.)
d. If Sam quit working on January 1st, then
the company lost a good man.
(Sam worked before January 1st.)
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e. If Bill knew that the experiment would fail,
then he must be a psychic.
(The experiment failed.)
24. a. Either the man in the next room is a doctor,
or we are in trouble.
(There is a man in the next room.)
b. Either not all of the men following us are
armed, or our plan will fail.
(There is at least one man following us.)
c. Either it's Susan who's got the jewels, or
we will never see them again.
(Someone has the jewels.)
d. Either Sam quit working on January ist, or
he isn't eligible for unemployment compensation.
(Sam worked before January 1st.)
e. Either Bill knew that the experiment would
fail, or his claim to be psychic is a hoax.
(The experiment failed.)
A speaker assertively uttering any of these sentences
in normal circumstances and without qualification would
be understood as taking the truth of the corresponding
statements in (21) for granted. If, on the other hand,
he were to assertively utter one of the conditionals
or disjunctions in (25-26), then no inference to the
corresponding statement in (21) would be justified.
25. a. If there is a man in the next room and he is
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a doctor, then we are lucky.
(There is a man in the next room.)
b. If there is an unarmed man following us,
then our plan will succeed.
(There is at least one man following us.)
c. If Susan has the jewels, then we will recover
them quickly.
(Someone has the jewels.)
d. If Sam worked before, but not after, January
1st, then the company lost a good man.
(Sam worked before January ist.)
e. If Bill's prediction that the experiment
would fail was correct, then he must be psychic.
(The experiment failed.)
26. a. Either there is a man in the next room and
he is a doctor, or we are in trouble.
(There is a man in the next room.)
b. Either there is an unarmed man following us,
or our plan will fail.
(There is at least one man following us.)
c. Either Susan has the jewels, or we will never
see them again.
(Someone has the jewels.)
d. Either Sam worked before, but not after, January
ist, or he isn't eligible for unemployment
compensation.
(Sam worked before January 1st.)
149
e. Either Bill's prediction that the experiment
would fail was correct, or his claim to be
psychic is a hoax.
(The experiment failed.)
The contrast between (23-24) on the one hand and (25-26)
on the other indicates that conditionals and disjunctions
typically implicate what their constituents presuppose,
but not what they entail.1 8
There is another way in which the implicatures of
compound sentences are relevant to a theory of presupposition.
Such implicatures behave the same way as standard presup-
positions do when the sentences that carry them are
embedded in certain larger contexts. One such context
is provided by compound sentences themselves. For
example, I have just shown that if a sentence A has
standardly been said to presuppose B, then a conditional
containing A implicates B. Now suppose that A itself is
a compound sentence (e.g., a disjunction) which implicates
19B.19 Conditionals containing A inherit this implicature.
27. a. If either the man upstairs is a doctor or
the woman downstairs is a nurse, then we have
a chance of saving Mary.
18
The constituents of a conditional are its antecedent and
consequent. The constituents of a disjunction are its disjuncts.
19The implicatures in question are those which arise ultimately
from the presuppositions of simple constituent sentences.
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b. If the jewels are still in the building,
then either the man upstairs has them or
the woman downstairs has hidden them.
c. There is a man upstairs.
d. There is a woman downstairs.
28. a. If either not all of John's children were
invited or not all of Bill's children are
coming, then someone did a bad job of
recruiting.
b. If our membership list is correct, then either
not all of John's children will be invited
or not all of Bill's children will be able
to come.
c. John has children.
d. Bill has children.
Each of the conditionals in (27) and (28) contains
a disjunction which, in isolation, implicates the
corresponding (c) and (d) statements. Since conditionals
inherit the implicatures of their compound components,
assertively uttering the (a) or (b) sentences without
explicit qualification is normally taken to commit the
speaker to the truth of the corresponding (c) and (d)
20
statements.
0
2 0Note: although the (a) and (b) sentences in (27) and (28)
implicate the corresponding (c) and (d) statements, this is not true
of the (a) and (b) sentences in (i) and (ii).
(i) (a) If either there is a man upstairs who is a doctor or
there is a woman downstairs who is a nurse, then we
151
Conditionals are not the only sentences that inherit
the implicatures of compound constituents. Conjunctions
and disjunctions do, too. First consider conjunctions.
The (a) sentences in (29) and (30) contain conjuncts
which are themselves compound sentences (i.e., disjunc-
tions). In isolation, these disjunctions implicate the
corresponding (b) and (c) statements. In each case,
the entire conjunction retains these implicatures.
29. a. There is medicine in the cabinet and
either the man upstairs is a doctor or
the woman downstairs is a nurse.
b. There is a man upstairs.
c. There is a woman downstairs.
have a chance of saving Mary.
(b) If the jewels are still in the building, then
either there is a man upstairs who has them or there
is a woman downstairs who has hidden them.
(c) There is a man upstairs.
(d) There is a woman downstairs.
(ii) (a) If either John has a child who wasn't invited or
Bill has a child who is not coming, then someone did
a bad job of recruiting.
(b) If our membership list is correct, then either John
has a child that won't be invited or Bill has a child
that won't be able to come.
(c) John has a child.
(d) Bill has a child.
The conditionals in (27) and (28) differ minimally from those in
(i) and (ii). The former sentences contain disjunctions whose
constituents give rise to the relevant implicatures. The latter
do not. Hence, the conditionals in (i) and (ii) do not implicate
the (c) and (d) statements.
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30. a. The food is already gone and either not all
of John's children have eaten, or not all
of Bill's children have eaten.
b. John has children.
c. Bill has children.
These examples indicate that conjunctions preserve
implicatures in the way that conditionals do.21
Next consider disjunctions. Earlier I showed that
if the components of a disjunction are simple sentences,
then the entire disjunction implicates what its disjuncts
presuppose (but not, in general, what they entail).
The facts are exactly analogous in the case of compound
sentences. Each of the disjunctions in (31) and (32)
contains a conjunction as one of its disjuncts. These
conjunctions contain simple sentences that presuppose the
(b) and (c) statements. Thus, the conjunctions implicate
these statements, and (31a) and (32a) inherit these
21(ia) and (iia) do not implicate (ib and c) and (iib and c)
respectively.
(i) (a) There is medicine in the cabinet and either there is
a man upstairs who is a doctor or there is a woman
downstairs who is a nurse.
(b) There is a man upstairs.
(c) There is a woman downstairs.
(ii) (a) The food is already gone and either John has child
who hasn't eaten, or Bill has a child who hasn't eaten.
(b) John has a child.
(c) Bill has a child.
These sentences correspond to the examples discussed in footnote 20.
153
implicatures.
31. a. Either it's Susan who has the jewels and
it is Mary who has the paintings, or our
investigation will fail.
b. Someone has the jewels.
c. Someone has the paintings.
32. a. Either not all of Kathy's children are at
school and not all of Judy's children are
away from home, or we won't have enough
people to play baseball.
b. Kathy has children.
c. Judy has children.
The disjunctions in (33) and (34), on the other hand,
behave differently. Although they contain conjuncts
that entail the corresponding (b) and (c) statements,2 2
these statements are not implicated by the relevant
disjunctions.
33. a. Either Susan has the jewels and Mary has
the paintings, or our investigation will
fail.
b. Someone has the jewels.
c. Someone has the paintings.
22For convenience, I will often speak of sentences entailing
statements. A sentence S entails a statement P if and only if the
proposition (statement) expressed by S entails P.
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34. a. Either Kathy has a child who is not at
school and Judy has a child who is at home,
or we won't have enough people to play
baseball.
b. Kathy has a child.
c. Judy has a child.
Examples like (23-34) have led several theorists,
most notably Karttunen, to claim that certain implicatures
of compound sentences are themselves presuppositions.
The argument for this conclusion is straightforward.
First, compound sentences implicate what their consti-
tuent sentences presuppose (but not in general what they
entail). Second, such implicatures of compound sentences
are inherited by larger compound sentences in which they
may be embedded. These facts follow automatically from
a single principle if the relevant implicatures of compound
sentences are, in fact, presuppositions.
35. If P is presupposed by one of the constituents
of a compound sentence S, then P is presupposed
by S.23
For this reason, Karttunen hypothesizes that compound
sentences presuppose what their constituents do.
23This principle is a simplification of the principles that
Karttunen actually adopts. The necessary complications and modi-
fications will be presented later. I will also look more closely
at Karttunen's argument in the sections that follow.
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In this essay I will follow Karttunen in holding that
certain implicatures of compound sentences are presuppo-
sitions of those sentences. 24 If this view is correct,
then there is a theoretically significant relation
which is participated in by certain simple sentences,
their negations, and compound sentences that contain them.25
24This view will be modified in Part 5.
25There are many other kinds of sentences that participate
in this relation--for example, sentences of the form 'It may be that
S'. Thus, the sentences in (i) but notthe sentences in (ii)
implicate statement (iii).
(i) (a) It may be that the man upstairs is a doctor.
(b) It may be that the man upstairs isn't a doctor.
(c) It may be that there is medicine in the cabinet
and the man upstairs is a doctor.
(d) It may be that either the man upstairs is a doctor
or the woman downstairs is a nurse.
(e) It may be that if the man upstairs is a doctor,
then we can save Mary.
(f) It may be that if the jewels are still in the building,
then the man upstairs has them.
(ii) (a) It may be that there is a man upstairs who is a doctor.
(b) It may be that there isn't a man upstairs who is a doctor.
(c) It may be that there is medicine in the cabinet and
there is a man upstairs who is a doctor.
(d) It may be that either there is a man upstairs who is
a doctor, or there is a woman downstairs who is a nurse.
(e) It may be that if there is a man upstairs who is a
doctor, then we can save Mary.
(f) It may be that if the jewels are still in the building,
then there is a man upstairs who has them.
(iii) There is a man upstairs.
In this essay, however, I will concentrate most on compound
sentences formed with sentential connectives.
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I will refer to this relation as 'k-presupposition'.
This is the relation mentioned in (35).
At present there is much that remains unclear about
k-presupposition. One thing we do know, however, is that
if a sentence S k-presupposes a statement P, then
assertively uttering S in normal circumstances and without
explicit qualification licenses an inference to P.
Examples (20), (23-24), and (27-32) are instances
of this relation.26
In calling this relation 'k-presupposition', I am
not assuming anything about the type of relation that it
is. For example, I am not assuming that the relation is
27
either logical or non-logical, semantic or pragmatic.
Nor am I assuming that it is the only kind of presupposi-
tion that there is. The definition of this relation and
the characterization of its relationship to other notions
of presupposition will be the subject of this essay.
26
It should be noted that some of these examples may be
instances of other relations as well--e.g., entailment.
27 In particular I am not assuming that for all S and P, if
S presupposes P, then S entails P.
PART 2
COMPOUND SENTENCES AND THE ATTACK ON
LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION
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I. Filtering and Truth Functionality
1.1 Filtering
I have just argued that compound sentences k-presuppose
what their constituents do. However, this conclusion is too
strong. Although there are many instances in which
the k-presuppositions of constituent sentences do carry over
to become k-presuppositions of the entire compound,
this is not always.the case. Each of the compound sentences
below contains a constituent sentence that k-presupposes
the corresponding (c) statement. These presuppositions
do not carry over to the compound sentences themselves.
1. a. If France has a king, then the King of France
is one of the few remaining monarchs in Europe.
b. Either France doesn't have a king, or the King
of France is one of the few remaining monarchs
in Europe.
c. There is a King of France.
2. a. If John has children, then all of his children
are asleep.
b. Either John doesn't have children, or all of
his children are asleep.
c. John has children.
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3. a. If anyone has solved the problem, then it's
Susan who has solved it.
b. Either no one has solved the problem, or it's
Susan who has solved it.
c. Someone solved the problem.
4. a. If Bill ever smoked, then he stopped smoking
before I met him.
b. Either Bill never smoked, or he stopped smoking
before I met him.
c. Bill has smoked.
5. a. If this function is not computable, then Church
knows that it is not computable.
b. Either this function is computable, or Church
knows that it is not computable.
c. This function is not computable.
Examples like these show that principle (35) of Part 1
must be modified. This is the central problem to which
Karttunen addresses himself in "Presuppositions of Compound
Sentences." I will take it up in detail in Part 5 where I
examine critically a number of his views. For the present, I
will follow him in proposing (6) and (7) as first approxima-
tions.
6. If S k-presupposes P, and R does not entail P,
then 'If R, then S1 k-presupposes P.1
iKarttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," Linguistic
Inquiry 4 (Spring 1973): 178.
160
7. If S k-presupposes P, and r-R' does not entail P,
then rEither R or ST k-presupposes P.2
These principles are consistent with all of the data
that I have considered thus far. Not only do they avoid
making incorrect predictions about (1-5), they correctly
account for many of the examples presented in Part 1. Be-
cause they predict that some, but not all, of the k-presup-
positions of a constituent sentence become k-presuppositions
of the entire compound, they are often said to perform a
filtering function. 3
(6) and (7) indicate the existence of filtering in
disjunctions and conditionals. What about conjunctions? Is it
necessary to adopt an analogous principle to account for the
k-presuppositions of these sentences? In the case of disjunc-
tions and conditionals, the existence of filtering is shown
by compound sentences that do not implicate, entail, or in
any other way suggest the truth of a k-presupposition of
one of their constituents. In the case of conjunctions,
there are no such examples. However, there is other
evidence that demonstrates the existence of filtering.
Ibid, p. 181. Note: (7) me:-ions expressions of the form '-R'
without making it clear whether the cga-ion in question is "internal"
or "external". I will discuss thes :wo kinds of negation in detail
in Part 3.
3There are other filtering :rinciples that might be used to
account for (1-5). These will be examined in Part 5 and compared with
(6) and (7). For the present, the difference between these alternatives
is not crucial.
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8. a. If Susan lives near Union Square, then she has
a landlord and her landlord is Irish.
b. Susan has a landlord and her landlord is Irish.
c. Susan has a landlord.
9. a. If John and Emily have been married for fifty
years, then they have children and all of
their children have grown up.
b. John and Emily have children and all of their
children have grown up.
c. John and Emily have children.
10. a. If Susan got anywhere in her investigation,
then someone had the jewels and it was one of
her contacts who had them.
b. Someone had the jewels and it was one of
Susan's contacts who had them.
c. Someone had the jewels.
11. a. Either Sam's recurring hallucinations are a
sign of mental illness, or he has taken a
lot of LSD and he has only recently stopped
taking it.
b. Sam has taken a lot of LSD and he has only
recently stopped taking it.
c. Sam has taken LSD.
12. a. Either the jewels have already been insured, or
they are safe and John knows that they are.
b. The jewels are safe and John knows that they
are safe.
c. The jewels are safe.
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The (a) sentences above do not k-presuppose the
corresponding (c) statements. Moreover, the (c) statements
are not entailed by either the antecedents of (8-10) or the
negations of the left disjuncts of (11-12). Consequently, if
(6) and (7) are correct, then the (b) sentences must not k-
presuppose the (c) statements either. Since each of these
sentences contains a conjunct which, in isolation, carries
the relevant k-presupposition, a filtering principle for
conjunctions is also required.4
13. If S k-presupposes P, and R does not entail P,
then R and S• k-presupposes P.5
Principles (6), (7) and (13) leave a number of
questions unanswered. (6) says nothing about the k-
presuppositions of conditionals that are inherited from
their antecedents. (7) and (13) are silent about the k-
presuppositions of disjunctions and conjunctions that
are inherited from their left disjuncts and conjuncts
respectively. This raises a question about the symmetry
Karttunen offers a different, but equally cogent argument for
the same conclusion ("Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," p. 179).
He points out that It {is possible} that S1 inherits the k-
may be
presuppositions, but not the entailments of S. (See footnote 25 of Part
1.) He then observes that (i), but not (ii), k-presupposes (iii).
(i) It is possible that Fred will kiss Cecilia again.
(ii) It is possible that Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia and
that he will kiss her again.
(iii) Fred has kissed Cecilia.
This is accounted for by (13).
Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," p. 179.
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of sentential connectives with respect to k-presupposition.
Are there analogous filtering principles for the leftmost
constituents of compound sentences, or are the k-presuppo-
sitions of these constituents always inherited?
In the case of disjunctions, this question is easily
answered. The sentences in (14) have exactly the same
k-presuppositions as the sentences in (15).
14. a. Either the King of France is French, or France
doesn't have a king.
b. Either all of Jack's letters have been held up
or he hasn't written any letters.
c. Either it's Susan who's got the jewels, or no
one has them.
d. Either Sam stopped smoking before I met him, or
he never smoked.
e. Either John regrets voting for Nixon, or he
didn't vote for Nixon at all.
15. a. Either France doesn't have a king, or the King
of France is French.
b. Either Jack hasn't written any letters at all,
or his letters have been held up.
c. Either no one has the jewels, or it's Susan
who's got them.
d. Either Sam never smoked, or he stopped smoking
before I met him.
e. Either John didn't vote for Nixon at all, or
he regrets voting for him.
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In neither case does assertively uttering the entire
disjunction implicate the truth of the corresponding
statement in (16).
16. a. There is a King of France.
b. Jack has written some letters.
c. Someone has the jewels.
d. Sam has smoked.
e. John voted for Nixon.
Consequently, neither the sentences in (14) nor those
in (15) k-presuppose these statements.6 This means
that the filtering principle for disjunctions is (17).
17. a. If S k-presupposes P, and r-R7 does not entail
P, then FEither R or S1 k-presupposes P.
b. If R k-presupposes P, and r-Sý does not entail
P, then rEither R or S1 k-presupposes P.
The situation with conjunctions and conditionals
is a bit more complex. Karttunen argues that all k-presup-
positions of an antecedent become k-presuppositions of the
entire conditional, and all k-presuppositions of an initial
6
Karttunen denies this. He claims that the sentences in (14), but
not in (15),are in some way deviant and do presuppose the statements in
(16). He is simply wrong about the data. The sentences in (14)
are perfectly acceptable and are exactly analogous to those in (15)
with respect to k-presupposition.
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conjunct become k-presuppositions of the entire conjunc-
tion. Thus, he claims that the filtering principles for
these sentences are asymmetric with respect to k-presuppo-
sition.
18. a. If S k-presupposes P, and R does not entail
P, then rIf R, then S1 k-presupposes P.
b. If R k-presupposes P, then VIf R, then S'
also k-presupposes P.
19. a. If S k-presupposes P, and R does not entail
P, then FR and S1 k-presupposes P.
b. If R k-presupposes P, then FR and S1 also
k-presupposes P.
In Part 5 I will show that Karttunen's arguments for
the (b) clauses of these principles are inconclusive.
However, this issue is independent of the main point I
want to make next. If the sentential connectives 'and',
'or', and 'if, then' are truth functional, then at least
some k-presuppositions must be non-logical.7
7
In this paper I will assume that the inductive definition
of k-presupposition specifies that the only k-presuppositions
of a compound sentence are those that arise from the relevant
filtering conditions.
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1.2 K-Presupposition and Truth Functionality
A logically presupposes B if and only if the truth
of B is a necessary condition for A to be either true
or false. 8  Thus, if rEither R or S1 logically presupposes
P and P is false, then FEither R or S1 is truth-valueless.
If, in addition, 'or' is truth functional, then FEither
T or S' must also be truth-valueless provided that R and
T do not differ in truth value.
From this it follows that not all k-presuppositions
are logical presuppositions. (18a) k-presupposes (18b).
18. a. Either France is not a member of NATO, or
the King of France is a reactionary.
b. There is a King of France.
R = 'France is not a member of NATO'
If this is also a logical presupposition, then (18a)
is truth-valueless (since (18b) is false). However,
substitution of another true sentence for R does not
In this paper I use "neither true nor false" and "truth-valueless"
interchangeably. These notions are not identical and are not even co-
extensive in a theory that posits more than two truth values. However,
the differences between these two notions are not significant here. For a
context in which these differences are important, see my "Frege's Theory
of Presupposition" and Dummet's Frege: Philosophy of Language,(New York:
Harper and Row, 1973), p. 185.
9This follows from filtering principle (17) of the previous
section.
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always preserve this lack of truth value. For example,
(19) is true rather than truth-valueless.
19. Either there is no King of France, or the King
of France is a reactionary.
Thus, if 'or' is truth functional, then at least some
k-presuppositions are not logical presuppositions.
In fact, if 'or' is truth functional, then some k-
presuppositions are not entailed by the sentences that
presuppose them. If (18a) entailed (18b), then (18a)
would not be true. The truth functionality of 'or'
would. then incorrectly predict that (19) is also untrue.
Consequently, if 'or' is truth functional, then some
instances of k-presupposition are not instances of
entailment.
A similar point holds for conditionals.1 0 Conjunctions,
on the other hand, require special attention. An important
theoretical difficulty arises when one tries to construct
an argument involving conjunctions that parallels the
10For example, (ia) k-presupposes (ib).
(i) (a) If Mary reads the report of the Surgeon General, then
she will stop smoking.
(b) Mary smokes.
R = 'Mary will read the report of the Surgeon General'
If this is a logical presupposition, and if (ib) is false, then (ia)
is neither true nor false. However, if R is also false, and 'if then'
is truth functional, then (ii) must also be truth-valueless.
(ii) If Mary smokes, then she will stop smoking.
It isn't. Therefore, if conditionals are truth functional, then
some k-presuppositions are non-logical.
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one just given involving disjunctions.
(20a) k-presupposes (20b).11
20. a. France is a member of NATO and the King of
France is a reactionary.
b. There is a King of France.
R = 'France is a member of NATO'
If this is also a logical presupposition, then (20a) is
truth-valueless. If, in addition, 'and' is truth func-
tional, then substituting (20b) for R should preserve
this lack of truth value (since both (20b) and R are false).
Thus,. (21) should be truth-valueless.
21. There is a King of France, and the King of
France is a reactionary.
This is where the argument involving conjunctions
differs from the argument involving disjunctions. Earlier
I showed that if 'or' is truth functional then maintaining
that all k-presuppositions of disjunctions are logical
presuppositions leads us to incorrectly characterize a
true sentence as truth-valueless. But (21) is not true
on anyone's account. It is either false or truth-valueless.
This follows from filtering principle (19) of the
previous section.
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We have reliable intuitions distinguishing truth from
untruth. If we also had reliable intuitions distin-
guishing falsity from truth-valuelessness, then we could
evaluate the claim that (21) is truth-valueless rather
than false.
Since I don't think we have such intuitions, I
don't think that we can directly evaluate this claim.
Logical presupposition is not a relation about which we
have direct intuitions, but rather is a theoretical
construct that can be used to account for certain
inferences. 1 2  (21) sanctions an inference to (20b)
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Proponents of logical presupposition have not always recognized
that alleged bearers of such presuppositions do not wear their truth
values on their sleeves. This point is illustrated by the following
passage from Strawson's "On Referring," Readings in the Philosophy of
Language, edited by Rosenberg and Travis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 174-5.
"Now suppose someone were in fact to say to you with a perfectly
serious air: 'The king of France is wise'. Would you say, 'That's
untrue'? I think it is quite certain that you would not. But
suppose he went on to ask you whether what he had just said was
true, or was false; whether you agreed or disagreed with what he
had just said. I think you would be inclined, with some hesita-
tion, to say that you did not do either; that the question of
whether his statement was true or false simply did not arise, be-
cause there was no such person as the king of France." (my emphasis)
Here Strawson tries to motivate a notion of logical presupposition by
appealing directly to data about what we would or would not say. Note,
however, that he uses the words 'untrue' and 'false' interchangeably.
It is natural that he should do so, since nothing in the passage would
change significantly if 'untrue' or 'not true' were substituted for
'false' throughout. Precisely this is what cannot be explained by
a theory of logical presupposition. On such a theory, it is neither
true nor false that the King of France is wise. Consequently, it is
not true and hence, untrue, that the King of France is wise. Thus,
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whether or not it logically presupposes (20b). Thus,
one cannot simply appeal to intuitions to determine
whether or not this is an instance of logical presup-
position. Consequently, one cannot construct a con-
vincing argument involving conjunctions that parallels
the one involving disjunctions.
What can be shown is that if 'and' is truth
functional, then either some k-presuppositions of conjunc-
tions are not logical presuppositions or some logical
presuppositions of conjunctions are not k-presuppositions.
In other words, there are conjunctions whose k-presupposi-
tions. and logical presuppositions are not identical.
This is easily demonstrated. (20a) k-presupposes
(20b). If this is not a logical presupposition, then
(20a) is a conjunction whose k-presuppositions are not
identical with its logical presuppositions. On the other
hand, if (20a) does logically presuppose (20b), and if
'and' is truth functional, then (21) must be truth-valueless.
Hence, it must logically presuppose something that is
untrue. Since (21) has no k-presuppositions that
if Strawson is "quite certain" that we would not say, "That's
untrue" in response to a claim about the King of France, then
he ought to have concluded that our intuitions conflict with his
theory every bit as much as they conflict with a theory that
postulates bivalence.
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13
are untrue, not all its logical presuppositions are
k-presuppositions. Thus, if 'and' is truth functional,
then there are conjunctions whose k-presuppositions
and logical presuppositions are not the same.
This brings up an important distinction that must be
kept in mind throughout--namely the distinction between
theses (22a) , (22b), and (22c).
22. a. K-presupposition is not co-extensive
with logical presupposition.
b. Not all k-presuppositions are logical
presuppositions.
c. No k-presuppositions are logical presuppositions.
Disjunctions and conditionals provide arguments for (22a)
and (22b). Conjunctions provide an argument only for
(22a). No arguments have yet been given for (22c).
The only argument I see for (22c) is programmatic.
The discussion up to now justifies positing a relation of
k-presupposition that differs from the notion of logical
13This claim carries the assumption that all k-presuppositions
of conjunctions arise from filtering principle (19) of the previous
section. It may be that (21) has no k-presuppositions at all. The
reason I hesitate about this is that I am not sure whether or not
Karttunen would claim that (20b) k-presupposes that France exists.
If he were to claim this, then he would hold that (21) shares this
k-presupposition. Still, since France does exist, (21) has no
k-presuppositions that are untrue. Hence, my argument goes through.
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presupposition. It may be that k-presupposition will
prove sufficient to adequately explain all relevant
data without appeal to logical presupposition at all.
Is so, then logical presupposition can be eliminated
from theories of natural language. It should be noted,
however, that in order to confirm this argument, a
comprehensive theory of non-logical presupposition must
be developed.
Even theses (22a) and (22b) depend upon the assumption
that the sentential connectives are truth functional.
A proponent of logical presupposition might deny this
assumption and argue that k-presupposition really is
just logical presupposition. To combat this argument,
I will look at a different phenomenon--presupposition
cancellation.14
14Karttunen often writes as if he does not recognize that the
argument against logical presupposition based on compound sentences
is programmatic. In "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences" (pp. 186-
188) he rejects all three-valued truth tables for conjunctions on
the grounds that they fail to incorporate adequate filtering conditions.
For example, he rejects (i).
(i) and T F *
T T F *
F F F *
If what he is trying to show is that we need a non-logical
notion of presupposition that applies to conjunctions, then his
observation about filtering is to the point. However, this does not
show that (i) is incorrect. On the other hand, if he is trying to
show that conjunctions do not carry logical presuppositions, then
his observation must be understood as part of a programmatic attempt
to supplant logical presupposition with an entirely new notion.
Karttunen also offers an argument against the truth
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table (ii).
(ii) & T F *
T TF *
F F F F
* * F *
He claims that according to (ii) what a conjunction logically presupposes
depends not on the form of the sentence or on its semantic properties,
but rather on what truth values its conjuncts happen to have. Fred Katz
has pointed out that this claim is incorrect (personal communication).
If we let rPre ST be a sentence which is true if and only if all of
the logical presuppositions of S are satisfied, then (iii) is
predicted by (ii) to be a logical presupposition of FA and B1.
(iii) r-(A and -Pre B) and -(B and -Pre. A) and (Pre A or Pre B)
Each conjunct of (iii) has the effect of ruling out one of the
positions occupied by '*' in (ii). According to (ii), rA and B1 is
truth-valueless iff (iii) is untrue. This holds for any A and B.
Thus, Karttunen's argument against (ii) is incorrect. The real
argument against (ii) is that it leaves a number of inferences
unexplained and hence is no substitute for k-presupposition.
.Finally, Karttunen claims that for all three-valued logics,
if truth functionality is maintained, then some classically valid
sentences or arguments will be lost ("Presuppositions of Compound
Sentences," p. 188). This claim is false. Fred Katz (personal commu-
nication.) has demonstrated that if (iv-viii) are adopted (the blanks
being filled in by either '*' or 'F'), then any sound and complete set
of axioms and rules of inference for the standard propositional
calculus will be validated.
(iv) - (v) V T F * (vi) & T F *
T F T T T T T TF -
F T F TF - F FF -
* T * T- - * - - -
(vii) M T F * (viii) E T F
T F - T TF -
F T T T F F T T
* T T * -T T
Note: this system incorporates what has been called "external
negation." However, there is nothing to prevent one from adopting
an "internal negation" operator as well. The argument against such
a system is not that it fails to preserve classical validity, but
only that it does not capture the inferences that k-presupposition
has been designed to accommodate.
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II. Presupposition Cancellation and Compound Sentences
The results based on filtering in Section 1.2
center on compound sentences that do not inherit the
k-presuppositions of their constituents. These results
depend upon the assumption that the connectives are truth
functional. The argument based on presupposition can-
cellation focuses on compound sentences that retain the
k-presuppositions of their constituents. 1 5 This argument
does not depend on any assumptions about truth functionality.
What is presupposition cancellation? If a sentence
S k-presupposes a statement P, then assertively uttering
S in normal circumstances and without explicit qualifi-
cation sanctions an inference to P--i.e., a speaker
assertively uttering S suggests that he believes P
and invites his audience to do the same. Such a
presupposition is cancelled in a conversational context C
if and only if the inference to P that is normally
sanctioned by assertively uttering S is explicitly
called into question in C and ceases to be sanctioned.
(23-27) are examples of presupposition cancellation.
Each of the (a) sentences below k-presupposes the
15Deirdre Wilson was the first theorist to draw attention to
the importance of presupposition cancellation for compound sentences.
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corresponding (b) statement. However, these sentences
can be appropriately uttered in contexts that deny or
cast doubt upon the truth of (b). Such contexts are
provided by (23c-27c). In these contexts the speaker
does not suggest that he believes (b) nor does he
invite his audience to accept (b). The k-presupposi-
tions are cancelled.
23. a. If all of the particles released by the
collision were negatively charged, then
the experiment was a success.
b. Some particles were released by the collision.
c. If all of the particles released by the
collision were negatively charged, then
the experiment was a success. However, this
assumes that the collision was strong enough
to separate some particles from the nucleus,
and I am not sure that it was.
24. a. If the jewels are still here, then it's
Susan who's got them.
b. Someone has the jewels.
c. If the jewels are still here, then it's
Susan who's got them. But I am afraid that
they were simply lost while we were on
vacation and that no one has them.
25. a. If Susan's agent gave her the money,
then the district attorney has a point.
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b. Susan has an agent.
c. If Susan's agent gave her the money,
then the district attorney has a point.
However, Susan doesn't even have an agent,
let alone one who practices extortion for her.
26. a. Either John gave up smoking or he gave up
drinking.
b. John used to smoke.
c. Either John gave up smoking or he gave up
drinking. Since he never smoked at all, it
must be drinking that he gave up.
27. a. Either the villain knows that Mary is dead,
or he is still in his hideout waiting to
receive word.
b. Mary is dead.
c. Either the villain knows that Mary is dead,
or he is still in his hideout waiting to
receive word. Since Mary may have escaped,
he may still be up there.
The fact that a k-presupposition P of a sentence
S can be cancelled provides evidence that S does not
entail P. If (23a-27a) entailed (23b-27b) respectively,
then (23c-27c) would be bizarre or inconsistent.16 Since
16Where presuppositions are entailed, cancelling is impossible.
(i)? It's Susan who has the jewels. But I am afraid that no
one has the jewels.
(ii)? Susan's agent gave her the money. But Susan doesn't have an
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they are neither, the (a) sentences do not entail the
(b) statements. Although the (a) sentences k-presuppose
the (b) statements, they do not logically presuppose
them. 1 7
We now have two arguments for the claim that not
all k-presuppositions are logical presuppositions. One
is based on filtering and the other is based on cancella-
tion. It is important to realize that the phenomena
agent.
(iii)? John gave up smoking. But he never smoked.
(iv)? The villain knows that Mary is dead. But she is alive.
Sometimes it is possible to show that a k-presupposition is
not entailed without appealing to instances of cancellation.
(i)! Either the post office or the police station in the next
town is open.
(ii) Either the post office in the next town is open, or the
police station in the next town is open.
(i) and (ii) k-presuppose that there is a post office and a police
station in the next town. Anyone assertively uttering them in normal
circumstances and without explicit qualification would implicate
that the next town contained both facilities. However, this implica-
ture is not an entailment. Suppose you were to utter assertively
either sentence and I were to say, "No, I'll bet you are wrong."
If the post office in the next town were open, then you would win
the bet no matter whether the town had a police station or not.
Since you could win the bet only if what you said was true, (i)
and (ii) do not entail (iii).
(iii) There is a post office and a police station in the next town.
18
For obvious reasons, conjunctions behave like simple sentences
with respect to cancellation. This does not show that simple
sentences and conjunctions bear logical presuppositions. All it
indicates is that there is no argument based on cancellation to
prove that they do not.
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upon which these arguments rely are independent.
Filtering determines when compound sentences inherit the
k-presuppositions of their constituent sentences. Can-
cellation occurs when a sentence carrying k-presuppositions
is assertively uttered in a wider discourse that
denies or casts doubt upon these k-presuppositions.19
Another difference between filtering and cancellation
is that all k-presuppositions can be filtered, whereas
not all k-presuppositions can be cancelled. For any P,
if S k-presupposes P, then P is "filtered out" in
determining the k-presuppositions of Either -P or S7,
rIf P, then S , and P and S .20 In contrast, the only
presuppositions that can be cancelled are those that are
not entailed by the sentences that presuppose them.
(23-27) are instances of cancellation but not filtering.
(28-32) are instances of filtering but not cancellation.
In determining the k-presuppositions of (28-32), P is
"filtered out" despite the fact that S entails P.
19
Presupposition cancellation is restricted to cases in which
a sentence is assertively uttered, but does not sanction an inference
to the relevant k-presupposition. Filtering is not so restricted.
The k-presuppositions of S may be "filtered out" despite the fact
that someone assertively uttering rEither -R or S1 or rIf R, then S
does not assertively utter S.
Moreover, although filtering occurs in conjunctions, the k-
presuppositions that are filtered out are not "denied" or "called
into question".
2 0This filtering is accomplished by principles (17-19).
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28. If the collision released particles from the
nucleus, then all of the particles so released
were negatively charged.
S = 'All of the particles released from the
nucleus by the collision were negatively
charged'
P = 'The collision released particles from the
nucleus'
29. If someone has the jewels, then it is Susan
who has them.
S = 'It is Susan who has the jewels'
P = 'Someone has the jewels'
.30. If Susan has an agent, then her agent gave her
* the money.
S = 'Susan's agent gave her the money'
P = 'Susan has an agent'
31. Either John has never smoked, or he gave up
smoking.
S = 'John gave up smoking'
P = 'John has smoked'
32. Either Mary is alive, or the villain knows that
she isn't alive.
S = 'The villain knows that Mary isn't alive'
P = 'Mary isn't alive'
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III. Compound Sentences and the Status of Logical
Presuppositions
So far I have established three major results.
First, there is a relation of k-presupposition that is not
identical with logical presupposition. Second, there are
instances of k-presupposition that are not instances of
logical presupposition. Third, some sentences k-presuppose
sentences that they do not entail. Both the arguments
based on filtering and those based on cancellation
support these conclusions.
In this section I will consider the stronger
conclusion that natural language is free of logical
presuppositions. So far I have only considered compound
sentences. Nothing has been said about the k-presupposi-
tions of simple sentences and their negations. If there
are no logical presuppositions, then these k-presuppositions
must also be non-logical. Do the results already
established allow us to conclude that this is the case?
It is tempting to think that they do. This
temptation comes in the form of the following argument:
33. a. The k-presuppositions of disjunctions and
conditionals are not logical presuppositions
of these sentences. For example, P is not a
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necessary condition for either (i) or (ii)
to have a truth value.
(i) If Nelson's wife was nominated, then
Gerald's wife was disappointed.
(ii) Either Nelson's wife wasn't nominated,
or Gerald's wife was disappointed.
P = {Nelson} has a wife'Gerald
b. The relationship between P and the compound
sentences in (a) is the same as the
relationship between (v) and (iii-iv), and
between (viii) and (vi-vii).
(iii) Nelson's wife was nominated.
(iv) Nelson's wife wasn't nominated.
(v) Nelson has a wife.
(vi) Gerald's wife was disappoited.
(vii) Gerald's wife wasn't disappointed.
(viii) Gerald has a wife.
c. Therefore, (iii-iv) do not logically
presuppose (v), and (vi-vii) do not logically
presuppose (viii).
If this argument were sound, it would demonstrate
that traditional examples of presupposition are not
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instances of logical presupposition. Unfortunately,
it is not. This can be seen by comparing it with a
parallel argument in which the question at issue involves
entailment rather than logical presupposition.
34. a. The k-presuppositions of disjunctions and
conditionals are not entailed by the
presupposing sentences. For example, P
is not a necessary condition for either (i)
or (ii) to be true.
(i), (ii), and (P) as in (33a).
b. Same as in (33b).
c. Therefore, (iii-iv) do not entail (v),
and (vi-vii) do not entail (viii) .
(33) and (34) have exactly the same form. Conse-
quently, one is valid if and only if the other is. Notice
21
also that (33a) and (34a) are true and that (33b) = (34b).
This means that either both arguments are sound or
22
neither is. Thus, the fact that (34c) is false shows
that both arguments must be rejected.
The problem is (b). What does it mean to say of
21The arguments in the previous two sections show this.
22
It incorrectly states that (iii) does not entail v), and
(vi) does not entail (viii).
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arbitrary pairs of sentences that the relationship
between their members is the same? If it means that
for all relations R each pair of sentences is an instance
of R if and only if the others are, then (33) and
(34) are valid, but not sound. On this interpretation,
premise (b) is false since (iii) and (vi) entail (v)
and (viii) respectively, whereas (i) and (ii) do not
entail P.
Premise (b) can also be interpreted in another way.
What it asserts is that there is a theoretically
significant relation that (i) and (ii) bear to P;
(iii),, and (iv) bear to (v); and (vi) and (vii) bear to
(viii). On this interpretation, (b) is true--the relation
in question being k-presupposition. But now the arguments
are not valid. (iii) and (vi) entail what they k-presuppose.
Nothing in the arguments precludes these k-presuppositions
from being logical presuppositions as well.
This possibility is not to be taken lightly.
In stating the filtering conditions for compound sentences
I simply assumed that we had a theory that picks out
the k-presuppositions of simple sentences and their
negations. Nothing was said about the nature of this
theory. If the best way to handle these sentences is
with a theory of logical presupposition, then our overall
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account of k-presupposition must include such a theory
as one of its parts.
There is nothing incoherent about this. Any
theory incorporating the filtering conditions of
Section 1.1 is committed to a recursive characterization
of k-presupposition. Such a characterization must
include at least one clause to cover the k-presuppositions
of simple sentences and their negations. If these
presuppositions are logical, then the clause in question
may simply be (35).
35. If P is a necessary condition for S to have a
truth value, then P is k-presupposed by S.23
In such a theory, (35) would be combined with a
definition of truth in which certain simple sentences
and their negations are neither true nor false. (35)
together with this truth-definition would predict what
these sentences k-presuppose.24 Addition of the filtering
This clause could be formulated differently depending upon
one's favorite definition of logical presupposition. Here I assume
that S is either a simple sentence or a negation of such a sentence.
2 4This account could easily be extended to cover other traditional
cases of logical presupposiion--e.g., sentences with quantifiers. To
do so would involve adopting a definition of truth in which the
relevant quantified sentences come out truth-valueless.
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conditions would provide a basis for explaining all
of the data that we have examined thus far.2 5
This is not to say that the above analysis is
ultimately correct. However, it does illustrate an
important point. Although compound sentences provide
motivation for positing a relation of non-logical
26presupposition, they do not furnish an argument for
27
eliminating logical presupposition altogether. To
25I assume here that any theory incorporating the filtering
conditions must include, in addition to a recursive characterization
of k-presupposition, a statement from which it follows that if S
k-presupposes P, then assertively uttering S in normal circumstances
and without explicit qualification sanctions an inference to P.
This is discussed in more detail in Part 5.
26Even if (35) is included in a recursive characterization of
k-presupposition, the relation remains non-logical in my sense. The
reason for this is that the claim that an arbitrary sentence S
k-presupposes a statement P does not imply that S entails P.
27Although this conclusion is obvious, it seems to me that it
has not always been recognized. For example, in "Presuppositions of
Compound Sentences," Karttunen claims that facts about filtering show
that three-valued logics with truth functional operators "have
nothing to recommend themselves" and that "they do not provide us
with a viable notion of presupposition. (p. 188)" Here the claim
seems to be not just that notions of logical presupposition are
insufficient and hence need supplementation, but rather that they
should be completely supplanted. What makes this conclusion
surprising is that it is based entirely on compound (and other
complex) sentences without any discussion of how we should handle
traditional data for a theory of logical presupposition.
Another argument in which Karttunen makes essentially the same
point is based on sentences of the form (i).
(i.•:It { may beis possibleS
Karttunen observes that if S presupposes P, then I't { may be } thatis possible
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determine whether or not such an argument is forthcoming,
we must turn our attention to the relationship between
presupposition and negation.
S sanctions an inference to P. This is not the case if S only
entails P (See Part 1, footnote 25). From this Karttunen concludes
that characterizations of presupposition in terms of entailment
are unsatisfactory. In particular, he claims that Van Frassen's
definition of presupposition as that which is entailed by a
sentence and its negation is inadequate.
It should be noted that all that is entailed by Karttunen's
observation is that presupposition is not the same relation as
entailment. This is compatible with Van Frassen's claim that
instances of presupposition are instances of entailment and also
with his claim that A presupposes B if and only if both A and
its negation entail B.
However, Karttunen's argument can be expressed differently.
What his data show is that if presupposition is defined exclusively
in terms of entailment, then something will be left unexplained--
namely, the inference from (i) to P, where S presupposes P. Thus,
the force of the argument is not that notions of logical presup-
position are inapplicable to natural language, but rather that they
are not sufficient. Instead,. we need a broader theory. It
remains an open question whether or not logical presupposition has
a part in this theory.
PART 3
LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION AND NEGATION
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I. Logical Presupposition, Negation, and Singular Terms
The most common argument for logical presupposition
centers on the relationship between certain simple
sentences and their negations. Chief among these are
sentences like those in (1) and (2).
1. a. Wilt Chamberlain is rich.
b. Nixon's wife is happy.
c. The monarch who rules France is wise.
2. a. Wilt Chamberlain isn't rich.
b. Nixon's wife isn't happy.
c. The monarch who rules France isn't wise.
Each of these sentences sanctions an inference to the
corresponding statement in (3).
3. a. There is such a person as Wilt Chamberlain.
b. Nixon has a wife.
c. There is a monarch who rules France.
The question is, what is the nature of this inference
and why does it go through?
Most theorists have assumed that both the sentences
in (1) and those in (2) bear a logical relation to the
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statements in (3). They have agreed that these latter
statements express necessary conditions for the former
sentences to be true. In my terminology, this amounts
to the claim that the sentences in (1) and (2) entail
their counterparts in (3).1
This presents a problem. The sentences in (2)
are negations of those in (1). It is natural to assume
that sentences which are negations of one another can be
neither true together nor false together. If, in addition,
every sentence is assumed to be either true or false,
then the claim that the sentences in (1) and (2) entail
the statements in (3) is problematic. For example,
since (3c) is false, both (lc) and (2c) must also be
false. But this is impossible on the assumptions
just mentioned.
Theories of logical presupposition provide one way
out of this difficulty. The assumption that every sentence
is either true or false is abandoned. The statements in
(3) are necessary conditions for the sentences in (1)
and (2) to have a truth value. This means that (ic)
and (2c) are truth-valueless. Nevertheless, if each had
a truth value, then one would be true and the other false.
Recall, sentences entail statements only in a derivative sense.
A sentence S entails a statement P if and only if the proposition
(statement) expressed by S entails P.
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One feature of this view is that it allows the
logical form of a sentence--or, in more contemporary
terms, its semantic representation--to be very close
to its surface grammatical form.2  For example, the
sentences in (1) retain their subject-predicate form in
semantic representation. Where singular definite
descriptions are involved, as in (Ic), a description
operator is used to construct semantically complex
singular terms. Hence, (lc) is represented by (4).
4, W ix (Mx & Rxf)
Here, the complex singular term 'Ix (Mx & Rxf) '
refers to the unique person who satisfies the open
sentence 'Mx & Rxf'. A sentence of the formal language
2This may be a virtue in a theory that attempts to account for
the syntax and semantics of sentences of natural language. Such a
theory must explicate the mapping between semantic representation and
surface grammatical form. Part of this mapping may be the result of
independently motivated principles of syntax. Apart from this, it is
desirable to posit a semantic representation that requires as
little new conceptual machinery as possible. Thus, by simplifying
the mapping between semantic and syntactic structure, we may be
simplifying the overall theory.
For purposes of illustration I will assume that the
semantic representation of an English sentence is given by a sentence
in a formal language. For our purposes, we may restrict our attention
to more or less standard first order languages.
I will assume that the statements below (about reference and
truth value) are part of a model theoretic logical theory which is
defined over the language of semantic representations. Consequently,
each of these statements should be understood as relativized to inter-
pretations. Of course, the "intended" interpretation is one in which
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which consists of an n-place predicate followed by n
terms is true if and only if these terms refer to an
n-tuple of objects that satisfies the predicate. It is
false if and only if they refer to an n-tuple that doesn't
satisfy the predicate. It is truth-valueless if and only
if at least one of the terms fails to refer. Finally,
a negation operator with the truth table (5) is
introduced, and (2c) is represented by (6).
5.
T
F
*
F
T
6. '%[W x(Mx & Rxf)]
On this account, both (ic) and (2c) turn out to be
truth-valueless.
This theory predicts that the sentences in (1)
and (2) entail the corresponding sentences in (3).
However, it is not the only theory to do so. Russell's
account makes the same predictions without abandoning
bivalence.5 The cost of his theory is that expressions
of the form 'the so-and-so' are no longer treated as
'f' names France, 'M' and 'W' are satisfied by monarchs and wise
individuals respectively, and 'R' is true of ordered pairs x and y
such that x rules y.
5See pp. 132-133, Part 1.
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genuine singular terms. A sentence containing such an
expression must be assigned a semantic representation that
is remote from its surface grammatical form--a represen-
tation in which the relevant expression is not repre-
sented by any single constituent of semantic structure.
It would even be possible to account for the
(alleged) entailments of (1) and (2) without either
accepting this consequence or positing logical presuppo-
sition. The easiest way to do so would be to introduce
a negative predicate making operator into the language
of semantic representations.6 This operator would be
involved in the construction of predicates like [%(P]
This predicate would be satisfied by all and only the
objects that do not satisfy P.7
As before, a sentence which consists of an n-place
predicate followed by n terms is true if and only if
these terms refer to an n-tuple that satisfies the
predicate. This time, however, we would say that a
sentence is false if and only if it is not true. On this
analysis, (2c) would be represented by (7).
7. ['W] ix(Mx & Rxf)
I .am indebted to Fred Katz (personal communication) for
pointing out the possibility of this analysis.
7This statement would be included in the theory's recursive
definition on truth.
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Although both (lc) and (2c) entail (3c), these sentences
would be characterized as false rather than truth-
valueless. Since the (alleged) entailments of these
sentences can be perspicuously characterized whether
or not a theory of logical presupposition is adopted,
it will be useful to look elsewhere for further data.
II. Negation, Quantifiers, and Logical Presupposition
Another traditional argument for logical presupposition
is based on quantified sentences like those in (8).
8. a. All of the books in this room are valuable.
b. None of the books in this room are valuable.
Each of these sentences sanctions an inference to (9).
9. There are books in this room.
8It might be claimed that (2c) is ambiguous and that on one
of its readings, it does not entail (3c). Since the analysis
just given postulates sentential, as well as predicate negation,
this is no problem. The.reading of (2c) in which it does not
entail (3c) can be represented by (i).
(i) -(W lx(Mx & Rxf))
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If these sentences entail (9), then they cannot be
represented by their most obvious counterparts in the
predicate calculus.
10. a. Yx (Bx & Rx =Vx)
b. -3x (Bx & Rx & Vx)
Consequently, some new representations must be found.
Proponents of logical presupposition have claimed
that examples like these provide evidence for their
theory. The classical defense of this position is
presented by Strawson in Introduction to Logical Theory
where he argues that (8a and b) logically presuppose
(9).10 Unfortunately, he doesn't provide formal
'B', 'R', and 'V' represent respectively the predicates 'is
a book', 'is in this room', and 'is valuable'.
10
Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, (London: Methuen
and Co., Ltd., 1971). Strawson's discussion takes place between
pages 152-184 of that work. However, his explicit arguments for
logical presupposition leave something to be desired. The main
argument (pp. 173-176) relies on intuitions about truth-valuelessness
and hence suffers from the difficulty noted earlier in footnote 12
of Part 2, pp. 169-170. His other main argument involves the inter-
pretation of the laws of traditional (Aristotelian) logic--the most
well-known of which constitute the Square of Opposition.
(i) (a) rAll x is y1 is the contradictory of- Some x is not y1.
(b) FNo x is y- is the contradictory of rSome x is y".
(c) rAll x is y1 and 'No x is y' are contraries.
(d) rSome x is yl and rSome x is not yl are subcontraries.
(e) IAll x is yI entails FSome x is y1
(f) ro x is y7 entails FRome x is not y7.
Strawson establishes two results about these laws. First, if
the definitions in (ii) are adopted, then there is no way to simulta-
neously preserve all the laws in (i) and correctly represent the
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representations for these sentences. Since it will be
convenient for our purposes to have such representations,
it is worthwhile to outline briefly how they might be
constructed.
A theory of logical presupposition seems to require
a productive mechanism for constructing quantifiers
meanings of the relevant English sentences in the standard,
bivalent predicate calculus.
(ii) (a) P and Q are contradictory iff one or the other must
be true, but both cannot be true together.
(b) P and Q are contraries iff they cannot be true
together, but they can be false together.
(c) P and Q are subcontraries iff one or the other must
be true and moreover, they both may be true together.
(d) P entails Q iff it cannot be that*P is true when
Q is not.
Second, if bivalence is abandoned, and the definitions in (ii) are
modified by inserting the clause 'whenever both have a truth value'
immediately after 'iff', then the laws in (i) can be rendered consis-
tent. On this analysis, sentences of the four forms presuppose a
statement of the form 'There are x's', where 'x' stands in for the
subject of the sentence. (For a discussion of the role of variables
in the four forms and the technical notion of a 'term', see Strawson.)
Although these results are interesting and worthwhile, they
do not motivate logical presupposition. For one thing, (i) could be
trivially rendered consistent by modifying the definitions in (ii) in a
different way--e.g., by inserting 'if the subject terms of both apply
to at least one thing'. For another, there is no reason to suppose
that an empirical theory of natural language has an obligation to save
the Square of Opposition in any interesting sense. Consider (id).
Since speakers have no reliable intuitions about truth-valuelessness,
there is no pre-theoretic reason to suppose that it is true on
the non-bivalent interpretation suggested by Strawson. It is
enough that our theory predict that it is false when interpreted in
accordance with (ii) and true when modified in accordance with the
trivial principle just mentioned. What this means is that although
the laws in (i) may be true when interpreted Strawson's way, independent
arguments are needed to justify abandoning bivalence in the first place.
In this section, I will try to reconstruct such arguments. Al-
though they are not explicitly given by Strawson, I believe that they
are at least roughly in line with what he had in mind.
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of arbitrary complexity. For purposes of illustration,
I will take the definite description operator as my model.
This operator converts an open sentence Ov into a
compound singular term Fivv I111 Since Pv may be any
open sentence, this process allows the formation of
singular terms of arbitrary complexity.
Similarly, an operator 'A' can be defined for
constructing compound quantifiers. To do this, we again
let (v be any open sentence andrQ l be any simple
quantifier--e.g., rvz1 or r . v A v)A is then
defined to be a compound quantifier, which can be
prefixed to an open sentence.12  For example, on this
analysis, the phrase 'all of the books in this room'
is represented by (11), and (8a) is represented by
(12).
11. [V x A (Bx & Rx)]
'V' and '0' are metalinguistic variables ranging over
expressions in the formal language of semantic representations. The
values of 'V' are variables in the formal language--'x', 'y', 'z',...
The values of '0' are formulas of the formal language. '(V' is used
in place of '0' where it is understood that the values of '(' are to
be limited to formulas in which V occurs free. For example,rIuVvl
is the expression that consists of '1' followed by v and @--where
it is understood that V occurs free in 4.
1 2Ed Keenan proposes a similar analysis using different notation
in "Presupposition in Natural Logic," The Monist 57 (July 1973): 344-
370.
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12. [V x A (Bx & Rx)] Vx1 3
The clause needed in a model theoretic truth
defintiion to evaluate such structures can be formulated
in several ways. But no matter how it is stated, it
must yield results requivalent to (13).
13. rQv A Dv.) Y`• is true in an interpretation I
if and only if
(i) there is at least one object that
satisfies Dv in I, and
(ii) rQvTvl is true in an interpretation J,
which is exactly like I except for
specifying that the values of the
variable v are restricted to all and only
those thingsthat satisfy ov in I.14
13
Note, compound quantifiers are not singular terms. Thus, the
representation of (8a) is not (i).
(i) V (Vx A (Bx & Rx))
On the above analysis, (i) is not even a well-formed formula.
One main reason for not representing English quantified phrases as
singular terms is provided by sentences that contain more than one such
phrase.
(ii) Each of the boys in the class likes some girl in the class.
(iii) Each of the women in the village hates some of her
relatives in the city.
(ii) exhibits the well-known ambiguity that can be captured by inter-
changing the scopes of the quantifiers. This solution would be impos-
sible if the quantified English phrases were represented by singular
terms. In fact, I see no way that such a representation could
account for either (ii) or (iii).
14if (13) is adopted, it is convenient to always adopt
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This clause guarantees that r(Vx &A x) Txl is
logically equivalent to r3xDx & Vx(Dx Txx)p , and
t(3x A Ox) TYx1 is logically equivalent to 3x( x & x).
Consequently, (12) entails (14).
14. 3x (Bx & Rx)
I am supposing that (12) is the semantic representation
of (8a) and that (14) is the representation of (9). Thus,
the theory just constructed predicts that (8a) entails
(9) .15
In making this prediction I didn't say anything
about lqgical presupposition. This notionecomes
representations in which different occurrences of simple quantifiers
bind different variables.
It is also necessary to extend the usual definition of binding.
The new definition must be equivalent to the following:
An occurrence of a variable u in a formula 6 is bound iff
(i) it is within an occurrence (in 6) of a formula
rQ V 'Por l(QV A D)T71 (where D and I are formulas); or
(ii) it is within an occurrence (in 0) of a singular term
All other occurrences are free.
15Where S and S' are sentences of English, I assume that a
theory predicts that S entails S' (on a reading) iff R(S') is
a consequence of R(S)--where R(S) and R(S') -are semantic repre-
sentations of S and S' respectively and the notion of consequence
is defined formally by the semantic theory. For convenience,
I am ignoring the difference between (9) and (i).
(i) There is at least one book in the room.
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relevant only when (15) and (16) are considered
together [(8a) is repeated here as (15)].
15. All of the books in this room are valuable.
16. Not all of the books in this room are valuable.
Both of these sentences sanction inferences to (9).
If both entail (9), then incorporating a theory of
logical presupposition into the account of quantification
just constructed provides a simple explanation of these
entailments. To provide this explanation, two further
elements are needed--(5) and (17).
5.
T
F
*
F
T
*
17. F(Qv A 0v) 'vlis false in an interpretation I
if and only if
(i) there is at least one object that
satisfies Ov in I, and
(ii) vQv9vlis false in J, where J is
exactly like I except for specifying
that the values of the variable v
200
are restricted to all and only
the objects that satisfy Dv in I.16
According to (13) and (17), the truth of (14) is a
necessary condition for (12) to be either true or
false.
16In addition to (17), it is necessary in a fully developed
theory to adopt clauses giving the falsity conditions for simple
quantifications liker3UV and F-9(7. As a first approximation, we
may adopt (i).
(i) A sentence rQVOlis false in an interpretation I iff
(a) rQv9is not true in I; and
(b) For some object 0 in the range of v and name B
that does not already occur in 4, ZV/8 is false in I8
(Ig is an interpretation that differs at most from I in
assigning the name 8 to the object 0. DV/ý is the
result of replacing all free occurrences of V in D
with occurrences of 8.)
Together, (i), (17) and (5) ensure that (ii) entails (iii)
and (iv) entails (v).
(ii) n(3 xA (Bx & Cx)) L x ly(Gy & Fy)
(None of the boys in the class like the girl in the
front row)
(iii) iy(Gy & Fy)
(There is a girl in the front row)
(iv) n'(3x A (Bx & Cx)) (Vy A (Gy & Cy)) Lxy
(None of the boys in the class like all of the girls in
the class)
(v) 3y(Gy & Cy)
(There is at least one girl in the class)
Sentences like (vi) and (vii) provide further tests for
the theory developed here.
(vi) Not every second year student likes his advisor:
(vii) No second year student likes his advisor.
Unfortunately, these sentences raise issues that cannot be
pursued in this thesis.
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12. (Vx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
14. 3x (Bx & Rx)
Since the negation operator defined in (5) preserves
truth-valuelessness, the truth of (14) is also a
necessary condition for (18) to be either true or
false.
18. %(Vx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
Thus, (12) and (18) logically presuppose (14). If (12)
and (18) represent (15) and (16), then the latter
logically presuppose, and hence entail, (9).
.This way of looking at things brings out an
important parallel between the rationale for logical
presupposition based on definite descriptions and that
based on quantifiers. In each case a sentence of English
and one of its grammatical negations are assumed to entail
the same statement. In each case a theory of logical
presupposition provides a simple explanation of this
entailment. Introduction of the 'i' and 'A' operators
captures the relevant entailments of the positive
sentences. Capturing the same entailments of the negative
sentences depends upon distinguishing falsity from
truth-valuelessness. Failure of ivQu7 to refer and failure
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of (QV A 4)f 1 to pick out a non-empty universe of discourse
result in truth-valuelessness. The account is completed
by positing a negation operator that preserves this
truth-valuelessness.
The parallel between these two cases illustrates a
fundamental issue regarding possible arguments for
logical presupposition. In considering simple sentences
(including simple quantifications) one would have no
reason to abandon bivalence if doing so did not faci-
17litate the account of larger sentences. If one were
only concerned with simple sentences, and nothing
more complex, then one could simply write into the truth
definition whatever is necessary for these sentences to
be true, letting all failures of truth be instances of
18falsity. This is troublesome only when different
reasons for a sentence's being untrue affect whether or
not some more complex sentence is true. 19 Distinguishing
17Dummet argues at length for this conclusion in his discussion
of Frege. See Frege: Philosophy of Language, (New York: Harper and Row,
1973), pp. 417-429 and pp. 446-467 (especially pp. 419-423). Also see
Dummet, "Truth," Philosophical Logic,edited by P.F. Strawson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 61-63.
18
e.g., one could adopt (13) without (17).
19
e.g., the difference (for the truth of (16)) between there
being no books in the room and there being an inexpensive one.
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between falsity and truth-valuelessness allows us to
mark such differences while maintaining that the contexts
in question are truth functional. Hence, the importance
of negation in arguments for logical presupposition.
This also sheds light on my earlier discussion of
compound sentences. Although the paradigmatic data for
theories of logical presupposition consist of simple
sentences,20 these sentences justify abandoning
bivalence only if larger, typically truth functional,
structures are best explained by distinguishing between
the falsity and truth-valuelessness of their constituents.
My discussion of compound sentences indicates that these
structures do not require this distinction. This eliminates
a large and obvious class of cases that might be used
to motivate logical presupposition. However, it is not
conclusive since it still leaves negation as a possible
source of support.
It should be noted that none of the data cited thus
far conclusively demonstrate the need for logical
presupposition. We have already seen that in the case
of definite descriptions, there are alternative accounts.
The same is true for quantifiers. For example, the
20
Typically, such sentences are grammatically of subject-
predicate form. This data includes both sentences whose grammatical
subjects are singular termsand those whose grammatical subjects are
quantified phrases.
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sentences in (19) could be represented by the sentences
in (20) rather than by those in (21).21
19. a. All of the books in this room are valuable.
b. Not all of the books in this room are valuable.
c. Some of the books in this room are valuable.
d. None of the books in this room are valuable.
20. a. 3x (Bx & Rx) & Vx (Bx & Rx nVx)
b. -Vx (Bx & Rx:DVx)
c. 3x (Bx & Rx & Vx)
d. 3x (Bx & Rx) & -3x (Bx & Rx & Vx)
-21. a. (Vx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
b. *(Vx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
c. (3x A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
d. 1(3xA (Bx & Rx)) Vx
The advantage of the representations in (21) is
their regularity. They correspond much more closely to
surface grammatical form than do their counterparts
in (20). The disadvantage of these representations is
that they require (13) and (17) which introduce truth
value gaps. On the other hand, the representations in
21Note the difference between '-' and "'' in (20) and (21).
These operators differ in that "L' preserves truth-valuelessness
whereas '-' equates falsity with untruth.
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(20) do not require these additions. Instead they
necessitate a complex and irregular representation relation
between sentences of English and their semantic repre-
22
sentations. To decide conclusively in favor of one
or the other of these alternatives would involve
examining their role in a total theory that includes
both syntax and semantics. Such a task is beyond the
scope of this essay. Prima facie, the case for logical
presupposition based on quantifiers and definite
descriptions seems to be at least as strong as the
case for the opposing alternatives that I have mentioned.
The case for logical presupposition may even be
strengthened by considering natural language quantifiers
like 'most'.
22. Most of the books in this room are valuable.
Let us represent 'most' with a formal quantifier rMiP
This quantifier is such that rMvV is true if and only
if most of the values of v satisfy Dv. On this account,
(22) cannot be represented by either (23) or (24).
23. Mx (Bx & Rx DVx)
24. Mx (Bx & Rx & Vx)
22
Note that the mechanism for associating sentences with their
semantic representations would have to treat sentences with 'some'
differently from sentences with 'all'.
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Since there are more things that are not books than
things that are, (23) is true and (24) is false, regardless
of what proportion of the books in the room are valuable.
However, if (22) is represented as (25), then (13)
correctly characterizes its truth conditions.23
25. (Mx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
If this analysis is correct, then there is independent
motivation for both compound quantifiers and their
characterization in (13). Thus, these devices can be
justified independently of a theory of logical presuppo-
sition.24
A similar analysis works for 'many'. 'Many' differs
from 'most' in being vaguer than 'most' and in occurring
naturally with 'not'.
23
More precisely, a definition of truth which includes (13)
together with a specification of the intended interpretation of the
predicates in (25) correctly characterizes the truth conditions of
(22). Note, (13) and (17) were stated so as to apply to all simple
quantifiers, not just 'Vx' and '3x'.
2 4Of course, this analysis of 'most' is not the only one
possible. For example, (22) could be represented by (i).
(i) 3x 3y (x numbers ' (Bw & Rw & Vw) & y numbers 2
(Bz & Rz & -Vz) & x>y)
Here, (ii) and (iii) are compound singular terms of the form 0vv1.
(ii) W^ (Bw & Rw & Vw)
(iii) 2 (Bz & Rz & -Vz)
Such terms refer to the set of all objects satisfying VD. However,
this analysis involves difficulties of its own--new term producing
operators, an ontology of sets for simple sentences like (22), and a
very complex representation relation. Thus, although the analysis
of most given in the text has not been conclusively established, it
seems to be a reasonable one.
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26. Many books in this room are valuable.
27. Not many books in this room are valuable.
The latter fact is important for theories of logical
presupposition. (26) and (27) sanction inferences to
(9). Representing (26) and (27) by (28) and (29) accounts
for these inferences (provided that both (5) and (17) are
also adopted).
28. (MNx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
29. '(MNx A (Bx & Rx)) Vx
The fact that several quantifiers can be treated in a
uniform way by a theory that incorporates (13) and (17)
constitutes significant evidence for such a theory.
If the (a) and (b) sentences in (30) and (31)
entail the corresponding (c) sentences, then the scope of
logical presupposition may be expanded still further.
30. a. It's his dancing that Sam likes to brag about.
b. It isn't his dancing that Sam likes to brag
about.
c. Sam likes to brag about something.
(knows
31. a. Joe realizes that he lost his wallet.
tregrets
know
b. Joe doesn't realize that he lost his wallet.
.regret 3
c. Joe lost his wallet.
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Although little is known about the correct way to
represent these sentences, a theory of logical presup-
position could make (c) sentences necessary conditions
for the (a) sentences to be either true or false.
Since negation preserves truth-valuelessness, the (b)
sentences take care of themselves. This approach to the
sentences in (30) and (31) is as promising as any I
know of.
Although it is not conclusive that simple sentences
and their negations bear logical presuppositions, I
have shown that such an account is at least plausible.
III. Negation, Cancellation, and Logical Presupposition
3.1 Wilson's Arguments
The case for logical presupposition just constructed
is based solely on negation. Moreover, it depends upon a
crucial characterization of the data.
32. a. All of the books in this room are valuable.
b. Not all of the books in this room are valuable.
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c. There are books in this room.
33. a. Some of the books in this room are valuable.
b. None of the books in this room are valuable.
c. There are books in this room.
34. a. The King of Sussex is the man you saw.
b. The King of Sussex isn't the man you saw.
c. There is a King of Sussex.
35. a. It was Susan who solved the problem.
b. It wasn't Susan who solved the problem.
c. Someone solved the problem.
.36. a. Sam stopped smoking yesterday.
b. Sam didn't stop smoking yesterday.
c. Sam used to smoke.
37. a. Malory knows that mongeese subdivide.
b. Malory doesn't know that mongeese subdivide.
c. Mongeese subdivide.
38. a. Bill realizes that my thesis is true.
b. Bill doesn't realize that my thesis is true.
c. My thesis is true.
Both the (a) and (b) sentences in (32-38). sanction
inferences to the corresponding (c) statements. Each of
the accounts that I have considered depends upon the
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further assumption that the (a) and (b) sentences entail
the (c) statements. This is precisely the assumption that
Wilson attacks. She argues that although the positive
sentences entail their (c)-counterparts, the negative
sentences do not. If her arguments can be sustained,
then negative sentences do not bear logical presuppositions.
One of Wilson's main arguments is based on the
connectives 'since', 'because', and 'and'. These
connectives are alike in that both A and B are entailed
by rince A, B , rB because A , and rA and B". Since
entailment is transitive, these sentences entail
everything that is entailed by A and B separately.
This fact can be used to reconstruct Wilson's argument.
25 (39) is not explicitly formulated by Wilson, but rather
is a reconstruction of her remarks. The argument that she gives is
designed to show that sentences like (ia-va) in (39) do not logically
presuppose (ic-vc). She says:
"I assume that these sentences are perfectly capable of being
true. This fact is puzzling for the strong presuppositional
analysis [an analysis in which complex sentences always inherit
the presuppositions of their constituents] . . . [ival for example
would presuppose that mongeese subdivide, but further states
that mongeese don't subdivide. It should follow that (ia-va) are
anomalous. Yet there are many cases where similar sentences
would be regarded as true . . .(Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-
Truth-Conditional Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975), p. 26)"
This is a perfectly good argument against "the strong presuppositional
analysis." However, Wilson also concludes from it that "The denial
of a presupposition is consistent with its related negative
sentence. (ibid)" What is needed to justify this conclusion is not
the argument just quoted, but the one given in (39).
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39. Premise 1: If C is entailed by either A or B,
then C is entailed by Since A, B ,
FB because A', and [A and B1.
Conclusion 1:
Therefore, if negative sentences (e.g., 34b-
38b) entail what they are customarily said to
presuppose (e.g., (34c-38c), then the (a)
sentences below entail incompatible statements.
(i) a. Since there is no King of Sussex, the
King of Sussex isn't the man you saw.
b. There is no King of Sussex.
c. There is a King of Sussex.
(ii) a. It wasn't Susan who solved the problem,
because the problem is unsolvable.
b. Someone solved the problem.
c. No one solved the problem.
(iii) a. Since Sam never smoked, he didn't
stop smoking yesterday.
b. Sam never smoked.
c. Sam used to smoke.
(iv) a. Malory doesn't know that mongeese sub-
divide because mongeese don't subdivide.
b. Mongeese subdivide.
c. Mongeese don't subdivide.
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(v) a. Bill realizes that my thesis is true
and not that it is false.26
b. My thesis is true.
c. My thesis is false.
Conclusion 2:
Since (ia-va) can be true, they do not entail
incompatible statements. Thus, (34b-38b) do
not entail (34c-38c). In short, negative
sentences do not entail what they are customarily
said to presuppose.27
This argument attempts to show that the inferences
sanctioned by negative (presupposition-bearing) sentences
are not logical, but rather are suggestions that can be
suspended or removed. The same conclusion can be reached
26 (va) is assumed to express a proposition which is true if
and only if the following is true:
Bill realizes that my thesis is true! He doesn't realize that
it's false.
The right conjunct in (va) is assumed to be equivalent to the sentence
following '!' above.
27
One defect in Wilson's argument is that it does not deal
explicitly with negations of quantified sentences. For example,
(ia-va) seem to be much more acceptable than the sentences below:
?Since there are no books in this room, not all of the books
in the room are valuable.
?Since there are no books in this room, none of the books
in the room are valuable.
?Since there are no books in this room, not many of the books
in the room are valuable.
I return to this point in Section 3.2.
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without mentioning complex sentences involving 'since',
'because', and 'and' at all. Wilson maintains that each
of the following cases represents a possible discourse,
the sentences of which are capable of being jointly true.
40. a. Sussex doesn't have a king. Therefore, the
King of Sussex isn't the man you saw.
b. It wasn't Susan who solved the problem.
That problem is unsolvable.
c. Sam didn't stop smoking yesterday. He's
never smoked in his life.
d. Mongeese don't subdivide. Therefore,
Malory doesn't know that they subdivide.
e. Bill doesn't realize that my thesis is false.
He couldn't. My thesis is true.
If the negative sentences above entailed what they
are customarily said to presuppose, then these dis-
courses would be inconsistent. Since they aren't
inconsistent, Wilson concludes that the negative
sentences do not carry the alleged entailments. Instead,
she holds, the inferences they sanction in isolation have
the force of suggestions which are here explicitly
withdrawn or rejected.
If these arguments are sound, then a slightly
stronger result is also forthcoming. In the cases
just cited, the falsity of the presupposition is not
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only consistent with the relevant negation, it pre-
sumably constitutes the grounds for asserting it. This
suggests that the falsity of the presupposition does
not render the negative sentence truth-valueless, but
28
actually guarantees its truth. For example, in
argument (41), a negative sentence is deduced from a
denial of its presupposition together with a necessary
truth. This indicates that the falsity of the presup-
position entails that the negative sentence is true.
41. Premise 1: No one can stop doing something if
he has never done it before.
Premise 2: John has never played chess with
Spassky.
Conclusion: John cannot stop playing chess with
Spassky. 29
Wilson's arguments represent a serious challenge to
30
theories of logical presupposition. If her conclusions
2 8Wilson makes this point on pages 28-30 of Presuppositions and
Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975).
29
Most linguists would claim that this sentence presupposes
that John has played chess with Spassky. Wilson's argument is designed
to show that this presupposition must be non-loigcal. For similar
arguments of the same type involving standard presupposition bearing
negative sentences, see Wilson, ibid.
30Unfortunately, some theorists have misunderstood these
arguments. One such theorist is Marga Reis ("Entanglement on
Factives," Linguistic Inquiry 4 (Spring 1973): 261-271). She
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argues that Wilson is wrong in claiming that there is an asymmetry be-
tween positive and negative sentences whose main verb is factive.
According to Wilson, the sentences in (i), but.not those in (ii),
entail (iii).
a. knows
(i) Mary b. has forgotten that first order logic is decidable.
c. remembers
a. doesn't know
(ii) Mary b. hasn't forgotten that first order logic is decidable.
c. doesn't rememberJ
(iii) First order logic is decidable.
Reis agrees that (i) entails (iii). Contrary to Wilson, she argues that
(ii) does, too. In the case of 'forget' and 'remember', her argument
is based on three premises.
Premise 1: (i) entails (iii).
Premise 2: 'remembers' is synonymous with 'hasn't forgotten'.
Premise 3: Substituting synonyms for synonyms yields logically
equivalent sentences.
Since these premises entail that (iib) entails (ii) (because (ic) does),
Reis rejects Wilson's analysis.
,However, premise 2 is patently false. Together with (3), it
predicts that (iv) and (v) are equivalent.
(iv) Since I never believed that first order logic is decidable,
I haven't forgotten that it is decidable.
(v) *Since I never believed that first order logic is decidable,
I remember that it is decidable.
Thus, Reis' counterargument must be rejected.
Her argument involving 'know' and 'forget' is even worse.
Premise 1: as before
Premise 2: 'forget' is synonymous with 'not know anymore'.
Premise 3: as before
These premises entail that (vi) entails (iii).
(vi) Mary doesn't know anymore that first order logic is decidable.
But this was never at issue. 'Know' is not equivalent to 'still know'.
'Not know' is not equivalent to 'not know anymore'. In general, ra
still VP's1 and ra doesn't VP anymore1 sanction inferences to 7F used
to VP7 . Since these inferences do not seem to be cancellable, they may
be entailments. Where VP is 'know that S- , S is entailed. However,
even if (vi) entails (iii), this is not a point about factives, but
rather about 'anymore'. Consequently, Wilson's original thesis
remains untouched.
Finally, Reis is wrong in claiming that Wilson's analysis is
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are correct, then the major source of support for these
theories is eliminated. However, there is a way of
reconciling these theories to her data. Doing this
involves distinguishing between two different types of
negation.
This distinction is illustrated by examples like
(43) and (44).
42. The King of France is wise.
43. The King of France isn't wise.
44. It is not {true } that the King of Francethe case
is wise.
Proponents of logical presupposition characterize (42)
as being truth-valueless. Thus, they are committed to
the claim that (45) is true.
45. The proposition that the King of France is
wise is neither true nor false.
Consequently, they are committed to the truth of (46),
(47) and (44).
incompatible with "all lexical decompositions involving a negative
element". If decomposition is desired, rforget that PE can be decom-
posed into ronce knew that P but doesn't know that P now&. On this
analysis (ib) but not (iib) entails (iii)--just what Wilson predicts.
We will see in a moment that there are ways in which Wilson's position
can be attacked. The arguments given by Reis are not among them.
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46. The proposition that the King of France is wise
is not true.
47. That the King of France is wise is not true.
true44. It is not { } that the King of Francethe case
is wise.
Since (44) is true, these theorists must distinguish
between two different kinds of negative sentences.31
Examples like (44) are instances of external negation and
never suffer from presupposition failure. Examples like
(43) are instances of internal negation and share the
presuppositions of corresponding affirmatives. When S
is truth-valueless, external negations of S are true,
whereas internal negations are truth-valueless.
This distinction can be used to handle apparent
cases of presupposition cancellation. In all such cases,
it is consistent to utter assertively a negative sentence
together with a denial of its presupposition. What makes
this seem problematic is that the negative sentences in
question do not have the form of explicit external negations
like (44). However, if the negative sentences in (39-41)
have, in those contexts, the force of external negations,
then Wilson's data can be accounted for by the theories
31For a more complete discussion of this argument, see my
"Frege's Theory of Presupposition," pp. 80-92.
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she attacks.
One way in which this can be done is to claim that
negatives sentences like (34b-38b) are ambiguous between
internal and external negation readings. It might also
be claimed that the internal negation readings are the
normal or preferred interpretations. This would account
for the fact that asserting these sentences typically
sanctions inferences to the relevant presuppositions.
On this view, the external negation interpretations
are present in (39-41) because they are forced.32
Wilson recognizes that theories of logical presuppo-
sition can be made to accommodate her data. Her position
is that the need to distinguish between internal and
external negation, and the need to specify the relevant
preferred interpretations greatly complicate such theories.
Against them she proposes a theory in which negative
sentences like (32b-38b) are unambiguous and do not entail
their putative presuppositions .(32c-38c). The inferences
to these presuppositions are pragmatic and arise from
It might not be necessary to posit ambiguity at all. -Concei-
vably, a theory might claim that although (34b-38b) are unambiguous
internal negations, external negation interpretations are imposed
on them in contexts like (39-41). On this view, something like the
principle of charity.may operate. The external negation interpretations
are imposed on these sentences in these contexts, because they are
the only ones that are consistent with the rest of the discourse.
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independently motivated principles of conversation and
rational communication.
If Wilson can substantiate these claims, then
her theory will obviously be very attractive--certainly
preferable to theories of logical presupposition.
However, her case against logical presupposition has
not yet been established. Apparent instances of can-
cellation do not prove that theories of logical presup-
position are incorrect, but rather indicate the desirability
of trying to construct a simpler and more natural
account of the data. Thus, Wilson's argument is
programmatic. If the program can be carried through,
then logical presupposition can be eliminated. If
not, then logical presupposition remains a viable
alternative in accounting for the inferences sanctioned
by certain sentences and their negations.
3.2 Cancellation and Quantification
In a moment, I will turn directly to Wilson's
positive account. Before doing that, however, I must
correct for a certain bias in the discussion thus far.
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In Section II, I indicated that quantified sentences and
their negations provide evidence for theories of logical
presupposition. In subsection 3.1, apparent instances of
cancellation are used to cast doubt on such theories.
However, none of these instances involves quantified
sentences. The reason for this is that inferences to
the putative presuppositions of these sentences are not
easily withdrawn.33
Not all
48. ? Not many of the books in this room are
None
valuable, because there are no books in
this room.
49. ? Since there are no books in this room,
not all
not many of the books in this room are
none
valuable.
(Not all
50. ? SNot many' of the books in this room are
ýNone )
valuable. There are no books in this room.
Although Wilson admits this, she denies that
quantified sentences motivate theories of logical
33Wilson recognizes this on pages 57-58 of Presuppositions and
Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,(London: Academic Press, 1975), where
she says that if quantified sentences carry presuppositions, then they
are candidates for "absolute presuppositions". On pages 51-52, she
characterizes absolute presuppositions as presuppositions "which can
never be cancelled and do not participate in non-presupposition-carrying
senses of negation."
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presupposition. According to her, the negations in (51)
and (52) each sanction inferences to (53). She claims
that either all of these inferences are entailments or
none of them are.
51. a. Not all of the books in this room are valuable.
b. Not many of the books in this room are valuable.
c. None of the books in this room are valuable.
52. a. It is not true that all of the books in
this room are valuable.
b. It is not true that many of the books in
this room are valuable.
c. It is not true that some of the books in
this room are valuable.
53. There are books in this room.
Since the sentences in (52) are external negations,
they are true when (53) is false. Thus, they do not
entail (53), but only suggest it. Since Wilson holds that
the inferences sanctioned by the sentences in (51) and (52)
have the same force, she concludes that the sentences in
(51) do not entail (53) either.
This argument is questionable. It rests on the
claim that the sentences in (51) entail (53) if and only if
the sentences in (52) do. But this is not obvious. We
have already seen that, for Wilson, the inferences from
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(51) to (53) cannot be explicitly cancelled. However,
the inferences from (.52) to (53) can be cancelled.
(all
54. It is not true that •many of the books in
some)
this room are valuable, because there are no
books in this room.
55. Since there are no books in this room, it is
not true that many of the books in this room
IsomeJ
are valuable.
rall
56. It is not true that many of the books in this
some7
room are valuable. There are no books in this
room.
For some reason, (54-56) seem to be much more
acceptable than. (48-50). If so, then they are apparent
counterexamples to the claim that the sentences in (51)
entail (53) if and only if the sentences in (52) do.
Consequently, they represent a serious threat to Wilson's
thesis that quantified sentences do not motivate theories
of logical presupposition.3 4
Still Wilson's positive account remains interesting.
34Theories of logical presupposition would treat the
sentences in (51) as unambiguous instances of internal negation.
The sentences in (52) would be either ambiguous or simply cases
of external negation.
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It is conceivable that we would be willing to accept her
analysis about quantified sentences, provided that her
pragmatic account is successful in other cases. Our
intuitions about (48-50) and (54-56) are not decisive.
If they conflict with an otherwise highly motivated
theory, then we might be willing to revise them.35
IV. Summary
This concludes my analysis of that portion of the
attack on logical presupposition that can be considered
independently of a detailed examination of Wilson's
and Karttunen's positive accounts. In the rest of this
essay I will present these accounts and evaluate them.
For now, it is useful to summarize the major results
achieved thus far.
First, compound sentences involving 'and', 'or',
35A similar point holds for theories of logical presuppo-
r true asition. Wilson claims that It is not true } that S
the case
sanctions inferences to the putative presuppositions of S. If so,
such inferences are problematic for theories of logical presupposition.
However, if these theories are highly motivated on other grounds,
then we might be willing to accept their analysis of external
negations and attribute any discrepancies with our intuitions to
performance factors. Consequently, it is important not to reject
out of hand either logical presupposition or Wilson's pragmatic
account. Instead, these theories must be compared against the
total range of data. This will be the main task of Part 4.
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and 'if, then' do not motivate theories of logical
presupposition. Although such sentences typically
sanction inferences to the k-presuppositions of their
constituents, many of these inferences are demonstrably
non-logical. Since the concept of logical presupposition
does not facilitate the account of the k-presuppositions
of compound sentences, these sentences do not provide
evidence for theories of logical presupposition.
Second, certain sentences and their negations
sanction inferences to the same statement. If these
inferences are entaiZments, then theories of logical
presupposition offer plausible explanations of them
(particularly in the case of quantified sentences).
Moreover, the claim that certain sentences and their
negations are bearers of logical presupposition is
compatible with a theory that handles the k-presuppo-
sitions of compound sentences non-logically.
Third, apparent cases of cancellation raise the
possibility that negative sentences do not entail their
presuppositions. If so, then theories of logical
presupposition are completely undermined and must be
replaced with non-logical accounts. However, this
result cannot be established until such non-logical
theories are constructed and evaluated. 3 6
36I have left out some of Wilson's arguments against logical
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presupposition because they are clearly unsound. Several are based
on a special notion of strong entailment that she defines as follows:
(i) Strong Entailment
"A sentence S entails another sentence P iff if S is
true, P must also be true and if P is false, S must also
be false. (Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional
Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975), p. 4)"
This notion interacts in a special way with the notion of logical
presupposition. No sentence P which is capable of being false can
be both strongly entailed and logically presupposed by the same
sentence. This follows automatically, for if any such sentence P
were false, then S would have to be both false and truth-valueless.
Wilson tries to use this result as a weapon. For example, she
uses it to argue that cleft sentences do not bear logical presup-
positions(ibid, pp. 30-32).
(ii) It was John who left.
(iii) John left.
(iv) Someone left.
According to Wilson, (ii) entails (iii), and (iii) entails (iv).
Since entailment is transitive and (iv) is capable of being false,
she concludes that (ii) does not logically presuppose (iv).
'However, this argument begs all the important issues. First,
it does not go through unless (ii) strongly entails (iii), and (iii)
strongly entails (iv). Both of these claims are problematic. Wilson
cites Chomsky's suggestion that although (ii) entails (iii), it does
not strongly entail (iii) (ibid, p. 31). This is precisely what any
proponent of logical presupposition would say, since on his theory, (ii)
is not false, but truth-valueless when both (iii) and (iv) are
false. Moreover, independently of any special facts about clefts,
theories of logical presupposition predict that (iii) entails (iv) but
does not strongly entail (iv). After all, it could be the case that (iv)
is false and there is no such person as John. If so, then (iii) would
be characterized as truth-valueless. Since this is exactly what any
proponent of logical presupposition would propose, it cannot simply
be assumed to be false.
Unfortunately, several of Wilson's arguments suffer from the same
difficulty. The problem is simple. Although strong entailment can be
used as a weapon against logical presupposition, intuitions about strong
entailment depend upon speakers' ability to distinguish falsity from
truth-valuelessness. According to Wilson, it is "demonstrable that
there is no consistent set of intuitions about when a given sentence
is false as opposed to lacking in truth value. (ibid, p. 61)" Thus,
on her own account, the crucial claims about strong entailment can't be
established. On the other hand, we do have intuitions about entailment
in the sense that I have defined. However, on this sense of entailment,
all logical presuppositions are entailed. Wilson's problem is that she
uses intuitions about entailment to construct arguments involving
strong entailment. Once this confusion is recognized, her arguments
collapse.
PART 4
PRESUPPOSITION, CONVERSATION, AND CONFIRMATION
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I. Wilson's Positive Account
According to Wilson, the data for theories of
presupposition fall into two different classes. In one
class, the presupposing sentences entail their presuppo-
sitions. In the other, they only suggest them. The
first class includes simple sentences and conjunctions of
such sentences. For example, the (a) and (b) sentences
below entail the (c) statements.
1. a. The man in the next room is a philosopher.
b. There is a linguist in the office, and the
man in the next room is a philosopher.
c. There is a man in the next room.
2. a. All of John's children are intelligent.1
b. Intelligence is hereditary, and all of
John's children are intelligent.
c. John has children.
1Wilson represents sentences of the form (i) with semantic
representations of the form (ii).
(i) All S is P.
(ii) 3x (Sx) & Vx (Sx DPx)
Although she does not give representations for sentences of the
form (iii), she seems to assume that their semantic representations
are of the form (iv). (See Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-
Conditional Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975), p. 59.)
(iii) Not all S is P.
(iv) --(3x (Sx) & Vx (Sx DPx))
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3. a. It is Susan who has the jewels.
b. It is Susan who has the jewels, and Mary who
has the money.
c. Someone has the jewels.
4. a. Sam has stopped smoking.
b. Sam has stopped smoking, and Bill has stopped
drinking.
c. Sam used to smoke.
5. a. Bill realizes that the Red Sox won the pennant.
b. Bill realizes that the Red Sox won the pennant,
and Harry realizes that the Reds won the series.
c. The Red Sox won the pennant.
The second class of sentences includes negations,
disjunctions, and conditionals. These sentences do
not entail, but only suggest the truth of their putative
presuppositions. 2
2
For Wilson, sentences entail other sentences only
derivatively. A sentence S entails a sentence S' iff the statement
made by S entails the statement made by S'. Similarly, we
may say that a sentence S entails a statement P iff the statement
made by S entails P.
Sentences suggest statements in a different way. According
to Wilson, the (a-c) sentences in (6-10) suggest the corres-
ponding (d) statements in the following sense: A speaker who
assertively utters one of the (a-c) sentences must believe the
(d) statement in order for his utterance to be sanctioned by
pragmatic principles that guide conversation. More of this
below.
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6. a. The man in the next room isn't a philosopher,
b. If the man in the next room is a philosopher,
then we are in luck.
c. Either the man in the next room is a philosopher,
or there are no philosophers in the building.
d. There is a man in the next room.
7. a. Not all of John's children are intelligent.
b. If intelligence is hereditary, then all of
John's children are intelligent.
c. Either intelligence isn't hereditary, or all
of John's children are intelligent.
d. John has children.
8. a. It isn't Susan who has the jewels.
b. If it is Susan who has the jewels, then we
will recover them shortly.
c. Either it is Susan who has the jewels, or
we will never find them.
d. Someone has the jewels.
9. a. Sam hasn't stopped smoking.
b. If Sam has stoppedsmoking, then we will invite
him to the party.
c. Either Sam has stopped smoking, or he has
stopped drinking.
d. Sam has smoked.
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10. a. Bill doesn't realize that the Red Sox won
the pennant.
b. If Bill lives in Boston, then he realizes
that the Red Sox won the pennant.
c. Either Bill doesn't live in Boston, or he
realizes that the Red Sox won the pennant.
d. The Red Sox won the pennant.
On this analysis, there is no room for logical presup-
position. In fact, there is no need to posit any
notion of presupposition at all. The inferences in
(1-5) are simple entailments. Semantic theory accounts
for them in the same way that it accounts for other
examples of entailment. The inferences in (6-10), on
the other hand, are pragmatic. Those sanctioned by
negative sentences are explained by Gricean principles of
conversation. Those sanctioned by disjunctions and
conditionals are accounted for by principles of confirmation
and evidence. In neither case is it necessary to invoke
any notion of presupposition. Consequently, if Wilson is
correct, the notion of presupposition can be eliminated
from theories of natural language.
The heart of Wilson's account is her explanation of
allegedly pragmatic inferences like those in (6-10). The
framework for this explanation is provided by Paul Grice.
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According to Grice, a speaker often suggests more by
assertively uttering a sentence than can be gathered
from the semantic representation of that sentence. Many
of these suggestions may be explained on the assumption
that conversation is conducted according to certain
rules and that hearers interpret a speaker's remarks so
as to preserve the assumption that these rules are being
obeyed. Among these rules are principles of cooperation
and rational communication that regulate the efficient
exchange of information. Grice calls such principles
conversational maxims. These maxims are seen as falling
under the general principle of cooperation.
11. The Cooperative Principle
Make your contribution to the conversation
so as to advance its accepted purpose or
direction.
12. Conversational Maxims
Quantity: (i) Don't give too little information.
(ii) Don't give too much information.
Quality: (i) Don't make statements which you
believe to be false.
(ii) Don't make statements for which
you have insufficient evidence.
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Relation:
Manner: (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Be relevant.
Avoid obscurity of expression.
Avoid ambiguity.
Be brief.
Be orderly.
According to Grice, a speaker's remarks are assessed
against the background assumption that these conversational
maxims are being obeyed. This assumption gives rise to
an important class of implicatures that Grice calls
'conversational implicatures'. The notion of a speaker
conversationally -implicating a proposition is defined
as follows:
13. A speaker who assertively utters a sentence S
conversationally implicates a proposition Q if and
only if
(i) he is to be presumed to be observing
the conversational maxims; and
(ii) the supposition that he believes Q is
required in order to make his assertive
utterance of S consistent with this
presumption; and
(iii) the speaker thinks (and would expect the
hearer to think that the speaker thinks)
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that the hearer can work out or grasp
intuitively that the supposition in
(ii) is required.3
This definition suggests a general pattern for
explaining how conversational implicatures arise.
Grice's characterization of this pattern (from the point
of view of the hearer) is given in (14).
14. He [the speaker] has said that P; there is no reason to
suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least
the cooperative principle; he could not be doing this
unless he thought that Q; he knows (and knows that I know
that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that
he thinks that Q is required; he has done nothing to stop
me from thinking that Q; therefore he intends me to
think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that
Q; and so he has implicated that Q.4
The notion just defined is one in which a speaker
conversationally implicates a proposition. However, it
is also possible to define a notion of conversational
implicature that applies to sentences.
15. A sentence S conversationally implicates a
proposition Q if and only if a speaker who
assertively utters S in normal circumstances5
3Grice, "Logic and Conversation," William James series, lecture 2,
unpublished manuscript.
4 Ibid.
Normal circumstances are those in which the speaker is presumed
to be obeying Grice's maxims.
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and without explicit qualification conversa-
tionally implicates Q.
For example, sentence (16) conversatiornaly implicates that
the speaker does not know which of the statements (17)
and (18) is true.
16. Either Martin is in North Carolina, or he is
in South Carolina.
17. Martin is in North Carolina.
18. Martin is in South Carolina.
The explanation of this conversational implicature
is as follows: The presumption that the speaker is
obeying the conversational maxims allows us to conclude
that (16) is relevant to the accepted purpose and direction
of the conversation. We may assume that (17) and (18)
are, too. Consequently, if the speaker knew that (17)
were true, or if he know that (18) were, then he would be
guilty of violating the first maxim of quantity ("Don't
give too little information"). That is, he would be
guilty of having made a weaker statement [(16)] when he
could have made a stronger statement [(17) or (18)]
which is also relevant to the conversation. Since, by
6
In this paper I will assume (i) and (ii).
(i) A statement A is weaker than a statement B if B entails A,
but A does not entail B.
(ii) A statement A is less informative than a statement B if
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hypothesis,7 the speaker has given us no reason to suppose
that he is opting out of the Cooperative Principle or any
its maxims, and since he knows that we are capable of
working out all this, he conversationally implicates
that he does not know which of (17) and (18) is true.
A is weaker than B.
Grice indicates that he accepts these assumptions in "Logic and
Conversation," William James series, lecture 4, unpublished manuscript;
and "The Causal Theory of Perception," in Perceiving, Sensing and
Knowing, edited by Robert J. Swartz, (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 450.
We are assuming that the speaker utters (16) "in a normal
context and without explicit qualification." Thus, he is to be
presumed to be observing the conversational maxims.
8This discussion parallels a discussion by Grice in lecture 3
of "Logic and Conversation." There he argues that a speaker who
asserts a disjunction conversationally implicates that the grounds
for his assertion are non-truth functional. I assume then that
Grice would hold that one who assertively utters (16) conversationally
implicates that he does not know which of (17)-(18) is true.
This brings up an interesting point regarding the interpretation
of definition (13). (13i) says that the speaker is presumed to be
observing the conversational maxims. One might imagine this clause
receiving two different interpretations--(a) and (b).
(a) The speaker is acting in accordance with the conversational
maxims.
(b) The speaker is guided by the conversational maxims.
To act in accordance with a maxim is to do what it says; one's
reasons are irrelevant. One may act in accordance with a rule even
when one is trying to violate it, so long as what one does is what
the rule prescribes. On the other hand, to be guided byamaxim is to
try to follow the maxim. Here it is not what one does, but what one
takes oneself to be doing that is relevant. Which interpretation is
needed for (13)?
One Grice's account, the presumption that a speaker is obeying
the conversational ma.ims is a presumption that he is being cooperative.
This suggests interpretation (b). It is interesting to see that
this interpretation is required by the conclusion that a speaker
who assertively utters (16) conversationally implicates that he does
not know which of (17)-(18) is true.
First consider interpretation (a). On this interpretation, the
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Wilson tries to apply similar reasoning to the
presuppositions of negations, disjunctions, and condi-
tionals. Her thesis about negations is (19).
19. Negative sentences (like 6a-10a) conversa-
tionally implicate what they are customarily
said to presuppose.
Her thesis about disjunctions and conditionals is
similar. However, it requires the addition of two new
maxims.
supposition that the speaker is observing the maxims entails that
he has made the strongest statement possible. It does not entail
that he believes that he has made the strongest statement possible.
He could be mistaken about what he is in a position to assert. If
a speaker asserts a disjunction while mistakenly believing that
he is in a position to assert one of its disjuncts, then he is
acting in accordance with the maxims although it is not his
intention to do so.
According to (13ii) a proposition Q is conversationally
implicated only if the supposition that the speaker is observing
the maxims entails that he believes Q. Thus, on interpretation
(a) someone assertively uttering (16) does not conversationally
implicate that he does not know which of (17)-(18) is true.
Now consider the (b) interpretation. On this interpretation
the supposition that the speaker is trying to follow the maxims
entails that he believes that he is making the strongest statement
he can. A speaker asserting a disjunction must believe that
he is not in a position to assert either disjunct. Thus, on
interpretation (b), one who assertively utters (16) conversa-
tionally implicates that he is not in a position to assert either
(17) or (18)--i.e., he conversationally implicates that he
does not know which of them is true.
In practice, the difference between interpretations (a)
and (b) does not have great significance, but for certain purposes,
it is useful to distinguish the two. In this essay I assume
the (b) interpretation.
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20. Don't assert a contingent disjunction unless
you have some evidence for the truth of
both disjuncts.
21. Don't assert a contingent conditional unless
you have some evidence for the truth of the
antecedent.10
Wilson notes that these maxims are not covered
by Grice's second maxim of quality ("Don't make
statements for which you have insufficient evidence") 11
To say that a statement is contingent is to say that it
is neither necessarily true nor necessarily untrue.
10Wilson states her new principles in terms of hearers
rather than speakers. She says that they are principles of
interpretation "...which hearers will try to apply first, and which
they will only abandon if [they do] not square with the facts. (Presup-
positions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, (London: Academic Press,
1975), p. 108)" The principle for disjunctions is included in the
following:
"If a speaker produces a disjunction which is a contingent truth
[sic] it is generally assumed that he has some evidence for the
truth of both disjuncts, although he does not know which is actually
true. Again it is open to him to deny that he has such evidence, but
as a matter of conversational fact he will be assumed to have it.
(Ibid, p. 105)"
The emphasis on hearers rather than speakers is unimportant. A
speaker who knows that he will be interpreted to have evidence for both
disjuncts will adopt maxim (20) above. Competent speakers are generally
competent hearers and vice versa. Thus, the maxims applying to
speakers and hearers are complementary.
According to Wilson, principles like (20) and (21) "...cannot
be handled on purely Gricean lines, for though they assume that a
speaker in saying something must have evidence, they do not depend on
his having evidence for what he actually says [i.e., the disjunction or
conditional], but on his having evidence for a related categorical
statement [i.e., constituents of the disjunction or conditional]. (Ibid,
p. 108)"
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That maxim requires someone who asserts a sentencel2
to have evidence for the assertion. However, it is
possible to have evidence for a disjunction without
having evidence for both of its disjuncts. Similarly,
it is possible to have evidence for a conditional
without having evidence for its antecedent. Thus,
Wilson's principles (20) and (21) impose additional
requirements that are not imposed by Grice's second
maxim of quality. Moreover, (20) and (21) do not seem to
follow from general rules governing rational and cooperative
behavior. Therefore, they are not Conversational
Maxims in Grice's sense.
Wilson's account can be reconstructed so that
principles (20) and (21) give rise to implications in
essentially the same way that Grice's maxims do. The
notion of a speaker W-implicating a proposition is defined
in exact analogy with the earlier definition of a speaker
conversationally implicating a proposition.
12
I will follow Wilson in sometimes speaking of "asserting
a sentence." To "assert a sentence" is to assert a statement
by way of assertively uttering a sentence. This terminology
is somewhat unfortunate since sometimes there is more than
one statement that can be asserted by assertively uttering
a given sentence. However, this will not affect the arguments
that follow.
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22. A speaker who assertively utters a sentence S
W-implicates a proposition Q, if and only if
(i) he is to be presumed to be observing
principles (20) and (21); and
(ii) the supposition that he believes Q is
required in order to make his assertive
utterance of S consistent with this
presumption; and
(iii) the speaker thinks (and would expect the
hearer to think that the speaker thinks)
that the hearer can work out or grasp
intuitively that the supposition in (ii)
is required.
The notion of a sentence W-implicating a proposition is
defined as follows:
23. A sentence S W-implicates a proposition Q if
and only if a speaker who assertively utters S
in normal circumstancesl3 and without explicit
qualification W-implicates Q.
Finally, I will represent Wilson's thesis about disjunctions
and conditionals as (24).
13
Here, normal circumstances are those in which the speaker
gives no indication that maxims (20) and (21) are not being obeyed.
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24. Disjunctions and conditionals (like those in
(6-10)) W-implicate their putative presupposi-
14tions.
Theses(19) and (24) are central to Wilson's positive
account of presupposition.15  In the sections that follow
I will reconstruct her arguments for these theses. I will
try to show that her arguments are inadequate and more
strongly, that (19) and (24) are false.
I should point out that although I believe that Wilson's
position must ultimately be rejected, I find it both inter-
esting and provocative. If her view could be sustained,
it would provide a very economical and satisfying account
of presupposition. On the other hand, if it cannot be
sustained, then it is important to determine precisely
where Wilson goes wrong. Fortunately, Wilson presents her
view carefully and clearly enough to make this possible.
14(24) will not account for the presuppositions of conditionals
that are inherited from their consequents. Wilson says nothing about
how these are to be accounted for.
15Although (19) and (24) are central to Wilson's account, she
regards them as tentative and refers to them as "suggestions."
Apparently she does not regard them as crucial to her fundamental claim
that "...presuppositional analysis has no part in semanticSon any terms.
(Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, p. xii)" But
she hasn't proven this claim. In Part 3 I showed that her argument
against attributing logical presuppositions to negative sentences is
programmatic. Although there are difficulties with the standard account
Wilson cannot claim to have refuted it unless she can show that there
is a better theory that avoids these difficulties--hence, the importance
of her "suggestions."
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II. Negation and Conversational Implicature
2.1 Wilson's Argument
Wilson's argument that negative sentences conversa-
tionally implicate what they are customarily said to
presuppose is based on example (25).16
25. John doesn't regret that Bill is ill.
a. John doesn't exist.
b. Bill doesn't exist.
c. Bill exists but isn't ill.
d. John exists and Bill is ill but John doesn't
know that Bill is ill.
e. John knows that Bill is ill but is not
sorry about it.
According to Wilson,
. . . any of (a)-(e) . expresses a sufficient condition
for the truth of [25], though none of (a)-(e) is necessary for
the truth of [25]. Since [25] can be uttered with any of
(a)-(e) appended as clarification, and without anomaly, all of
(a)-(e) express possible interpretations of [25].17 (my emphasis)
16Wilson's entire discussion centers on this one example.
Since her thesis is a general one, I assume that she thinks that
all cases can be dealt with in the way that (25) is.
17Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
(London: Academic Press, 1975), p. 99.
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Wilson also claims that
. . if [25] is uttered in isolation or without clarification,
it would normally be taken as suggesting (d), or, more likely,
(e). What has to be explained on Gricean principles is why (e) is
the preferred interpretation of [25]. 18 (my emphasis)
Before giving Wilson's argument, I need to say a
word about what she means by "possible interpretations"
and "preferred interpretations." She uses these
expressions in one way when talking about theories of
logical presupposition and in another way when presenting
her own theory. In discussing logical presupposition,
she says
. . . it seems that an adequate theory of [logical] presupposition
must allow for negative sentences to be ambiguous between
readings on which they carry presuppositions [i.e., internal
negation readings] and readin s on which they do not [i.e.,
external negation readings]. (my emphasis)
A negative sentence has a preferred internal interpretation
in the absence of any indication to the contrary. The
external interpretation may be invoked in a number of ways: by
placing heavy stress on the verb, for example, or by explicitly
stating that the presupposition is false, or by adding something
which itself entails the negation of the presuppositions.20
(my emphasis)
Here, an interpretation of a sentence is one of its
meanings. Thus, a sentence with more than one possible
interpretation is ambiguous. A preferred interpretation,
18 Ibid, p. 100.
1 9 Ibid, p. 35.
20Ibid, p. 33.
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on the other hand, is a meaning that the sentence
carries when used in isolation or without clarification.
For example, to say that the internal interpretation
of a negative sentence is preferred is to say that the
sentence is interpreted as carrying presuppositions
unless the context indicates otherwise.21
When Wilson presents her own theory, she uses
the expressions "possible interpretation" and "preferred
interpretation" in another way. She rejects the view
that negative sentences are ambiguous. On her analysis
of negation, "There is no ambiguity: merely a disjunctive
set of truth conditions, the truth of any of which is sufficient
for the truth of the negation."2 2 (my emphasis) Nevertheless,
she talks about the "truth conditions" of a negative
sentence as constituting its "possible interpretations."
When she says that (a)-(e) are possible interpretations
of (25), she means that they are individually sufficient
and disjunctively necessary conditions for (25) to be
true. Each of (a)-(e) constitutes a possible basis for
asserting (25).
2 10n this view, the internal interpretation of (i) is one in
which it carries the presupposition (ii).
(i) The King of Thessalonia isn't happy.
(ii) There is exactly one king of Thessalonia.
22
Ibid, p. 35.
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What does she mean when she says that (d) and (e)
are preferred interpretations of (25)?23 It seems to
me that she has two theses in mind. First, it is
appropriate to assertively utter (25), in isolation
or without clarification, provided that the evidence for
one's assertion is the truth of what is expressed by (d)
or (e). However, if one's evidence is that which is
expressed by (a)-(c), then the assertion is inappropriate.
Second, a speaker who assertively utters (25) in isolation
or without clarification suggests (d) or (e). Such a
speaker conveys to his audience either the message that (d)
is true or the message that (e) is true.2 4
It is not completely clear whether Wilson holds that (e)
is the preferred interpretation of (25) or whether she believes that
both (d) and (e) are preferred interpretations. Fortunately, this
unclarity does not affect her main argument that (25) conversa-
tionally implicates its putative presuppositions. In order to
simplify the discussion, I will assume for the present that both
(d) and (e) are preferred. This assumption will be re-examined later.
24Wilson never says what it means to say that a speaker X
uses a sentence S to convey a statement P. Presumably, it does
not mean that X uses S to assert P. On Wilson's account a speaker
may use (25) to convey the statement expressed by (e) even though
what the speaker says can be true when statement (e) is false. Such
a speaker does not assert statement (e); he suggests it. Wilson
seems to assume that X uses S to convey P if and only if X uses
S to indicate that P is true. In some cases, the statement conveyed
is the statement asserted. In other cases, it is not.
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Wilson's argument can now be summarized. She
claims that although (a-c) are "possible interpretations"
of (25), a speaker obeying Grice's maxims would not use
(25) to convey them. Nor would he use (25) (in isolation
or without clarification) if his evidence were (a),
(b), or (c), Rather, such t. speaker would use (25) to
convey (d) or (e). Since anyone who believes (d) or
(e) must also believe (26), (25) conversationally
implicates (26).25
26. Bill is ill.
Therefore, if Wilson's argument is sound, then (25)
conversationally implicates what it is customarily said
to presuppose.
Wilson states her argument in the following passage:
. .any of (a)-(e) . . . expresses a sufficient condition for
the truth of [25], though none of (a)-(e) is necessary for
the truth of [25]. Since [25] can be uttered with any of
(a)-(e) appended as clarification, and without anomaly, all of
(a)-(e) express possible interpretations of [25]. ..
. . . if [251 is uttered in isolation, or without clarification,
it would normally be taken as suggesting (d), or, more likely,
(e). What has to be explained on Gricean principles is why
(e) is the preferred interpretation of [251.
First, notice that, except when explicitly contradicting
a previous remark, there would be no point at all in using [25]
to convey the information in (a)-(c) above. If, for example,
Bill is not ill, then the shortest way of conveying this
information is by saying that Bill is not ill. Brevity, or the
25I will follow Wilson in sometimes talking about sentences being
believed, conveyed, and conversationally implicated. Again, sentences
are believed, conveyed, or conversationally implicated only in a
derivative sense.
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avoidance of unnecessary prolixity, is one of the Gricean
goals of conversation. Moreover, if I want to convey the
information that Bill is not ill, [25] is a remarkably
inefficient way of conveying this information, since it
merely entails that one of (a)-(e) is true. The avoidance
of obscurity or ambiguity is another of the Gricean goals
of conversation. In other words, someone who was obeying the
Gricean maxims would simply never use [251 on the basis of (c),
since there is another, shorter, more explicit and less mis-
leading way to convey the information in (c). The same
holds of (a) and (b): it is in general, and ignoring
special purposes such as flat contradiction, deliberate
confusion of the issue, etc., easier to say straight out that a
given person does not exist than to use a more complex negative
such as [25].
The elimination of (a)-(c) interpretations by appeal to
Gricean maxims leaves (d) and (e) as the most likely interpre-
tations of [25]. The (d) and (e) interpretations take for
granted that John exists and Bill exists, and that Bill is
ill. Hence these presuppositions of a sentence like [25]
can be explained by a theory of conversation, and do not
need to be accounted for at the semantic level. 26
This argument is reconstructed in (27).
27. Premise 1
(a)-(e) are possible interpretations of (25)--
i.e., (a)-(e) are individually sufficient and
disjunctively necessary conditions for (25)
to be true.
Premise 2
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use
(25) (in isolation or without clarification)
26Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
pp. 99-100.
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to convey 27 b27 (a), (b), or (c).
on the basis of
Conclusion 1
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims can use
(25) (in isolation or without clarification)
to convey{to convey } only (d) or (e).on the basis of
Premise 3
Anyone who believes (d) or (e) must also
believe (26).
Conclusion 2
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims who
asserts (25) (in isolation or without
clarification) takes it for granted that
(26) is true. Such a speaker conversation-
ally implicates what (25) is customarily
said to presuppose.
27
The equivocation in this premise will be taken up later
in Section 2.2.3. Until then I will use only the "convey"
interpretation. This does not affect any of the arguments that
follow .
I should also point out that I interpret premise 2 to assert
both (i) and (ii).
(i) A speaker cannot use (25) (in isolation or without
clarification) to convey (a), (b), or (c).
(ii) The reason he cannot use (25) (in isolation or without
clarification) to convey (a), (b), or (c) is that to do
so would violate Grice's maxims of conversation.
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2.2 Evaluating Wilson's Position
There are two main problems with Wilson's position.
The first involves her use of the notion "possible
interpretation". The second involves her use of Grice's
maxims. In Section 2.2.1, I will show that argument (27)
is invalid. In order to repair it, Wilson would have
to redefine her notion of "possible interpretation" in
a way that takes for granted most of what needs to be
explained. In addition, she would have to posit an
ad hoc, and otherwise unmotivated, mechanism for enumerating
the possible interpretations of sentences. Finally,
in Section 2.2.5, I will argue that her use of Grice's
maxims to eliminate certain "interpretations" is mistaken
in important respects. These two problems undermine
Wilson's position.
2.2.1 "Possible Interpretations"
Wilson's argument (27) is invalid, because Premises
1 and 2 do not entail Conclusion 1. Wilson thinks that
if she can show that (25) cannot be used to convey
(a-c), then she will have shown that it must be used to
convey (d) or (e). But this does not follow unless
(a-e) are the only statements that (25) can be used to
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convey. Since Premises 1 and 2 do not entail this, the
argument is invalid as it stands.
Perhaps then Wilson is appealing to a suppressed
premise.
Premise 0
If T is a set of individually sufficient and
disjunctively necessary conditions for the truth
of a sentence S, then the only statements that S
can be used to convey are members of T.
Although adding Premise O to (27) renders the argument
valid, this premise is false. Consider (25f) and (25g).
25. f. (The disjunction of (a-e))
g. John believes that Bill is ill, but isn't
sorry about it.
28Both of these examples entail (25). Moreover, on
28Thus, each constitutes a possible basis for assertively
uttering (25) and each can be appended to (25) as clarification.
For example, a speaker might assertively utter (25) with (g) in
mind rather than (d) or (e). If so, he might append (g) to (25)
as clarification.
(i) John doesn't regret that Bill is ill; he-believes Bill
is ill, but isn't sorry about it.
Consequently, on Wilson's account, (f) and (g) must be "possible
interpretations" of (25). Note, however, that neither of them
entails (26).
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Wilson's analysis of (25), (a-e), (e-f) and (a-d, g)
are each sets of individually sufficient and disjunc-
tively necessary conditions for (25) to be true. 29
Thus, Premise 0 predicts that (25) can be used to convey
only the statements common to all three sets. Since
these sets have no common members, Premise 0 incor-
rectly predicts that (25) cannot be used to convey
anything. Therefore, Premise 0 is false, and the
modified argument is unsound.
(25f) and (25g) also illustrate another point.
Wilson sometimes talks about "the truth conditions"
of a sentence as if it were clear what this phrase
means. It isn't. I have just presented three different
sets of individually sufficient and disjunctively
necessary conditions for (25) to be true. Consequently,
2 9 In the case of (e-f), this is obvious since (f) itself
is logically equivalent to (25). Although less obvious, it
is equally true of (a-d, g). The claim that both (a-e) and
(a-d, g) are individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary
conditions for the truth of (25) entails that the disjunction
of (a-e) and the disjunction of (a-d, g) are logically equivalent.
They are.
In one direction, the entailment is obvious--i.e., the
disjunction of (a-e) entails the disjunction of (a-d, g). The
entailment holds in the other direction despite the fact that
(g) doesn't entail (e). Suppose that the disjunction of (a-d,
g) is true and the disjunction of (a-e) is not. Then each of
(a-e) must be untrue while (g) is true. This is impossible.
(a-d) are each untrue if and only if John and Bill exist,
Bill is ill, and John knows that Bill is ill. Since we are
assuming that (e) is also untrue, John must be sorry about Bill's
illness. But this means that (g) cannot be true. Since this
contradicts our original assumption, the disjunction of (a-d, g)
entails the disjunction of (a-e)--i.e., the two disjunctions
are logically equivalent.
251
there is no such thing as the truth conditions of (25).
This eliminates the plausibility Wilson's argument
might at first be thought to possess. When confronted
with her argument, one is tempted to think of (a-e) as
the truth conditions of (25). One then imagines that
Wilson is implicitly assuming that a sentence can only
be used to convey one of its truth conditions. Examples
like (25f) and (25g) undermine this view.33
2.2.22 Attempted Improvements
'In light of these difficulties, Wilson might maintain
that some sets of truth conditions are "better" than
30According to Wilson, there are two types of truth conditions--
necessary and sufficient. P is a necessary condition for the
truth of S iff S entails P. Q is a sufficient condition for the
truth of S iff Q entails S. The job of a semantic theory is to
capture all the entailment relations that a sentence enters into.
A semantic theory that does this accounts for the truth conditions
of a sentence. So far, so good. One goes wrong when one assumes
that the set of "possible interpretations" of a negative sentence S
is the set of individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary
conditions for S to be true. There is no such set.
I've already illustrated this with example (25). Moreover,
the point is perfectly general. Let S be a sentence; let T be
a set of individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary
conditions for S to be true; and let A and B be members of T. If
T already contains A or B7, then form T' by subtracting rA or BP
from T. If T doesn't contain rA or B1 , then form T' by adding
rA or B1 . In either case, T' is not identical with T. Nevertheless,
both T and T' are sets of individually sufficient and disjunctively
necessary conditions for S to be true.
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others. She might hold that the set of "possible
interpretations" of a sentence S is a set of indivi-
dually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions
for the truth of S. Nevertheless, not all such sets of
truth conditions are sets of "possible interpretations"
of S. What, then, is a "possible interpretation"
of a sentence?
In discussing (a-e) Wilson says,
... any. of (a)-(e) . . . expresses a sufficient condition
for the truth of [25], though none of (a)-(e) is necessary for
the truth of [25]. Since [25] can be uttered with any of
(a)-(e) appended as clarification, and without anomaly,
all of (a)-(e) express possible interpretations of [25].31
This suggests that any statement that entails a sentence
S is a "possible interpretation" of S. However, this
cannot be what Wilson has in mind. Grice's maxims
cannot eliminate all such "interpretations" that do not
entail the putative presuppositions of S while leaving
intact those statements that do. In Section 2.2.5, I
will show that according to Wilson, the only "interpreta-
tions" eliminated by Grice's maxims are those that are
shorter than S.32 (25f) and (25g) are not shorter than
31Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
p. 99.
3 2The crucial maxim is "Be brief". It is this maxim that
is supposed to eliminate (a-c) in (25). Actually, there is a
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(25), nor do they entail (26). Thus, if they are among
the "possible interpretations" of (25), then, on Wilson's
account, Grice's maxims do not eliminate them, and (25)
does not conversationally implicate (26).
Wilson might object that the set of "possible
interpretations" of a sentence does not include all
statements that entail it. In particular, she might
object that the set of possible interpretations of
(25) does not include (f) or (g) (despite the fact
that (g) can be appended to (25) as clarification).
If so, then more must be said about the notion
33
"possible interpretation". Moreover, simply to assume
problem in comparing the length of statements as opposed to
sentences, since a statement can often be expressed by sentences of
different lengths. Wilson never addresses this problem. However,
her position might be put as follows: Grice's maxims prevent one
from using a longer sentence S when a shorter sentence S' would
convey one's meaning. She might also claim that in the case of a
statement like the one expressed by (25e),there is no sentence shorter
than (25) that can be used to convey it.
I don't want to push this too hard since in Section 2.2.5 I
will argue that Wilson's account of Grice's maxims won't do. At pre-
sent, however, I want to make a different point--namely that even
if Wilson is right about how Grice's maxims work, her argument
that negative sentences conversationally implicate their putative
presuppositions must be rejected.
33On pages 7 and 8 of Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional
Semantics, Wilson considers the theoretical objection that her
notions of entailment and truth condition are too wide for
semantic purposes. She says,
".. . For example,itis atruth of logic that (21) entails (22):
"(21) Metal expands on heating, and I am now heating the metal
"(22) The metal will expand.
But although (21) entails (22), it is not intuitively obvious
that as a matter of semantic knowledge I can infer (22) from
(21), or that (22) is a part of the meaning of (21). Similarly,
if we take two necessary truths, such as (23) and (24), it will
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follow from my definitions that they entail each other:
"(23) All sick pandas are sick
"(24) All bachelors are men.
But again, though an entailment relation holds between (23)
and (24), it is intuitively clear that (23) is semantically
independent of (24), and that the semantics should record this
fact. For one who believes in the truth-conditional approach to
semantics, the solution to this problem is to narrow down the
types of truth-condition and entailment which are seen as
semantically relevant. Wiggins, for example, in the article
cited above, relies on the notion of a designated truth condi-
tion for each sentence. The designated truth-conditions for
(23) and (24) will differ, and their semantic differences will thus
be taken into account. In fact, a solution along these lines
will follow automatically from the requirement that a semantic.
description be compositional, constructing the truth-conditions
for a given sentence in terms of the items appearing in that
sentence together with the syntactic description of the sentence.
Hence a truth-conditional semanticist may concede that the
notions of entailment and truth-condition are too wide for
semantic purposes, and then proceed to narrow them down to the
point where they coincide with semantic intuitions. At this
.point the objection will no longer hold. (pp. 7-8)"
This is all that Wilson has to say on the subject. Although a
solution to the problem of necessary truths (her (23) and (24)) may
follow automatically from the requirement of compositionality,
nothing Wilson says solves the problem that I have raised in this
section.
Note also that for Wilson's purposes, it won't do to eliminate
all disjunctive statements like (25f) from sets of "designated"
truth conditions. Consider (i).
(i) Either the president elected in 1980 will be a Democrat
or he (she) will be a Republican.
The sentences in (ii) are individually sufficient and disjunctively
necessary for (i) to be true.
(ii) a. The president elected in 1980 will be a Democrat.
b. The president elected in 1980 will be a Republican.
However, (i) would never be used to convey (.iia) or (iib). Moreover,
it would not normally be used on the basis of (iia) or (iib). The
standard case in which a disjunction is asserted is one in which the.
speaker knows that one or the other of the disjuncts is true, -but
doesn't know which. Thus, if Wilson's "designated" truth conditions for
(i) are to be possible interpretations of (i), then they must include
the disjunction (i) itself. But then there is no obvious reason for
excluding (25f) from the "designated" truth conditions of (25).
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that a speaker must convey (d) or (e) if (a-c) are
eliminated is to assume the central fact that needs to
be accounted for--namely that one presupposes (26)
when one uses (25) in isolation.
This brings up a more general point. It won't
do to define the set of possible interpretations of a
sentence to be that set which together with Gricean maxims
determines what the sentence can be used to convey in
isolation. For one thing, there is no such set. (e),
(d, e), . . . (a-e) would all serve Wilson's purposes
equally well.34 Even if Wilson could find some way
of picking out the sets she wanted, she would have to
explain why these particular sets were selected.
A good illustration of this point is provided by
(30).
30. It wasn't Sam who kissed Mary.
This sentence is customarily said to presuppose (31).
31. Someone kissed Mary.
To explain this, Wilson would presumably maintain that
the set of possible interpretations of (30:) is
34(25), in isolation or without clarification, "conveys" (e)
rather than (d). Wilson recognizes this and tries to use Grice's
principles to explain it. I discuss. this in Section 2.2.5.
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32. a. No one kissed Mary.
b. Someone kissed Mary, but it wasn't Sam.
(32a) is shorter than (30). Therefore, Wilson would
claim that Grice's maxims eliminate it in the same way
they eliminate (25a-c). Since someone who believes
(32b) must believe (31), Wilson would maintain that (30)
conversationally implicates (31). However, unless she
can tell us why (32) rather than (33) is the set of
"possible interpretations" of (30), her "explanation"
is useless.
33. a. Sam didn't kiss anyone.
b. Sam kissed someone, but it wasn't Mary.36
Note: it is just as easy to construct a Wilsonian
"proof" that (30) conversationally implicates (34) as
it is to argue that it implicates (31).
35
Although Wilson doesn't discuss this example, the above
analysis is required by her account.. (The only example she does
discuss is (25).) Actually, there are two other "interpretations"
involved that are also ruled out by Grice's maxims.
Ci) Sam doesn't exist,
(ii) Mary doesn't exist.
These "interpretations" do not affect my point and will be ignored here.
36On Wilson's account, (33a-b) are individually sufficient and
disjunctively necessary conditions for (30) to be true. (Again Wilson
would probably add (i) and (ii) of footnote 35.)
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34. Sam kissed someone.
The "proof" runs as follows:3 7
Since (30) can be uttered with either (33a) or (33b)
appended as clarification, and without anomaly,
(33a-b) are possible interpretations of (30).
However, there would be no point in using (30) to
convey (33a). If Sam didn't kiss anyone, then the
shortest way of conveying this information is by
saying that he didn't kiss anyone. Brevity, or the
avoidance of unnecessary prolixity, is one of the
Gricean goals of conversation. Moreover, if I
4want to convey the information that Sam didn't kiss
anyone, (30) is a remarkably inefficient way of
conveying this information, since it merely entails
that one of (33a-b) is true. The avoidance of
obscurity or ambiguity is another of the Gricean
goals of conversation. In other words, someone
obeying the Gricean maxims would simply never use
(30) on the basis of (33a) since there is another
shorter, more explicit and less misleading way to
convey the information in (33a). Thus, when (30) is
used in isolation, it conveys. (33b), Since (33b)
takes it for granted that (34) is true, (30) conver-
sationally implicates (34).
37
What follows is a paraphrase of what Wilson says about (25).
See the passage quoted above on pages 245-246 of the text.
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Clearly, a theory that "explains" what is false as easily
as it "explains" what is true is inadequate. Thus, even
if Wilson is right about how Grice's maxims eliminate "possible
interpretations", she has failed to account for the
presuppositions of negative sentences.
The reason she has failed is that her analysis
implicitly relies on a notion of "possible interpretation"
that begs all the important questions. She holds that
(35-38) are all semantically equivalent.
35. Sam kissed Mary.
36. It was Sam who kissed Mary.
37. Mary was kissed by Sam.
38. It was Mary who was kissed by Sam.
A chief virtue of her account is supposed to be that
different kinds (or scopes) of negation are not required.
Thus, the negations of (35-38) should all be semantically
equivalent.
Nevertheless, Wilson's account requires that the
negations of (35), (36) and (38) have different "possible
interpretations". 38 This means that "possible interpre-
tation" is not a semantic notion and hence cannot be
38
(35) and (37) have the same presuppositions and so may have
the same "possible interpretations".
259
defined in terms of semantically "designated truth
conditions". It also means that some special mechanism
must be devised for specifying the "possible interpre-
tations" of a sentence. Unless this mechanism can be
motivated independently, it constitutes a complication
of the theory quite on a par with special mechanisms
to compute presuppositions directly. Essentailly the
same points can be made using a wide variety of examples.
2.2.3 A Further Source of Confusion
There is another reason why Wilson's argument
appears to be more plausible on first glance than it
really is. One can easily be confused about Premise 2.
Premise 2
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
(in isolation or without clarification) to convey
(a), (b), or (c).
In arguing for this premise, Wilson equatesit with
Premise 2a.
Premise 2a
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
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(in isolation or without clarification) on the basis of
(a), (b), or (c).39
The difference between these two premises is that (2)
talks about what a sentence can be used to convey,
whereas (2a) is concerned with what can constitute the
grounds or evidence for assertively uttering a sentence in
isolation. These are not the same things.
It is one thing to say that a speaker is not using
a sentence S to convey a proposition P. It is quite another
to say that P is not the basis for a speaker's assertion
of S. Consider (39), (40), and (41).
39. a. If Sam owns any paintings, then none of them
are valuable.
b. Sam has sold all his valuable possessions.
40. a. Either Sam does not own any paintings, or
none of his paintings are valuable.
b. Sam has sold all his valuable possessions.
41. a. Several people have been robbed.
b. Bill, Henry, and Mary have been robbed.
39Wilson says that "Someone who was obeying the Gricean maxims
would simply never use (25) on the basis of (c), since there is
another, shorter, more explicit way to convey the information in
(c). (Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, p. 100)"
(my emphasis)
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In each case, the truth of (b) is a sufficient
condition for the truth of Ca). Moreover, a speaker might
assert (a) on the basis of his belief in (b). He might do
this without conveying Cb) or suggesting that it is true.
For example, if what is relevant to the conversation in
(41) is not who was robbed, but whether anyone was robbed,
then one might appropriately assert (a) on the basis of
(b) without any intention of conveying (b). Similar
remarks apply to (39) and (40). Thus, if one wants to
show that a certain statement P is not the basis for
a speaker's remarks, then it is not enough to show that
the speaker is not trying to convey P.
In itself, the confusion of (2) and (2a) is not
particularly important. However, this confusion may
lead to a much more serious mistake. It is tempting
to think that if (2a) is true, then a speaker using
(25) (in isolation or without clarification) must not
know that any of (a-c) is true. From this, it is easy to
jump to the further conclusion that the speaker must know
that (a), (b), and (c) are not true. If this conclusion
could be established, then Wilson would not have to
worry about whether or not (a-e) exhaust the "truth
conditions" or "possible interpretations" of (25). By
concentrating on (a-c) alone, she would have shown that
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(25) conversationally implicates (26).
Of course, the reasoning that leads to this conclusion
is fallacious.40 Premise 2 does not entail (2a);
(2a) does not entail (2b); and (2b) does not entail (2c).
Premise 2
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
(in isolation or without clarification) to convey
(a), (b), or (c).
Premise 2a
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
(in isolation or without clarification) on the basis
Sof (a), (b), or (c).
Premise 2b
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
(in isolation or without clarification) if he knows
(believes) that (a), (b), or (c), is true.
Premise 2c
A speaker obeying Grice's maxims cannot use (25)
(in isolation or without clarification) unless he
knows (believes) that (a), (b), and (c) are not
true.
40Note, I am not claiming that Wilson did reason in this
way. Rather, I am trying to locate and eliminate a possible source
of confusion.
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The differences between (2, a, b, and c) are obvious
when these principles are clearly formulated and compared
with one another. However, when confronted with Wilson's
argument, it is easy to overlook these differences.4 1
When this confusion is combined with the confusion about
what constitutes "the set of truth conditions" or
"possible interpretations" of a sentence, her argument
can appear quite plausible, when in fact it is not.
2.2.4 Summary
What I have shown is that Wilson's argument that
negative sentences conversationally implicate their
putative presuppositions must be rejected. It must be
rejected even if one accepts her claim that Grice's
maxims prevent one from using (25) .to convey (a-c). In
Section 2.2.5, I will -show that even this latter claim is
incorrect. One cannot use (25) to convey (a-c). However
Grice's maxims are not responsible for this fact.42  Finally,
I will argue that negative sentences do not conversa-
tionally implicate their putative presuppositions.
41The same kind of confusion can arise if one (fallaciously)
reasons as follows: If Premise 2 is correct, then a speaker
conversationally implicates that he is not using (25) to convey (a),
(b), or (c), Therefore, he conversationally implicates that he is con-
veying the. negation of (a), the negation of (b), and the negation of (c).
42
Having noted the confusion of "to convey" and "on the basis
of", I will continue to adopt the "to convey" interpretation unless
otherwise indicated. This choice does not affect the arguments
I will give.
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2.2.5 "Be Brief"
Most of Wilson's discussion of (27) is concerned
with trying to show that Grice's maxims prevent a
speaker from using (25) to convey (a), (b), or (c).
Wilson gives two arguments for this conclusion.
The first is based solely on the maxim "Be brief".
The key presumption is that shorter sentences are to be
preferred over longer ones. (a), (b), and (c) are
shorter sentences than (25). Thus, the quickest and
easiest way of conveying the information expressed by
these sentences is to utter them assertively. Conse-
quently, Wilson concludes that a speaker obeying Grice's
maxims cannot use (25) to convey the information in
(a), (b), or (c), since he would then be guilty of
being unnecessarily verbose. According to this argument,
such a speaker would choose (25c) over (25) simply
because it is two words shorter.
Presumably the maxim "Be brief" plays some role in
guiding conversation; however, it is hard to believe that
it has the role that Wilson attributes to it. For example,
some justification may be required for using the seven
word sentence (42) rather than the five word sentence (43).
42.. The story was reported by the Globe.
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43. The Globe reported the story.
However, even if no justification is forthcoming,
we hardly regard the violation of the maxim of brevity
worth noticing. Certainly one is not prevented from
using (42) where (43) would do just as well. If the
maxim of brevity were the only reason not to use (25)
to convey the information expressed by (c), then
violations here would also be negligible. Since (25)
cannot be used to convey the information in (c), we
must look for other explanations of the facts at hand.44
Wilson does just this. After invoking the maxim
"Be brief" she adds the following:
Moreover, if I want to convey the information that Bill is not
ill, [25] is a remarkably inefficient way of conveying this
information, since it merely entails that one of (a)-(e)
is true. The avoidance of obscurity or ambiguity is another of
the Gricean goals of conversation. In other words, someone who
was obeying the Gricean maxims would simply never use [25]
on the basis of (c), since there is another, shorter, more
explicit and4 ess misleading way to convey the information
in (c) .
Here Wilson suggests that in addition to the maxim
43(25c) is only one example. The same point could be made for
(25a) and (25b).
44 If the maxim of brevity were as important as Wilson claims,
then it is hard to see how (25e) could ever be used. (25) is shorter
than (e) and can also be used to express the information in (e).. Thus,
the maxim of brevity would preclude the use of (e).
4 5Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
p. 100.
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"Be brief", the maxims "Avoid ambiguity" and "Avoid
obscurity of expression" are also involved in ruling out
"interpretations" (a-c). This is initially puzzling.
On Wilson's account, (25) is not ambiguous. At this point
her terminology is misleading. According to her, each
sufficient "truth condition" of a sentence is a "possible
interpretation" of the sentence. Thus, a sentence
having more than one sufficient "truth condition" has
more than one "possible interpretation". However,
the fact that a sentence has more than one "interpretation"
does not show that it has more than one meaning. Thus,
Wilson's observation that (25) merely entails that
one of (a-e) is true does not show that (25) is ambiguous.4 6
Wilson's point can best be expressed by considering
the first maxim of quantity--"Don't give too little
information". This maxim tells us to avoid making a
weaker (less informative) statement when we are in a
position to make a stronger (more informative) statement
that is relevant to the conversation. According to
Wilson, the statements expressed by (a), (b), and (c)
46Nor does it show that an utterance of (25) is ambiguous.
An utterance may be ambiguous even when the sentence uttered is
not--e.g., 'He is intelligent'. However, the fact that there is
more than one sufficient truth condition for a sentence does not
show that an utterance of the sentence is ambiguous.
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entail, but are not entailed by the statement expressed
by (25). Thus, (a), (b), and (c) express stronger state-
ments than (25) does. Consequently, a speaker asser-
tively uttering (25).rather than (a), (b), or (c)
violates the first maxim of quantity.
This assumes that one cannot use (25) to convey
the statements expressed by (a), (b), or (c). If one
could, then no violation of the first maxim of quantity
would occur. What must be explained is why (25)
cannot be used to convey these statements.
Consider (c). According to Wilson, (c) contains
information not found in (25)--i.e., (c) entails, but
is not entailed by (25). Because of this, there is
no way for a hearer to grasp that the information
in (c) is what a speaker who utters (25) wishes to
convey. Consequently, (25) is an obscure and ineffective
way of communicating this information. This seems to
be Wilson's point in invoking the maxim prohibiting
obscurity of expression.
This position has one main virtue. It claims that
the reason (25) cannot be used in place of (c) is not
that (c) is shorter than (25) but rather that (:) is
Zess informative. This is at least the right kind of
reason for supposing that a certain sentence cannot be
used to convey a certain statement. For example, it
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is why (40a) normally cannot be used to convey (40b).
40. a. Either Sam does not own any paintings, or
none of his paintings are valuable.
b. Sam has sold all his valuable possessions.
No one would claim that brevity is the reason (40a)
cannot be used in place of (40b). There is no basis
for thinking that length is any more important in the
case of (25).
The argument just given might be seen as providing
support for Wilson's analysis. Unfortunately, it doesn't.
It applies to "interpretations" (d) and (e) every bit
as much as it applies to (a-c). On Wilson's analysis,
the statements expressed by (d) and (e) are weaker
(less informative) than the statement expressed by
(25). Consequently, if the uninformativeness of (25)
rules out using it to convey (a-c), then this same unin-
formativeness must rule out using it to convey (d) or
(e). However, not all of these "interpretations" can
be eliminated since (25) can be used to convey (e).
447Clearly, something is wrong.
47If (a-e) were all ruled out by Gricean maxims, then (25)
might still be used to convey the message that the disjunction of
(a-e) is true. Of course, (25) can be used to convey this. However,
this is not the only message that it can be used to convey. Similarly,
if the first maxim of quantity ruled out using (25) (in isolation or
without clarification) on the basis of (a-e), then one still would
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To avoid this objection, Wilson must do two things.
First, she must find a difference between (a-c) and (e)
48that is relevant to the operation of a maxim. This
maxim must prevent a speaker from using (25) in place
of (a-c), but allow him to use it in place of (e).
Second, she must show that the maxim in question has
priority over the maxim prohibiting obscurity. Where
the former conflicts with the latter, violations of
the latter must be permitted.
Some maxims do have priority over others. For
example, Grice observes that ". .. to make a less
informative [i.e., weaker] statement rather than a
more informative [i.e., stronger] statement would be to
offend against the first maxim of quantity, provided
that the more informative statement, if made, would be of
interest [i.e., provided that it would be relevant] . 49
(my emphasis) Thus, the maxim of relevance takes
be able to use (25) appropriately (in isolation) when one believed
that at least one of (a-e) were true, but didn't know which. However,
this is not the only basis that one might have for asserting (25).
48I assume here that although (25) can be used to convey (e),
it cannot be used to convey (d). Wilson shares this assumption. In
a moment I will present her argument for it. Until then I will
concentrate only on (a-c) and (e).
494Grice, "Logic and Conversation," Lecture 4, unpublished
manuscript. Presumably Grice means that asserting a weaker
statement rather than a stronger one violates the first maxim of
quantity provided that the extra information provided by the
stronger statement is relevant to the conversation.
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priority over the first maxim of quantity.
Unfortunately, the maxim of relevance does not
distinguish between (a-c) and (e). One might claim that
it is permissible to use a sentence that does not
express the message that one is trying to convey provided
that the presumption of relevance makes it clear what
the message is. But this doesn't explain why a speaker
can use (25) to convey (e) in a context in which (e)
is relevant, but he cannot use (25) to convey (a-c)
in a context in which they are relevant. Thus, the
priority of the maxim of relevance does not account for
the difference between (a-c) and (e).
This brings me back to the maxim "Be brief". It
distinguishes between (a-c) and (e). If it had priority
over "Avoid obscurity", then one could use a sentence
that did not express what one wanted to convey, provided
that the sentence were shorter than any sentence that
did express one's message. Unfortunately, the maxim of
brevity does not have this consequence.
Wilson did not grasp this point. The reason she
didn't is connected with her dubious notion of the
"possible interpretations" of a sentence. She assumed
that each sentence S is associated with a set T of
"possible interpretations" which includes all of the
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statements that S can be used to convey. She thought
that if the maxim of brevity eliminated all members of
T except one, then it would be obvious to the hearer
which statement someone asserting S intended to convey.
This is how Wilson treats (25). The (a-c) "inter-
pretations" are eliminated because they are shorter
than (25). What about (d) and (e)? According to Wilson,
The choice between (d) and (e) interpretations can be similarly
weighted in favour of (e) in the following way. If a speaker
had wanted to convey (d), then most efficient way of conveying
this information would be by saying [#]:
[#] John does not know that Bill is ill.
While (25] has [#] as a possible interpretation, it also has
the possible interpretation given in (e) above. Since there
are thus two available ways of conveying the information in
[#] of roughly the same length, one of which is open to other
interpretations, the Gricean goal of clarity will dictate
[#1 as the correct form in which to convey this information.
This leaves (e) as the most likely interpretation of [25]
according to Gricean principles--as it in fact is. 50 (my emphasis)
In this passage, Wilson implicitly claims the
priority of "Be brief" over other Gricean maxims. (d)
is eliminated because there is a way of conveying the
information it expresses that "is roughly the same length"
as (25) but is not "open to other interpretations."51
50Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
p. 100.
51
Of course, (d) itself is longer than (25). On Wilson's
account the reason that (#) can be used to convey the information
expressed by (d) is that (#) conversationally implicates that
(a-c) are false--i.e., that John exists and Bill is ill.
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Of course, there is also a way of expressing the infor-
mation in (e) that is not "open to other interpretations"--
by using (e) itself. Apparently, the reason that "the
Gricean goal of clarity" doesn't eliminate (e) is that
it isn't "of roughly the same length" as (25). It is
four words longer. Thus, on Wilson's analysis, the
maxim "B3e brief" takes priority over other Gricean
maxims and is responsible for the fact that a speaker
cannot use (25) to convey (a-d) but can use it to convey
(e).
This position cannot be correct. I have already
argued that the maxim of brevity won't bear the weight
that Wilson places on it. Giving this maxim priority
over other Gricean maxims just compounds the problem.
Thus, Wilson's argument that Grice's maxims explain why.
(25) cannot be used to convey (a-d) must be rejected.
The issue becomes even clearer when Wilson's
unjustified reliance on "possible interpretations" is
eliminated. She implicitly maintains that a sentence
S can be used to convey one of its "possible interpreta-
tions" P just in case S is shorter than any sentence that
expresses P. By dropping reference to "possible inter-
pretations" we get (44).
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44. A sentence S can be used to convey a statement
P (that it does not semantically express)
just in case S is shorter than any sentence
that does express P.
(44) is clearly false.52 Thus, the maxim of brevity
does not explain why (25) cannot be used to convey the
statements expressed by (a-d), but can be used to convey
the statement expressed by (e).
2.3 Conclusion
The results of Section 2.2 undermine Wilson's
argument that negative sentences conversationally
implicate their putative presuppositions. In Sections
2.2.1-2.2.4, I demonstrated that her argument is invalid
and cannot be repaired. In Section 2.2.5, I showed that
she fails to establish one of her premises. This leaves
her analysis unsupported.
The problem with Wilson's view is even more serious.
I do not think that she has simply failed to come up
with the right argument to establish her conclusion.
52
If it were true, then it would be just as correct to use (i)
to convey (iii) as it is to use it to convey (ii).
(i) John hasn't stopped smoking.
(ii) John used to smoke and still does.
(iii) John never smoked before and doesn't now.
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Rather it seems to me that her conclusion is false.
Negative sentences do not conversationally implicate
their putative presuppositions.
For example, on Wilson's account, competent speakerB
recognize that (47) and (48) are logically equivalent.
47. Sam didn't flunk the test.
48. It wasn't Sam who flunked the test.
(47) does not conversaio6nally implicate (49).
49. Someone flunked the test.
If (48) does, then the maxims that give rise to this
.53
implicature must treat (47) and (48) differently.53
This eliminates the maxims of quantity and quality.
Quantity:
Quality:
(i) Don't give too little information.
(ii) Don't give too much information.
(i) Do not make statements which you
believe to be false.
(ii) Do not make statements for which
you have insufficient evidence.
"Be brief", "Avoid ambiguity", and "Avoid obscurity"
53
This argument assumes that Wilson's notion of "possible
interpretation" cannot be used to distinguish between (47) and (48).
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are not responsible for the difference between (47) and
(48) either. This leaves only "Be relevant" and "Be
orderly". I see no way of using these maxims to es-
tablish the alleged conversational implicature. I
conclude that (48) does not conversationally implicate
(49). More generally, negative sentences do not conver-
sationally implicate their putative presuppositions.
III. Disjunctions and Conditionals
3.1 Wilson's Analysis
Wilson argues that disjunctions and conditionals
implicate their putative presuppositions. However, she
does not: claim that the implicature is conversational.
Rather, it is supposed to arise from two new maxims of
confirmation.
20. Don't assert a contingent disjunction unless you
have some evidence for the truth of both disjuncts.
21. Don't assert a contingent conditional unless you
have some evidence for the truth of the antecedent.
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In Section I, I used these maxims to define a
notion of W-implicature.
22. A speaker who assertively utters a sentence S
W-implicates a proposition Q, if and only if
(i) he is to be presumed to be observing
principles (20) and (21); and
(ii) the supposition that he believes Q is
required in order to make his assertive
utterance of S consistent with this
presumption; and
(iii), the speaker thinks (and would expect the
hearer to think that the speaker thinks)
that the hearer can work out or grasp
intuitively that the supposition in
(ii) is required.
The notion of a sentence W-implicating a proposition is
defined as follows:
23. A sentence S W-implicates a proposition Q if
and only if a speaker who assertively utters
S in normal circumstances and without explicit
qualification W-implicates Q.
Wilson's thesis is that disjunctions and conditionals
W-implicate their putative presuppositions.
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For example, a speaker who assertively utters
(50a) or (50b) would normally be taken to suggest the
truth of (50c).
50. a. If the King of Thessalonia came to the
party, then the party was a success.
b. Either the King of Thessalonia came to the
party, or there were no monarchs in
attendance.
c. There is a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
Wilson's explanation of this is that (50a) and (50b)
W-implicate (50c). She argues that a speaker uttering
(50a-b) and observing (20) and (21) must have evidence
for the truth of (51).
51. The King of Thessalonia came to the party.
Of course, it is not required that the speaker have
conclusive evidence for (51) or even that he have enough
evidence to warrant asserting it. If he had that much
evidence, then he would not assert (50a) or (50b),
but rather would make a stronger statement. Still,
the alleged) fact that he must have some evidence
for (51) provides Wilson with an argument. According
to her, it is impossible to have any evidence for (51)
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unless the truth of (50c) is given. Consequently, the
speaker must believe (50c), and (50a-b) must W-implicate
54it.
Wilson seems to think that this kind of account
can be given for all contingent disjunctions and
conditionals. Although she recognizes that her notion
of evidence raises questions, she maintains that the
job of answering these questions does not fall within
the scope of linguistic theory, but rather is a task
for confirmation theory. She is content to make a
prima facie case and depend on the investigations of con-
firmation theorists to provide further support for her
position.
Wilson says that if principles like (20) and (21)
exist
. . . they raise as many questions as they answer. In particular,
they raise the question of what counts as evidence for a given
54Assumption (i) is necessary to make this argument go through.
(i) Competent speakers know that it is impossible to have
evidence for (51) unless (50c) is true.
The supposition that is required to make the speaker's utterance
consistent with the presumption that he is observing (20) and
(21) is (ii). (See interpretation' (b) in footnote (8).)
(ii) The speaker believes that he has evidence for (51).
Given (i) and (ii) we may conclude that the speaker believes that
(50c) is true.. Since Wilson would accept (i), she would claim
that (50a.-b) W-implicate (50c).
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statement. I.have said that in general, if a speaker utters
one of (67)-(69) he is assumed to have evidence for (70):
(67) Nixon may regret being bald
(68) If Nixon regrets being bald, I'm leaving
(69) Either Nixon regrets being bald or his brother does
(70) Nixon regrets being bald.
Now although there are a number of necessary conditions for the
truth of (70), only some of these necessary conditions count
towards confirming the truth of (70). For example, (70) cannot
be true unless Nixon exists; but the fact that Nixon exists does
not count as confirmation of (70). Similarly, (70) cannot be true
unless Nixon is bald; but the fact that Nixon is bald would not be
accepted as evidence in favour of (70). What would count as
evidence would be Nixon's behaviour given that the first two
conditions were satisfied; for example, his insistence on sub-
sidising the National Foundation for Research on Hair Restoration,
or his gloom when looking at the back of his head in the mirror.
While it is certainly part of the job of a semantic theory to
investigate valid deductive reasoning, it does not seem to me
to be part of its job to investigate confirmation theory. And
insofar as the interpretation of modals, conditionals and disjunc-
tions depends on what counts as confirmation of a related categori-
cal statement, it does not seem to me to be the job of semantics
to investigate this.
If what I have been saying in this section is correct, it
provides an additional reason for abandoning the semantic approach
to presuppositions. Presuppositions tie up with the theory of con-
firmation in the following way. What have been treated as presup-
positions of various types are exactly those truth-conditions which
would not be counted as evidence for the truth of their related sen-
tences. What have been treated as entailments or assertions are
just those truth conditions which5 ould count as evidence for the
truth of their related sentences.
In the subsections that follow I will make three
points about Wilson's account of disjunctions and condi-
tionals. First, it conflicts with her claim that negative
sentences suggest rather than entail5 6 their putative
55
Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
pp. 108-109. Note: the presuppositions of (68) and (69) are neither
necessary nor sufficient truth conditions of these sentences.
56
P entails Q if and only if the truth of Q is a necessary
condition for P to be true.
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presuppositions. Second, it leaves many presuppositions
unexplained. Third, (20) and (21) are not acceptable
maxims. Speakers do not follow them and hearers do not
presume that they do.
3.2 Negations, Disjunctions and Conditionals
I have already argued that negative sentences do
not conversationally implicate their presuppositions.
This. conclusion is compatible with Wilson's claim that
such sentences only suggest that their presuppositions are
true. For example, it could be that negative sentences
57
conventionally implicate or pragmatically presuppose the
relevant statements. Even if Wilson were to give up her
views about conversational implicature and negation,
she could retain her semantic analysis of negative sen-
tences. On this analysis, (52) is logically compatible
with the falsity of its presupposition (53).58
57
A sentence S conventionally implicates a statement P if S
suggests P and this suggestion arises not from general, conversational,
or pragmatic principles, but rather from the meaning of S. See
Grice, "Logic and Conversation," Lecture 2, unpublished manuscript.
58
These examples were selected for convenience. Any
presupposi-:ion-bearing negative sentence will do.
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52. The King of Thessalonia didn't come to the party.
53. There is a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
In fact, the negation of (53) [i.e., (54)] entails (52).
54. There isn't a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
In this subsection I will show that Wilson's
account of disjunctions and conditionals conflicts with
her semantic analysis of negation. If (20) and (21)
are responsible for the presuppositions of (55a-b), then
(54) does not entail (52). Rather (52) entails (53).
55. a. If the King of Thessalonia didn't come to
the party, then the party was a flop.
b. Either the King of Thessalonia didn't come
to the party, or all the monarchs in Europe
were there.
Wilson admits that a speaker who assertively
utters (55a-b) in isolation or without clarification
suggests (53).59 If maxims (20) and (21) are responsible
59Wilson does not discuss these particular examples. However,
she does discuss a number of others. For example, she says
"I am as convinced as is the most devout presuppositionalist
that anyone who asserts (25), (27) or (29) in isolation, or
without qualification, in general suggests quite strongly that
(26), (28) and (30) are also true:
"25. Mary doesn't regret that her grandmother was trampled
by an antelope.
"26. Mary's grandmother was trampled by an antelope.
282
for this suggestion, then a speaker assertively uttering
(55a) or (55b) must believe that he has evidence for (52).
52. The King of Thessalonia didn't come to the party.
Wilson must also maintain that a speaker cannot believe
that he has such evidence unless he believes (53).
53. There is a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
Only if she accepts this can she hold that (55a-b)
W-implicate (53).
However, since she also claims that (54) entails
(52) , she must simultaneously hold the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 1
One can believe,that one has evidence for (52)
only if one believes (53).
Assumption 2
The negation of (53) [i.e., (54)] entails (52).
"27. If I stop playing chess with Fischer, I'll start
playing with Spassky.
"28. I (will) have been playing chess with Fischer.
"29. Either it wasn't Blossom who put Gluefast in my
contact lenses or she is lying to me..
"30. Someone put Gluefast in my contact lenses.
What I do deny is that this suggestion can be successfully treated
as either a logical presupposition or an entailment. (Presuppositions
and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics, p. 22)"
Wilson thinks that, in general, the putative presuppositions of dis-
juncts are suggested by the entire disjunction and that the putative
presuppositions of the antecedent are suggested by the conditional.
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These assumptions lead to a false conclusion.
From Assumption 1 it follows that if a speaker
does not believe (53), then he does not believe that
he has evidence for (52). Suppose that he does not
believe (53). Instead he believes itsnegation (54)
and recognizes that (54) entails (52). On Wilson's
assumptions, such a speaker believes (52) but does not
think that he has any evidence for his belief. Surely
this need not be the case. On the contrary, such a
speaker would naturally regard his evidence for (54)
as evidence for (52).60
.This argument shows that either Assumption 1 or
Assumption 2 (or both) is false. Assumption 1 is a
consequence of Wilson's pragmatic analysis of disjunc-
tions and conditionals. Assumption 2 is a consequence
of her semantic analysis of negation. Therefore, the
two analyses conflict.
If (55a-b) W-implicate (53), then (54) does not
entail (52).
52. The King of Thessalonia didn't come to the party.
53. There is a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
60
On Wilson's account (52) and (i) are semantically equivalent.
(52) The King of Thessalonia didn't come to the party.
(i) It is not true that the King of Thessalonia came to the party.
(54) entails both. Surely one can believe that one's evidence for (54)
is evidence for (i). Thus, on Wilson's account the same should be
true of (54) and (52).
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54. There isn't a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
55. a. If the King of Thessalonia didn't come to
the party, then the party was a flop.
b. Either the King of Thessalonia didn't come
to the party, or all the monarchs in Europe
were there.
From this it does not automatically follow that (52)
entails (53). However, on any reasonable account of
negation it will. For example, both Russell and theorists
of logical presupposition agree that (52) entails (53)
on the reading in which (52) is not entailed by (54).
If there is such a reading, then there is no plausible
alternative to this assumption. Consequently, Wilson
is faced with a dilemma. Either she must hold that
her analysis of disjunctions and conditionals does not
account for the presuppositions of (55a-b)61 or she
must give up her central claim that negative sentences
do not entail their presuppositions.
616
,The same point holds for all disjunctions whose
presuppositions are inherited from a negative disjunct and
all conditionals whose presuppositions are inherited from
a negative antecedent.
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3.3 Recursion
Negative sentences are not the only sentences
that cause Wilson difficulties. Compound sentences
are also a problem. When they are embedded in larger
compounds, they give rise to presuppositions that Wilson
cannot explain. Consider (57).
57. a. If the King of Thessalonia or the Queen of
Moravia went to the party, then it was a
success.
b. If the King of Thessalonia was injured or
the Queen of Moravia was insulted, then
there will be war.
Althoug'h (57a) and (57b) each suggest the truth of
(58) and (59), Wilson cannot account for this. 6 2
58. There is a (unique) King of Thessalonia.
59. There is a (unique) Queen of Moravia.
Wilson's principle (21) requires a speaker asserting
(57a) to have some evidence for (60a); likewise a
62ilson seems not to have noticed sentences like those in (57).
KarttunerL has. Since Wilson's theory is supposed to explain every-
thing that Karttunen's does, without its problems, Wilson is called
upon to account for (57). She gives no indication that she would
deny that: the sentences in (57) suggest (58) and (59).
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speaker asserting (57b) is required to have evidence for
(60b).
60. a. Either the King of Thessalonia or the Queen
of Moravia went to the party.
b. Either the King of Thessalonia was injured
or the Queen of Moravia was insulted.
However, one can have evidence for a disjunction without
having evidence for both of its disjuncts. Thus, even
on Wilson's account, one can have evidence for (60a-b)
without believing both (58) and (59). Consequently,
(57a-b) do not W-implicate (58) or (59). Wilson
fails to account for these suggestions.
If it were possible to invoke principle (20), then
she could explain these suggestions. This principle
stipulates that a speaker who asserts a disjunction
must have evidence for both disjuncts. Applying the
principle to (60a) would require the speaker to have
evidence for (61) and (62).
61. The King of Thessalonia went to the party.
62. The Queen of Moravia went to the party.
Applying it to (60b) would require the speaker to have
evidence, for (63) and (64).
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63. The King of Thessalonia was injured.
64. The Queen of Moravia was insulted.
According to Wilson, such a speaker must believe (58)
and (59).
However, (20) cannot be invoked. It requires
a speaker asserting a disjunction to have evidence for
both disjuncts. But (60a-b) are not asserted. In this
example, they are the antecedents of conditionals.
Since one who asserts a conditional does not assert
its antecedent, one who asserts (57a) or (57b) does not
assert (60a) or (60b). Thus, Wilson's account of dis-
junctions and conditionals leaves (57a-b) unexplained.
This shortcoming of Wilson's analysis is no minor
matter. Her theory cannot account for the way presuppo-
sitions are recursively "passed on" from smaller to
larger constituents in a compound sentence, nor is there
any obv:ious way of revising (20) to handle these cases.
Wilson cannot maintain that whenever one uses a dis-
junction one must have evidence for both of its disjuncts.
(65), (66) , and (67) show this.
65. I have no evidence to support the claim that
either the King of Thessalonia or the Queen of
Moravia went to the party.
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66. It is not true that either the King of Thes-
salonia or the Queen of Moravia went to the
party.
67. Bill said that there is a King of Thessalonia
and a Queen of Moravia and that either the King
of Thessalonia was injured or the Queen of
Moravia was insulted.
Consequently, I see no way of salvaging Wilson's account.
3.4 Spurious Maxims
In subsections 3.2 and 3.3 I showed that there are
disjunctions and conditionals that Wilson's maxims
cannot handle. In this subsection I will show that
the maxims themselves are not acceptable. It is simply
not true that speakers are presumed to follow them
unless they indicate otherwise.
First consider (68).
68. Either there is no King of Thessalonia or the
King of Thessalonia is in hiding.
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There is no presumption that a speaker asserting (68)
has evidence for both disjunctions--i.e., there is no
presumption that Wilson's maxims are being obeyed.
Wilson would agree with this, but she probably
would not find it troubling. On her account, one
cannot have any evidence for (69) unless one believes
(70.
69. The King of Thessalonia is in hiding.
70. There is a King of Thessalonia.
A speaker who believed (70) would never used (68)--
provided that he was observing Grice's maxims. Rather
he would make the stronger statement (69).
Wilson's explanation of (68) would probably be
the following: a speaker using (68) is not presumed
to be obeying (20) because he is presumed to be obeying
Grice's maxims. More generally, a speaker will be
presumed to be observing Wilson's maxims only if.this
presumption is consistent with the claim he is also
observing Grice's.
A more troublesome example is (71).
71. Either the president elected in 1980 will be
a Republican or the president elected in 1980
will be a Democrat.
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One can assert (71) without having evidence for either
of its disjuncts. For example, if one were discussing
the strength of the two major parties in the United
States, then one could appropriately assert (71) on
the basis of the historical weakness of third party
candidates. No disclaimers would be necessary nor
would one have to indicate the basis for one's assertion.
Hearers would simply not presume that the speaker
must have evidence for either disjunct.
Why is there no presumption? I think it is because
Wilson's maxims do not guide conversation. What would
Wilson say? On her account, (20) requires the speaker
63to have evidence for incompatible propositions --
(72) and (73).
72. The president elected in 1980 will be a
Republican.
73. The president elected in 1980 will be a
Democrat.
Wilson might claim that the incompatibility of (72)
and (73) explains why hearers do not presume her maxims
are being observed. For example, she might claim that
63
I assume that it is understood that if one is a Republican,
then one is not a Democrat and vice versa.
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it is impossible to have evidence for incompatible
propositions.
It isn't. One cannot have conclusive evidence for
such propositions, but Wilson's maxims do not require
this. In fact, it is commonplace to have some evidence
for incompatible claims. For example, I now have
evidence for both (74) and (75).64
74. Ford will be the Republican Party's nominee
in 1976.
75. Reagan will be the Republican Party's nominee
in 1976.
Evidence for the former is the fact that Ford is the
incumbent and incumbent presidents are traditionally
nominated. Evidence for the latter is a recent Gallup
Poll showing Reagan ahead. Thus, if I were to assert
(76), then I would have evidence for both disjuncts,
even though they are incompatible. Moreover, this
evidence would be part of my evidence for (76).
76. Either Ford will be the Republican Party's
nominee in 1976 or Reagan will be.
64Here I assume that it is understood that only one of
these can be true.
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Hearers do not, in general, presume that someone
who asserts a disjunction has evidence for the individual
disjuncts; nor do they presume that he doesn't have
evidence. In some contexts, they presume that he does;
in others, that hedoesn't; and in still others, they
make no presumption at all. This means that there is
no general presumption that Wilson's maxims are being
obeyed. They simply do not guide conversation.
The same point is illustrated by (77) and (78).
77. Either the president elected in 1980 will be
a Republican or the Republican Party will go
broke.
78. If the president elected in 1980 is a Republican,
then the Democrats will have to reorganize.
Here there is no question of having evidence for in-
compatible propositions. Moreover, (77) and (78) can
be appropriately asserted by a speaker who does not have
evidence for (72).
72. The president elected in 1980 will be a Republican.
Consider (78). If the point of'the conversation were
to indicate what it would mean for the Democrats to be
out of power for many years, then (78) would be appropriate
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even if there were no evidence for its antecedent. The
speaker would not have to make it clear that he was
opting out of Wilson's maxims. It would not enter
anyone's mind that the maxims were relevant. A similar
point holds for (77).
It won't do to claim that the contexts I have
suggested are special and that the normal presumption
in favor of (20) and (21) is suspended in these cases.
To claim this would be to make Wilson's theory unaccep-
tably vague. The danger is that it may become vacuous.
Unless some account can be given of where these maxims
can and cannot be invoked, she has no theory at all.
In fact, she is in trouble no matter what move
she makes. If she claims that the presumption in favor
of (20) and (21) is suspended in these contexts, then
she has no explanation of the fact that asserting (77)
or (78) in these contexts suggests (79).
79. There will be a president elected in 1980.
On the other hand, if she claims that the presumption
her maxims are being obeyed remains in force, then (77)
and (78) show this claim to be false. To be sure, these
sentences suggest (79). Hence, the speaker must have
evidence for (79). However, it is crucial to Wilson t s
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argument that evidence for (79) is not evidence for
(72). "What have been treated as presuppositions of
various types are exactly those truth conditions which
would not be counted as evidence for the truth of their
related sentences."65 Consequently, Wilson cannot handle
(77) and (78).
(80) and (81) are also counterexamples to Wilson's
maxims.
80. If there is a doctor in the house, then
I'll be surprised.
..81. Either there is a doctor in the house,
or Susan's done for.
A speaker asserting these statements is not presumed
to have evidence for (82).
82. There is a doctor in the house.
Thus, Wilson's maxims do not apply to them.
Now consider the sentences in (83) and (84).
83. a. If there is a doctor in the building and
he is on duty, then I'll be surprised.
6Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics,
p. 109.
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b. If the doctor in the building is on duty,
then I'll be surprised.
84. a. Either there is a doctor in the building
and he is on duty, or Susan is done for.
b. Either the doctor in the building is on
duty, or Susan is done for.
Since Wilson's maxims do not apply to the (a) examples,
there is no reason to suppose that they apply to the
(b) exiamples. Of course, (83b) and (84b) suggest (85).
85. There is a doctor in the buiding.
Thus, a speaker asserting one of these statements must have
evidence for (85). Note the explanation. (83b) and (84b)
suggest (85); therefore, the speaker must have evidence for
(85). What is primary is the suggestion, not the evidence. Con-
sequently, the suggestion is not explained by the need for
evidence.
IV. Summing Up
In Part 4 I have shown two things. First, negative
sentences do not conversationally implicate their presuppo-
sitions. Second, Wilson's principles of confirmation
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do not account for the presuppositions of disjunctions
and conditionals. Thus, Wilson's positive theory of
how presuppositions arise is wrong.
I want to emphasize that although her positive
theory fails, there is much in Wilson's discussion of
presupposition that is of permanent value. Her posing of
issues, marshalling of data, and criticism of certain
alternative accounts is very effective. I have not
mentioned some of these issues simply because Wilson
does such a good job on them herself.
One place where I did follow Wilson was in Part
2 where I argued that the presuppositions of compound
sentences are non-logical and have the force of suggestions
rather than entailments. The status of negative sentences
is less clear. Such sentences might carry logical
presuppositions. If they do, they are ambiguous between
internal and external negation readings. On the other
hand, they may only suggest their presuppositions.
Nothing that I have said decides conclusively between
these alternatives.
PART 5
KARTTUNEN'S THEORY OF PRESUPPOSITION
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I. Overview
1.1 Introduction
Like Wilson, Karttunen not only attacks theories
of logical presupposition, he also develops his own
account of how presuppositions arise. Unlike Wilson,
he does not try to "explain away" the notion of pre-
supposition. He does not appeal to any independent
principles of evidence or conversation. Instead,
he focuses on compound sentences and tries to develop
a mechanism that allows one to compute the presuppositions
of a compound sentence from the presuppositions and
entailments of simpler sentences.
The starting point for his work was provided by
Langedoen and Savin in "The Projection Problem for
Presuppositions."l They argued that the presuppositions
of a subordinate clause always become presuppositions
of the entire sentence of which the clause is a part.
Karttunen showed that this is wrong and tried to develop
a more adequate account. His theory covers many different
Langendoen, D. Terence,and Savin, Harris B., "The Projection
Problem for Presuppositions," in Studies in'Linguistic Semantics
edited by Charles Fillmore and D. T. Langendoen, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1971), pp. 55-62.
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types of sentences and constructions. In this paper
I will be concerned with his analysis of disjunctions,
conjunctions, and conditionals. Karttunen discusses
this aspect of his theory in "Presuppositions of Compound
Sentences" and "Presupposition in Linguistic Context." 2
In Parts 1 and 2, I outlined a simplified version
of Karttunen's account. Karttunen presents his theory
in two stages. Theses (1-3) comprise the first stage. 3
1. a. If A k-presupposes C, then TIf A, then B
k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C, and A does not entail
C, then Ilf A, then B1 k-presupposes C.
2. a. If A k-presupposes C, then rA and B k-
presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C and A does not entail C,
then rA and B k-presupposes C.
3. a. If A k-presupposes C and r-B7 does not entail
C, then TEither A or B k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C and f-A1 does not entail
2Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," Linguistic
Inquiry 4, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 169-194; and "Presupposition and Lin-
guistic Context," Theoretical Linguistics 1, no. 1/2 (1974): 182-194.
3Karttunen refers to the principles that determine the presup-
positions of conditionals, conjunctions and disjunctions as "filtering
principles". If A is a constituent of such a compound sentence S, and
if A presupposes P, then P is "filtered out" in the context of S iff
S does not presuppose P.
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C, then Either A or B k-presupposes C.4
In the second stage, presupposition is relativized
to context. The fact that compound sentences carry
suggestions in certain situations but not in others
leads Karttunen to abandon (1-3) and to express the
ideas behind them in a radically different way. I
will first examine the simplified account (theses 1-3)
in order to provide a better understanding of the
fundamental nature of the theory. I will then move on
to the more complex analysis.
1.2 Simplifying Assumptions
In this subsection I will lay the foundation for my
analysis of Karttunen's theory. I will state several
assumptions and clarify certain notions that are
essential to an evaluation of his account.
1.2.1 K-Presupposition
In developing his theory Karttunen is not always
explicit about what it means to say that one sentence
Principles 1 and 2 are Karttunen's. Principle 3 is a modifica-
tion of his proposal to make the conditions for disjunctions symmetrical.
Later in Part 5 I will discuss whether or not the conditions
for conjunctions and conditionals should also be symmetrical.
It is also understood that the only k-presuppositions of
conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals are those that arise
from thesefiltering principles.
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k-presupposes another. He does not begin with a formal
definition of k-presupposition. Rather he assumes
that simple positive sentences and their negations
bear their standard presuppositions. Whether or not
other sentences bear k-presuppositions is determined
by a number of linguistic tests.
According to Karttunen, if one were unsure about
whether or not a sentence S k-presupposes something P,
then one could test for this by embedding S in 'It
may be that . .' or by embedding it in a disjunction
or a conditional.5 If the resulting complex sentence
does not implicate P, then P is not a k-presupposition
of S. If the complex sentence does implicate P, then
this is evidence that S k-presupposes P.
Suppose that one wanted to know whether or not
the conjunction (4) k-presupposes or merely entails (5).
4. It is Susan who has the jewels, and it is
Mary who has the paintings.
5. Someone has the jewels, and someone has the
paintings.
Since (6), (7), and (8) implicate (5), this is evidence
5
More precisely, one must embed S in a disjunction or a
conditional in which filtering does not occur.
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that (4) k-presupposes (5).
6. It may be that it is Susan who has the jewels
and it is Mary who has the paintings.
7. Either it is Susan who has the jewels and it
is Mary who has the paintings, or we'll never
recover the missing items.
8. If it is Susan who has the jewels and it is
Mary who has the paintings, then the missing
items will soon be returned.6
For Karttunen, k-presupposition is (roughly) what
is preserved by the contexts mentioned in his tests.
The standard-presuppositions of simple positive sentences
and their negations are k-presuppositions. rIt may be that S7
Note: the contexts in question do not always preserve entail-
ment nor do they always preserve suggestion. Although (i) entails
(5), examples (ii), (iii), and (iv) do not suggest (5).
(i) Susan has the jewels and Mary has the paintings.
(ii) It may be that Susan has the jewels and Mary has the paintings.
(iii) Either Susan has the jewels and Mary has the paintings,
or the items have been lost.
(iv) If Susan has the jewels and Mary has the paintings, then
the missing items will soon be returned.
Similarly, although an assertive utterance of (v) suggests (vi),
examples (vii), (viii), and (ix) do not suggest (vi).
(v) It is snowing.
(vi) I believe it is snowing.
(vii) It may be that it is snowing.
(viii) Either it is snowing, or the streets will be clear.
(ix) If it is snowing, then the children will be happy.
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k-presupposes P if and only if S does. A disjunction,
conjunction, or conditional k-presupposes P if and only
if principle (1), (2), or (3) says that it does.
This is a reconstruction of Karttunen's procedure.
On this reconstruction, his tests provide the basis for
an inductive definition of k-presupposition. Karttunen
assumes that there is a way of defining the class of
k-presuppositions of simple positive sentences and their
negations. The definition is completed by principles
like (1), (2) and (3). If this procedure can be
carried through, Karttunen will have succeeded in formally
characterizing a notion of presupposition.8
Of course, this is not enough. Karttunen must
also specify the empirical claim that is made by saying
that one sentence k-presupposes another. Although he
is not fully explicit about this, he seems to assume (9).
7This is only a partial account of Karttunen's definition.
A complete account would include principles for determining the
k-presuppositions of other types of complex sentences like
factives, propositional attitudes, and modals.
8Note: Karttunen's procedure is different from that of
many theorists. Karttunen's definition of k-presupposition is
inductive and mechanical. Although it formally characterizes the
class of k-presuppositions, it does not indicate what empirical
claim is made by saying that one sentence k-presupposes another. This
is accomplished by principles (9) and (10) below. In short,
Karttunen first formally characterizes a theoretical notion,
and then gives partial specification of its role in an empirical
theory.
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9. If a sentence S k-presupposes a sentence P,
then a speaker who assertively utters S (in
normal circumstances and without clarification)
indicates that he believes P and that he
assumes his audience accepts (or will accept) P.
I suspect that Karttunen would also be willing to
adopt (10).
10. If S k-presupposes-P, then it is inappropriate
for a speaker to utter S assertively (in
normal circumstances and without clarification)
unless he believes P and his audience accepts
(or will accept) P.
These principles give his theory empirical content.
(9) and (10) are a good beginning. Although they
are by no means final, they are clear enough to serve as
working principles and to provide us with data to test
Karttunen's theory.10  In addition, they contain a
theoretical insight worth noticing. Karttunen observes
that in certain cases it is appropriate to assertively
utter a sentence even if one knows that the audience does
(9) is compatible with the claim that some sentences entail
their k-presuppositions, and others do not.
10Although the data is not ideal, there are enough clear cases
to justify the enterprise. I will try to follow the commonly
accepted characterizations of this data wherever possible.
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not share one's assumptions. (9) and (10) are designed
to take this into account.
For example, one might appropriately assert each of
the (a) statements below even if one knew that one's
audience had no prior opinion as to'truth or falsity
of the corresponding (b) statements.
11. a. If I had a dime, I'd buy you a Coke. 1 1
b. I don't have a dime.
12. a. Jones lives in the third brick house down
the street from the post office. 1 2
b. There are at least three brick houses down
the street from the post office.
13. a. My brother is smarter than anyone in this room.
b. I have a brother.
When can a speaker assert the (a) statements without
assuming that his listeners already accept the (b)
statements? When he knows they wiZZll accept them. For
example, (12a) may be used in giving directions to someone
who hasn't the slightest idea that there are any brick
houses near the post office. This is because the hearer
Karttunen takes counterfactual conditionals to presuppose
the falsity of their antecedents. He cites this sentence on page 170
of "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," Linguistic Inquiry 4
(Spring 1973).
12
Karttunen cites this sentence on page 191 of "Presupposition
and Linguistic Context," Theoretical Linguistics 1 (1974).
306
is prepared to accept the speaker's assumptions and has
no reason to doubt them. Similarly, in asserting (13a),
I assume that my audience will grant that I have a brother
no matter how much they might disagree with my assertion.
If I thought they weren't willing to grant this, then I
would not use (13a), but would use (14) instead.
14. I have a brother and he is smarter than
anyone in this room.
In short, presuppositions can introduce new information,
but (normally) this information should not be controversial.
1.2.2 The Basis Step of the Induction
My statement of Karttunen's program leaves it
open as to whether or not simple positive sentences and
their negations bear logical presuppositions. The
question at issue involves the clause(s) covering these
sentences in the inductive definition of k-presupposition.
If they do bear logical presuppositions, then the clause
may be (15).
15. If P is a necessary condition for S to have a
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truth value, then S k-presupposes P.13
Incorporating (15) in a semantic theory in which certain
simple sentences and their negations are truth-valueless
would allow Karttunen to predict which of these sentences
carry k-presuppositions.14  The addition of principles
like (1-3) would complete the inductive definition.
Karttunen's program is also compatible with the
claim that there are no logical presuppositions. If
this claim is correct, then the theory must somehow
specify certain entailments of simple positive sentences
as being k-presuppositions. The clause for negation
might then be (16).
16. If S k-presupposes P, and S' is a negation of S,
then S' k-presupposes P.15
13
This clause could be formulated differently depending on
one's favorite definition of logical presupposition.
14If one adopts (15), then one must be careful how one defines the
connectives. (15) (together with semantic theory) should not introduce
k-presuppositions where principles (1-3) do not sanction them. If "and",
"or", and "if, then" are truth functional, then one who accepts (1-3)
has the option of including truth-valuelessness in their truth tables only
in the positions occupied by "*" below.
and T F * if, then T F * or T F *
T T T
F F F
* 4(*) (*) (*) * (*) (*) * (*)
15(16) treats all negations of a sentence alike. It is not
necessary that Karttunen accept this. For example, he could distinguish
different types of negation exemplified in (i) and (ii).
(i) The King of France isn't wise.
(ii) It is not the case that the King of France is wise.
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On this account, there is no need to suppose that negative
sentences entail their k-presuppositions. Thus, within
the context of Karttunen's theory, adopting (16) is
an alternative to positing logical presupposition.
When Karttunen reformulates his theory to account
for the relativization of presupposition to context,
he does adopt (16). However, he gives no argument for
rejecting logical presupposition. I will not follow
Karttunen in this respect. For the present, I will
leave it open whether or not the (a) and (b) sentences
in (17-21) logically presuppose the (c) sentences.
17. a. The man in the next room is a philosopher.
b. The man in the next room isn't a philosopher.
c. There is a man in the next room.
18. a. All of John's children are intelligent.
b. Not all of John's children are intelligent.
c. John has children.
19. a. It is Susan who has the jewels.
b. It isn't Susan who has the jewels.
c. Someone has the jewels.
20. a. Sam has stopped smoking.
b. Sam hasn't stopped smoking.
16He gives some arguments in "Presuppositions of Compound Sen-
tences." I have already shown in Part 2 that these arguments are unsound.
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c. Sam used to smoke.
21. a. Bill realizes that the Red Sox won the pennant.
b. Bill doesn't realize that the Red Sox
won the pennant.
c. The Red Sox won the pennant.
This will allow me to raise certain issues that might
otherwise be obscured. In particular, I will raise the
issue of whether or not Karttunen's theory provides
any reason for abandoning logical presupposition.
1.2.3 Entailment
In this essay I have assumed that a sentence A
entails a sentence B if and only if the truth of B is
necessary for the truth of A. Karttunen also accepts
this definition. He says that "In general, we say that A
semantically entails B (A I- B) if (and only if) B is true
whenever A is." 17 However, he recognizes that this
definition leads to problems in the formulation of his
filtering principles (1-3).18
17Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," p. 177.
18bd p. 183.
Ibid, p. 183..
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According to the above definition of entailment,
every sentence entails every necessary truth. Now
consider (22).
22. a. Either my information is incorrect, or
11John doesn't know that 2 equals 2048.
b. 211 equals 2048.
(22b) is necessarily true and hence is entailed by (23).
23. My information isn't correct.
Thus, according to Karttunen's principle (3), (22a)
does not k-presuppose (22b).19 Consequently, Karttunen
fails to predict that a speaker who asserts (22a)
takes (22b) for granted--i.e., Karttunen fails to predict
that such a speaker suggests that he believes (22b)
and indicates that he assumes that his audience accepts
(or will accept) (22b).
This example might not be problematic for Karttunen
if the notion of entailment used in (1-3) is one that
belongs strictly to semantic theory as opposed to
20
mathematics or formal logic. But this raises the
P19rinciple (3) does not mark (22b) as one of the k-presuppositions
of (22a). Since all k-presuppositions of a disjunction arise from this
principle, (22a) does not k-presuppose (22b).
2 0Such. a notion would have to have an extension different from
the extension of the notion of entailment that I have been using
in this paper.
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question as to what notion(s) of entailment is (are)
specially the province of semantics. Karttunen does
not try to answer this question; nor will I.
Nevertheless, I suspect that Karttunen's theory
demands an entailment relation that captures some
notion of immediate inference. 22  That is, I suspect
that the entailment relation needed for (1-3) is such that
if S entails E, then competent speakers will recognize
the entailment without laborious calculation and
23demonstration. Unless this is the case, the connection
between k-presupposition and what a speaker takes for
granted will be seriously weakened. Thus, I will follow
Karttunen in presenting examples in which the entailments
in question would be easily recognized by all competent
speakers.
21Jerrold Katz discusses this question in Chapter 6 of Semantic
Theory, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
22On page 189 of "Presuppositions and Linguistic Context,"
Karttunen says that "It is implicit in this treatment that every
individual's beliefs are considered to be closed under entailment.
I am not sure whether this is a defect."
23This principle is meant to be a necessary condition for
characterizing the notion of entailment that Karttunen requires.
I do not claim that it is a sufficient condition. Another necessary
condition is that if S entails E, then the truth of E is a necessary
condition for the truth of S.
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1.3 The Aims of My Analysis
In the sections that follow I will do three things.
I will explicate Karttunen's theory starting with what I
have already presented and going on to his more complex
account. Second, I will indicate several problems with
his theory. Third, I will show how Karttunen might
modify his theory in order to resolve some of the
problems he encounters.
II. Counterevidence
The evidence that Karttunen cites for his analysis
is inconclusive. Consider the filtering principle
for conditionals.
1. a. If A k-presupposes C, then rf A, then B
k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C, and A does not entail C,
then rIf A, then B1 k-presupposes C.
The crucial part of this principle is the italicized
clause that "filters out" the presuppositions of B that
are entailed by A. Karttunen's evidence for this clause
is provided by the contrast between (24) and (25).
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These are the only sentences that he cites.
24. If baldness is hereditary, then all of Jack's
children are bald.
A = 'Baldness is hereditary'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
25. a. If Jack has children, then all of Jack's
children are bald.
A = 'Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
b. If it is true that Jack has children, then
all of Jack's children are bald.
A = 'It is true that Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
c. If Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia, Fred
will kiss Cecilia again.
A = 'Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia'
B = 'Fred will kiss Cecilia again'
C = 'Fred has kissed Cecilia'
d. If Harry is married, then his wife is
no longer living with him.24
24
Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," p. 177.
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A = 'Harry is married'
B = 'Harry's wife is no longer living with
him'
C = 'Harry has a wife'
A speaker who assertively utters (24) implicates that
Jack has children. He does not implicate this if he
utters either (25a) or (25b). Moreover, a speaker
assertively uttering (25c) or (d) does not implicate
the k-presuppositions of their consequents. Since (lb)
allows Karttunen to account for this, he takes these
sentences as evidence for (lb).
"However, they are also evidence for the following
alternative conditions.
1. b'. If B k-presupposes C, and A is not logically
equivalent to C, then rIf A, then B k-presup-
poses C.
b*. If B k-presupposes C, and C does not entail A,
then rIf A, then B' k-presupposes C.
b#. If B k-presupposes C, and neither A nor C
entails the other, then rIf A, then BI
k-presupposes C.
Each of these conditions, together with (9), predicts
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that one who assertively utters (24) implicates that
Jack has children. No such prediction is made for
(25a) or (25b).
9. If a sentence S k-presupposes a sentence P,
then a speaker who assertively utters S (in
normal circumstances and without clarification)
indicates that he believes P and that he assumes
his audience accepts (or will accept) P.25
These conditions also account for (25c) and (d). Thus,
Karttunen's data does not distinguish among the different
formulations of (1).
Karttunen presents only two kinds of cases--those
in which the k-presupposition C is logically independent
of the antecedent and those in which it is equivalent to
it. (24) is an example of the first type. The sentences
in (25) are examples of the second type. 26  Since A is
logically equivalent to C in (25), the italicized clauses
25
In what follows I will sometimes talk of a speaker who "takes
P for granted". I use this locution as short for "believes P and
assumes the audience accepts (or will accept) P".
26
Note: to say that two sentences are logically equivalent is not
to say that they mean the same thing. For example, A and C of (25c)
are not synonymous. My claim is only that they entail one another.
In the case of (25d) someone might claim that the consequent also
k-presupposes that Harry's wife used to live with him. If so, then this
is a k-presupposition that is not entailed by A, and (25d) is an apparent
counterexample to (lb). Other apparent counterexamples of this type will
be discussed in a moment. For the present, I note only that Karttunen
says that C of (25d) is "just what the consequent proposes. ("Presuppo-
sitions of Compound Sentences," p. 177)"
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in (lb), (lb'), (lb*), and (lb#) are not satisfied,
and C is "filtered out". Consequently, each of the
conditions handles Karttunen's data.
To decide among these alternatives, we must look
for conditionals in which the antecedent is not logically
equivalent to the k-presupposition of the consequent.
The sentences below are examples of this.
26. If Sam paid the bill promptly, then his
payment is in the mail.
A = 'Sam paid the bill promptly'
B = 'Sam's payment (of the bill) is in the
mail'
C = 'Sam paid the bill'
27. If Bill killed Martha, then he knows she is dead.
A = 'Bill killed Martha'
B = 'Bill knows Martha is dead'
C = 'Martha is dead'
28. If there is a King of France and he is intelligent,
then the King of France is one of the few
intelligent monarchs in the world.
A = 'There is a King of France and he is
intelligent'
B = 'The King of France is one of the few
intelligent monarchs in the world'
C = 'There is a King of France'
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In these cases, A entails C but not vice versa. Prin-
ciples (Ib') and (lb*) (together with (9)) incorrectly
predict that a speaker assertively uttering (26), (27),
or (28) takes C for granted. Thus, if (9) is correct,
then (lb') and (lb*) are false.
This leaves (lb) and (lb#). Sentences (29-31)
bear on the choice among these alternatives.
29. If there was a mouse in the bathtub, then
Susan knows who put it there.
A = 'There was a mouse in the bathtub'
B = 'Susan knows who put the mouse in the
bathtub'
C = 'Someone put a mouse in the bathtub'
30. If Martha is dead, then it was Bill who kill
A = 'Martha is dead'
B = 'It was Bill who killed Martha'
C = 'Someone killed Martha'
31. If John has children, then all of John's son
are bald.2 7
ed her.
s
27This sentence is somewhat odd. It is hard to see how a
speaker could regard the truth of the antecedent as warranting
the claim that John has sons. In Section VI I will show how Kart-
tunen exploits this oddity in attempting to account for (31)
within the context of his "second stage" theory. For the present,
it is enough to note that (31) does not implicate C. Thus, it
is a counterexample to (lb).
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A = 'John has children'
B = 'All of John's sons are bald'
C = 'John has sons'
In each of these cases, C entails but is not entailed
by A. Moreover, someone assertively uttering (29),
(30), or (31) does not take C for granted. Thus, if
(9) is correct, then Karttunen's (lb) is false and must
be replaced by (lb#).
The same point holds for conjunctions. Karttunen's
filtering principle for these sentences is (2).
2. a. If A k-presupposes C, then rA and B7
k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C, and A does not entail C,
then A and Bý k-presupposes C.
Again, the crucial part of this principle is the italicized
clause that "filters out" the presuppositions of B
that are entailed by A. Karttunen's evidence for this
clause is provided by the contrast between (32) and (33-36).28
32. Baldness is hereditary, and all of Jack's
children are bald.
A = 'Baldness is hereditary'
28Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," pp. 178-179.
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B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
33. Jack has children and all of Jack's children
are bald.
A = 'Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
34. It is true that Jack has children, and all of
Jack's children are bald.
A.= 'It is true that Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
35. Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia and Fred will
kiss Cecilia again.
A = 'Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia'
B = 'Fred will kiss Cecilia again'
C = 'Fred has kissed Cecilia'
36. Harry is married, and his wife is no longer
living with him.
A = 'Harry is married'
B = 'Harry's wife is no longer living with him'
C = 'Harry has a wife'29
29Someone might claim that the second conjunct also k-presupposes
that Harry's wife used to live with him. See footnote 26.
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First consider (32). Since A does not entail C,
(2b) predicts that (32) k-presupposes that Jack has
children. Next consider (33-36). In each case, A
entails C. Thus, (2b) "filters out" the k-presupposition,
and the conjunction is not claimed to k-presuppose C.
All of these predictions are correct. This can
be seen by embedding (32-36) in certain complex sentences.
37. a. It may be that baldness is hereditary and
that all of Jack's children are bald.
b. If baldness is hereditary and all of Jack's
children are bald, then Jack is resigned
to his fate.
c. Jack has children.
38. a. It may be that Jack has children and that
all of Jack's children are bald.
b. If Jack has children and all of Jack's
children are bald, then Jack is resigned to
his fate.
c. Jack has children.
39. a. It may be that it is true that Jack has
children and that all of Jack's children
are bald.
b. If it is true that Jack has children and all
of Jack's children are bald, then Jack is
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resigned to his fate.
c. Jack has children.
40. a. It may be that Fred has managed to kiss
Cecilia and that Fred will kiss Cecilia again.
b. If Fred has managed to kiss Cecilia and Fred
will kiss Cecilia again, then he is a happy
man.
c. Fred has kissed Cecilia.
41. a. It may be that Harry is married and that his
wife is no longer living with him.
b. If Harry is married and his wife is no longer
living with him, then Harry is living alone.
c. Harry has a wife.
A speaker assertively uttering (37a) or (37b)
implicates (37c). This is accounted for by the fact that
(32) k-presupposes (37c). The principles for modals
and conditionals predict that (37a-b) inherit this k-
presupposition. On the other hand, a speaker assertively
uttering (38a,b-41a,b) does not implicate the corresponding
(c) statement. Karttunen's filtering condition (2)
handles this by not including (c) among the k-presuppo-
sitions of (33-36).
Unfortunately, these facts are also accounted for
by the following alternatives to (2b).
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2. b. If B k-presupposes C and A does not entail C,
then FA and B k-presupposes C.
2. b'. If B k-presupposes C, and A is not logically
equivalent to C, then rA and 1B k-presupposes C.
2. b*. If B k-presupposes C, and C does not entail A,
then rA and B7 k-presupposes C.
2. b#. If B k-presupposes C, and neither A nor C
entails the other, then r- and B k-presupposes C.
Since the only examples of filtering that Karttunen
gives are ones in which A is logically equivalent to C,
his data does not distinguish among the different
formulations of (2). To distinguish among these alter-
natives, one must find cases in which A entails but
is not entailed by C, and cases in which C entails but
is not entailed by A. (42-44) are examples of the first
type. (45-47) are examples of the second type.
42. Bill used to smoke a lot and he hasn't
stopped smoking.
A = 'Bill used to smoke a lot'
B = 'Bill hasn't stopped smoking'
C = 'Bill has ;smoked.
43. Bill killed Martha and knows she is dead.
A = 'Bill killed Martha'
B = 'Bill knows Martha is dead'
C = 'Martha is dead'
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44. Harry kissed Susan last week and today he
kissed her again.
A = 'Harry kissed Susan last week'
B = 'Today Harry kissed Susan again'
C = 'Harry has kissed Susan at least once'
45. John has children and his sons are bald'
A = 'John has children'
B = 'John's sons are bald'
C = 'John has sons'
46. There was a mouse in the bathtub, and Susan
knows who put it there.
A = 'There was a mouse in the bathtub'
B = 'Susan knows who put the mouse there'
C = 'Someone put a mouse in the bathtub'
47. Martha is dead and it was Bill who killed her.
A = 'Martha is dead'
B = 'It was Bill who killed Martha'
C = 'Someone killed Martha'
If principle (9) is correct, then none of (42-47)
k-presupposes C. This can be seen by embedding these
conjunctions under 'It may be that' or by including them
as one of the constituents in a disjunction or conditional.
A speaker assertively uttering the (a) or (b) sentences
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below does not take the corresponding (c) statements
for granted.
48. a. It may be that Bill used to smoke a lot
and that he hasn't stopped smoking.
b. If Bill used to smoke a lot and he hasn't
stopped smoking, then he'll probably get
cancer.
c. Bill has smoked.
49. a. It may be that Bill killed Martha and knows
she is dead.
b. If Bill killed Martha and knows she is dead,
then he must be a terrible person.
c. Martha is dead.
50. a. It may be that Harry kissed Susan last week,
and today he kissed her again.
b. If Harry kissed Susan last week and today he
kissed her again, then he must be in love.
c. Harry has kissed Susan.
51. a. It may be that John has children and that
his sons are bald.
b. If John has children and his sons are bald,
then Mary will be disappointed.
c. John has sons.
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52. a. It may be that there was a mouse in the
bathtub and that Susan knows who put it there.
b. If there was a mouse in the bathtub and Susan
knows who put it there, then someone's in
trouble.
c. Someone put a mouse in the bathtub.
53. a. It may be that Martha is dead and that it
was Bill who killed her.
b. If Martha is dead and it was Bill who killed
her, then Bill must be a terrible person.
c. Someone killed Martha.
Examples (42-44) and (48-50) are counterexamples to
(2b') and (2b*). Examples (45-47) and (51-53) are
counterexamples to Karttunen's (2b). Consequently,
(2b) must be replaced by (2b#).
A similar point holds for disjunctions. The evidence
that Karttunen cites does not distinguish among (3b),
(3b'), (3b*) and (3b#).
3. b. If B k-presupposes C, and -A' 3aPoes not entail C,
then -Either A or B k-presupposes C.
3. b'. If B k-presupposes C, and r-Al is not logically
equivalent to C, then rEither A or B' k-presupposes
C.
It is not always clear what sentence Karttunen has in mind as
r-A~ for a given A. I. discuss this issue in detail in Section IV.
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3. b*. If B k-presupposes C and C does not entail r-A',
then rEither A or B' k-presupposes C.
3. b#. If B k-presupposes C, and neither F-Ar
nor C entails the other, then rEither A or Bý
k-presupposes C.31
Unfortunately, the data needed to choose among these
alternatives is not as clear as it is for conditionals
31The evidence Karttunen cites for (3b) is provided by (i-v).
(i) Either baldness is not hereditary, or all of Jack's children
are bald.
7~-A= 'Baldness is hereditary'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
(ii) Either Jack has no children, or all of Jack's children are bald.
r.Al= 'Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
(iii) Either it is false that Jack has children, or all of
Jack's children are bald.
~-A1 = 'It isn't false that Jack has children'
B = 'All of Jack's children are bald'
C = 'Jack has children'
(iv) Either Bill has always refrained from beating his wife, or
Bill has already stopped beating her.
1
_-A1 = 'Bill hasn't always refrained from beating his wife'
B = 'Bill has already stopped beating his wife'
C = 'Bill has beaten his wife'
(v) Either Harry is not married at all, or his wife is no
longer living with him.
rA0= 'Harry is married'
B = 'Harry's wife is no longer living with him'
C = 'Harry has a wife'
A speaker assertively uttering (i) implicates C. This is not the
case with (ii-v). In these cases A is logically equivalent to C.
Thus, (3b), (3b'), (3b*) and (3b#) each "filter out" C.
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and conjunctions. Consequently, I will not decide here
among the different formulations of (3). 32
III. Relativizing to Context
3.1 Abandoning "Stage 1"
In the last section I showed that if (9) is correct,
then Karttunen's filtering principles (1) and (2) are
false and (3) is questionable. The alternatives to
(1-3) are (1#-3#).
i#. a. If A k-presupposes C, then rIf A, then B
k-presupposes C.
32
Two sentences that provide some evidence for (3b#) are (i)
and (ii).
(i) Either Sam didn't pay his bill promptly, or his payment
is in the mail.
r-A'= 'Sam paid his bill promptly'
B = 'Sam's payment (of his bill) is in the mail'
C = 'Sam paid his bill'
(ii) Either there is a treasure on the island and Harold has
found it, or he knows by now that there is no treasure at
all on the island.
rA= 'It is not the case that there is treasure on the
island and Harold has found it'
B = 'Harold knows by now that there is no treasure at
all on the island'
C = 'There is no treasure on the island'
It seems to me that a speaker assertively uttering either (i)
or (ii) does not implicate C. If this is so, then (i) and (ii)
are counterexamples to (3b), (3b') and (3b*).
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b. If B k-presupposes
entails the other,
k-presupposes C.
2#. a. If A k-presupposes
k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes
entails the other,
poses C.
3#. a. If A k-presupposes
C, and neither A nor C
then If A, then B
C, then rA and BI
C, and neither A nor C
then rA and B1 k-presup-
C, and neither rB
nor C entails the other, then rEither A or B
k-presupposes C.
b. If B k-presupposes C, and neither r-A
nor C entails the other, then rEither A or B
k-presupposes C.
However, one need not adopt (1#-3#). One might
try to reformulate (9) so as to save (1-3). Alternatively,
one might simply reject (9) together with all the filtering
principles considered thus far and adopt a radically
different approach. This is what Karttunen does. 33
Karttunen doesn't consider any alternatives to (1-3)
in presenting the first stage of his theory; nor does he
mention any of the evidence against (1-3) and in favor of
33
Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context," Theoretical
Linguistics 1, no. 1/2 (1974).
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(1#-3#). However, (1-3) are merely steps on the way
to a more sophisticated theory. The principles of this
theory make use of context in a way that (1-3) do not.
This changes the import of some of the examples in the
last section. But before I can show this I must
present the more sophisticated theory.
Up to now I have been considering sentences in
isolation without taking into account the effects of
different contexts. I have been assuming that if S
k-presupposes P, then a speaker assertively uttering S
takes P for granted unless he explicitly indicates other-
wise. The only role of context that I have considered
is that of explicitly denying the k-presuppositions of an
assertion.34
Karttunen points out that context plays a much
larger role than this. He says that context is involved
in "filtering out" the presuppositions of compound
sentences. Consider the following examples given by
Karttunen.
54. a. Either Geraldine never wore Holy Underwear,
or she has given up wearing them.
34
I have also limited my attention to utterances in neutral
contexts--viz., contexts in which the speaker is not trying to be
sarcastic, confuse the issue and so forth. I will continue to
limit my attention to such contexts.
330
-l = 'Geraldine has worn Holy Underwear'
B = 'Geraldine has given up wearing them'
C = 'Geraldine has worn Holy Underwear'
54. b. Either Geraldine never was a Mormon, or she
has given up wearing Holy Underwear.
-A = 'Geraldine is (or was) a Mormon'
B = 'GerlJadine has given up wearing
Holy Underwear'
C = 'Geraldine has worn Holy Underwear'
55. a. If Nixon appoints a homosexual to the Cabinet,
then he will regret it.
-A = 'Nixon will appoint a homosexual
to the Cabinet'
B = 'Nixon will regret appointing a
homosexual to the Cabinet'
C = 'Nixon will appoint a homosexual to
the Cabinet'
b. If Nixon appoints J. Edgar Hoover to the
Cabinet, then he will regret having appointed
a homosexual.
A = 'Nixon will appoint J. Edgar Hoover
to the Cabinet'
B = 'Nixon will regret having appointed
a homosexual'
C = 'Nixon will appoint a homosexual to
the Cabinet'
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56. a. If Haldeman is guilty, then Nixon is guilty,
too.
A = 'Haldeman is guilty'
B = 'Nixon is guilty, too'
C = 'Someone other than Nixon is guilty'
b. If Miss Woods destroyed the tapes, then
Nixon is guilty, too.
A = 'Miss Woods destroyed the tapes'
B = 'Nixon is guilty, too'
C = 'Someone other than Nixon is guilty'
(1-3) predict that the k-presupposition C is
"filtered out" in (54a), (55a), and (56a).35 In these
cases, the compound sentence does not, in fact, inherit
the k-presupposition of the relevant constituent. Thus,
(1-3) block the incorrect prediction that a speaker
assertively uttering one of these sentences takes C
for granted.
The situation is otherwise with the (b) sentences.
In (54b) r-A7 does not entail C. In (55b) and (56b),
A doesn't entail C. Thus, (1-3) predict that (b)
k-presupposes C in each case. 36 This consequence
together with (9) predicts that a speaker assertively
35(1#-3#) also "filter out" these k-presuppositions.
3 6The same point holds for (1#-3#).
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uttering one of these sentences takes C for granted.
This prediction is false. In some contexts a
speaker may take C for granted, but he does not do so
in all contexts. In the case of (54b), Karttunen asks
us to imagine a situation in which both speaker and hearer
assume (54c).
54. c. All Mormons wear Holy Underwear.
In such a context one might appropriately utter (54b)
without believing that Geraldine ever wore Holy Underwear
and without assuming that the audience believes this
either.
The relevant contexts for (55b) and (56b) are those
in which (55c) and (56c) respectively are included in
the background assumptions common to speakers and hearers.
55. c. J. Edgar Hoover is a homosexual.
56. c. Destroying the tapes is a crime.
A speaker assertively uttering (55b) or (56b) in such a
context need not be taking the k-presupposition of the
consequent for granted.
(54-56) show that Karttunen's 'irst stage" theory
is incorrect. He locates the problem in the failure of
principles (1-3) to use the conversational context of an
utterance in "filtering out" the relevant presuppositions.
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According to Karttunen, a speaker who utters (54b) in a
context that includes (54c) does not suggest C because the
context together with -_A entails C. Similar remarks apply
to (55b) and (56b). If Karttunen is right, then the
filtering clauses in his principles must be modified to
reflect the role played by the conversational context. 37
3 7Initially, Karttunen had some difficulty in reformulating his
conditions. He talked about the presuppositions of simple sentences
and their negations as being "absolute" and those of compound sentences
as being "relative to context". "Absolute presuppositions" were to be
invariant from context to context. "Relative presuppositions" were
not. The "relative presuppositions" of a compound sentence S were to
be computed on the basis of the constituents of S, their presuppositions
(relative and absolute), and the context X.
The problem with this approach was not that Karttunen developed
inadequate machinery, but that he had difficulty giving a coherent
account of what he was doing. What, on this account, does it mean to
say that one sentence presupposes another? Karttunen said that he had
some definition like (i) in mind.
(i) "Surface sentence A pragmatically presupposes a logical form
L, if and only if it is the case that A can be felicitously
uttered only in contexts which entail L ("Presupposition
and Linguistic Context," pp. 181-182)."
Note: according to (i) the presuppositions of a sentence can't
vary from context to context. If a sentence S can be felicitously
uttered in a context that does not entail P, then clearly it is not
the case that S can be felicitously uttered only in contexts that
entail P. Nevertheless, Karttunen continued to talk of the presupposi-
tions of compound sentences as varying from context to context.
Karttunen's problem was that his filtering principles were stated
in terms of relative presuppositions; however, the definition of
presupposition that he adopted to give his theory empirical content
[i.e., (i)] did not apply to this relative notion. For this reason
some of his theoretical discussion is obscure and needs to be recon-
structed.
Fortunately, it is easy to do this, and, in the end, Karttunen
himself came up with the account that he needed. He said, "...we say
that the sentence 'If A, then B' can be felicitously uttered in context
X only if X entails all of the logical forms in the set [of presuppo-
sitions of 'If A, then B' relative to X] (ibid, p. 184)"
This suggests a more general characterization.
(ii) If a sentence S k-presupposes a sentence P with respect to
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3.2 "Stage 2"
In modifying his theory, Karttunen abandons the
notion of k-presupposition for compound sentences and
replaces it with the notion of a context X satisfying-the-
presuppositions-of S. As before, his definition is inductive.
Although the basis step is provided by simple positive
sentences, Karttunen has no theory about how the presup-
positions of these sentences are characterized. He
simply assumes that they bear the presuppositions that
they are customarily said to carry. A context X satisfies-
the-presuppositions-of a simple positive sentence S if and
only if X entails all of the presuppositions of S.
Karttunen's clauses for negations, conditionals, con-
junctions, and disjunctions are as follows:
a context of background assumptions X, then either X
entails P or uttering S in X is inappropriate.
Of course, this is not a definition of presupposition with respect
to context; nor can it be turned into one by making it a biconditional.
If this were done, then all entailments of X would be presuppo-
sitions of S with respect to X. Still (ii) is sufficient to give
a theory of "relative presupposition" empirical content provided
that the notion of "relative presupposition" can be recursively
characterized by Karttunen's filtering conditions.
Although this kind of theory is possible, Karttunen
eventually found a much more elegant way of accounting for
the data. This account is discussed in Section 3.2.
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57. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of l-Sl
if and only if X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S. 38
58. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rIf A, then B if and only if
(i) X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A; and
(ii) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B.
59. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
r-ither A or B" if and only if
(i) X U r-AT satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B;
(ii) X U '-B' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A.39
60. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rA and Bl if and only if
(i) X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A; and
(ii) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B.
Karttunen is not fully explicit about what empirical
claim is made by saying that a context satisfies or
does not satisfy the presuppositions of a sentence;
yet he seems to accept (61).
38
Karttunen says that this condition applies to "internal
negations". He does not say what he means by this, nor does he give
any argument for or against the claim that negatives sentences bear
logical presuppositions. I will discuss this issue in Section IV below.
39Karttunen gives both symmetric and asymmetric conditions for
disjunctions. For reasons cited in Part 2, I will consider only
the symmetric condition.
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61. If X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-of S,
then it is inappropriate for a speaker to
assertively utter S in X.40
The reason for not making (61) a biconditional is that
there may be factors independent of presupposition that
make the utterance of a sentence inappropriate in a
given context. Thus, a context X might satisfy-the-
presuppositions-of S without it being appropriate to
assertively utter S in X. Since (61) is not intended to
be a definition, this is not a problem.
For Karttunen, a context is the set of background
assumptions common to speakers and hearers. He says
that
. a conversational context, a set of logical forms,
specifies what can be taken for granted in making the next
speech act. What this common set of background assumptions
contains depends on what has been said previously and other
aspects of the communicative situation. In a fully explicit
discourse, the presuppositions of the next sentence uttered
are satisfied by the current context . .
. . . Once the new sentence has been uttered, the context
will be incremented to include the new shared information.
Viewed in this light, a theory of presupposition amounts to a
theory of a rational order of contexts from smaller to larger
sets of shared information. At each step along the way that a
fully explicit discourse proceeds, the current context satisfies
the presuppositions V the next sentence that in turn increments
it to a new context.
40Although this principle is vauge, it is clear enough for us to
recognize certain obvious cases. Note, (61) parallels the earlier
principle (10).
41
Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context," p. 190.
Karttunen notes that this conception of presupposition was developed
independently by Stalnaker.
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One qualification to this view must be made. In
discussing Karttunen's first stage theory I noted that
k-presuppositions can introduce new information so
long as this information is uncontroversial. This is
why the italicized clause in (10) was included.
10. If S k-presupposes P, then it is inappropriate
for a speaker to utter S assertively (in
normal circumstances and without clarification)
unless he believes P and his audience accepts
(or will accept ) P.
A similar point holds for the notion of a context
satisfying-the-presuppositions-of a sentence. Karttunen
says
. . . ordinary conversation does not always proceed in the
ideal orderly fashion described earlier. People do make
leaps and shortcuts by using sentences whose presuppositions
are not satisfied in the conversational context. This is the
rule rather than the exception, and we should not base our
notion of presupposition on the false premise that it does not
or should not happen. But granting that ordinary discourse is
not always fully explicit in the above sense, I think we can
maintain that a sentence is always taken to be an increment to
a context that satisfies its presuppositions. If the current
conversational context does not suffice, then listener is
entitled and expected to extend it as required. He must
determine for himself what context he is supposed to be in on the
basis of what was said and, if he is willing to go along with
it, make the same tac• extension that his interlocutor
appears to have made.
42
Ibid, p. 191.
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This suggests that (61) be reformulated as (62).
62. If X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-of S,
then it is inappropriate for a speaker to
assertively utter S in X unless there is a
proposition Q such that
(i) Q U X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S; and
(ii) Q is uncontroversial--i.e., the
audience is prepared to grant this.
Although (62) is not as precise as one might wish,
it is clear enough to provide empirical content for
Karttunen's principles (57-60).
According to (57-60), (63) is inappropriate in
43
normal contexts that do not include (64), whereas
(65) is appropriate (so far as presupposition is
concerned) in any context.44
63. If baldness is hereditary, then all of John's
children are bald.
64. John has children.
65. If John has children, then all of his children
are bald.
43 (63) is satisfied by a context X only if X U 'Baldness is
hereditary' entails 'John has children'.
I am ignoring here the fact that a context for (65)
must entail that John exists.
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(57-60) and (1-3) treat (63) and (64) in roughly the
same way. (57-60) differ from (1-3) in that the former
take account of the difference between assertively
uttering a compound sentence in one context rather
than another.
For example, (1-3) incorrectly predict that a speaker
assertively uttering (66) implicates (67).
66. If Plunkett leaves the Patriots, the Patriots
will regret losing the best quarterback they
ever had.
67. The Patriots will lose the best quarterback
they ever had.
(57-60) avoid this incorrect prediction. According to
these principles, a context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-
of (66) if X entails (68).
68. Plunkett is the best quarterback the Patriots
ever had.
Thus, Karttunen's second stage theory correctly predicts
that a speaker assertively uttering (66) in a context
that includes (68) is not interpreted as taking (67)
45for granted.45Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether or not Karttunen's
second stage theory can accommodate the counterexamples to (1-3) men-
tioned in Section II. I will deal with this topic in Section VI.
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3.3 Filtering and Cancellation
In discussing Karttunen's first stage theory of
k-presupposition I distinguished between filtering and
cancellation.4 6 I will now show how this distinction
is carried over to his second stage theory.
In the first stage theory, filtering is used to
define what k-presuppositions are carried by a compound
sentence. Cancellation, on the other hand, is used to
determine when an inference to a k-presupposition is
sanctioned.
*69. A k-presupposition P of a sentence S is
filtered in a compound sentence containing S
if and only if the compound sentence does not
inherit the k-presupposition P.
70. A k-presupposition P of a sentence S is
cancelled in a conversational context X, if
and only if the speaker in X explicitly
indicates that he is not assuming P.
All k-presuppositions can be filtered--even those that
are entailed by the sentences that presuppose them.
In contrast, only those k-presuppositions that are not
46
See Part 2, Section II.
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entailed can be cancelled.
In Karttunen's second stage theory, he abandons
the notion of k-presupposition for compound sentences.
Thus, the distinction between filtering and cancellation
cannot be stated in the same way that it is stated
for his first stage theory. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion remains. Karttunen's principles (58-60) determine
whether or not a given context satisfies-the-presuppo-
sitions-of a compound sentence. This corresponds to
filtering in the first stage theory. Cancellation,
on the other hand, is involved in clarifying the empirical
claim that is made by saying that a context satisfies-
the-presuppositions-of a sentence.
In cases of cancellation, a sentence S may be
appropriately uttered in a context X even though X
does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-of S. For
example, Karttunen's principles (58-60) predict that the
(a) sentences require contexts that entail the (b)
sentences.
71. a. If all the particles released by the collision
were negatively charged, then the experiment
was a success.
b. Some particles were released by the collision.
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72. a. If the jewels are still here, then it's
Susan who's got them.
b. Someone has the jewels.
73. a. Either John gave up smoking, or he gave up
drinking.
47b. John used to smoke.
However, if the speaker makes it clear that he is not
assuming (b), then he may assertively utter (a) even
though the context does not entail (b). For example,
he may appropriately utter both (a) and (c) in
such a context.
71. a. If all the particles released by the
collision were negatively charged, then the
experiment was a success.
c. However, this assumes that the collision
was strong enough to separate some particles
from the nucleus, and I am not sure that it
was.
72. a. If the jewels are still here, then it's
Susan who's got them.
c. But I am afraid that they were lost while we
were on vacation and that no one has them.
47 (58-60) also predict that (73a) requires a context that
entails that John used to drink. This is irrelevant to the argument.
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73. a. Either John gave up smoking, or he gave
up drinking.
c. Since he never smoked at all, it must be
drinking that he gave up.
These examples indicate that an additional
clause should be added to (62).
74. If a context X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-
of a sentence S, then it is inappropriate for
a speaker to assertively utter S in X unless
(a) there is a proposition Q such that
Q U X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S,
and Q is uncontroversial--i.e., the
audience is prepared to grant this; or
(b) there is a proposition Q such that
X U Q satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S,
and the speaker explicitly indicates
that he is not assuming Q.
The second clause allows Karttunen to account for
cases of explicit cancellation like (71a, c)-(73a,c).48
48Although Karttunen does not discuss cancellation, (74)
would allow him to accommodate such facts.
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IV. Negation and Disjunction
In Part 2 I showed that the filtering principle for
disjunctions must be symmetric. Karttunen denies this
in his earlier article "Presuppositions of Compound
Sentences" but later says in "Presupposition and Linguistic
Context"4 9 that the principle may be symmetric after all.
His symmetric condition is (59).
59. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
FEither A or BE if and only if
(i) X U -Al satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B;
(ii) X U r-B1 satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A.
This principle fails to handle cases in which
both disjuncts presuppose the same thing.
75. Either Sam's son is at home or he is at school.
A = 'Sam's son is at home'
r1A = 'Sam's son is not at home'
B = 'Sam's son is at school'
r'_Bn = 'Sam's son is not at school'
C = 'Sam has a son'
49Karttunen says
"It is possible that the principle for disjunctions, and perhaps
that for conjunctions as well, should be symetric [sic]. . . A syme-
tric [sic] condition for 'or' would read [as] follows
"X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of 'A or B' iff X U [-A]
"satisfies-the-presuppositions-of 'B' and X U [-B] satisfies-the-
"presuppositions-of 'A'. For 'and' substitute 'A' for '-A' and
"'B' for '-B'. ("Presupposition and Linguistic Context," footnote
5, page 185)"
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Both r-A' and r-B entail C. Thus, for any context X,
X U r-A' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B, and
X U r-BI satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A. Therefore,
(59) fails to account for the fact that (75) can be
appropriately uttered only in contexts that entail that
Sam has a son.
This objection assumes two things. The first
assumption is that (76) and (77) are instances of logical-
ly internal negation. That is, they entail (78).
76. Sam's son is not at home.
77. Sam's son is not at school.
, 78. Sam has a son.
The second assumption is that the negation mentioned
in (59) is logically internal.50 Since these assumptions
might be questioned, I will show that no matter what is
said about negation, there are disjunctions that (59)
cannot handle.
If the negation mentioned in (59) is logically
internal, then (75) shows that (59) is inadequate. If
the negation is external, then there are two possibilities
to consider. Either some sentences are instances of
50
Instances of logically internal negation entail what they
are customarily said to presuppose. Instances of logically external
negation do not. They are true if and only if their corresponding
affirmatives are not.
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logically internal negation, or all negations are
external.51
If there are no logically internal negations,
then (59) cannot handle (79).
79. Either Sam's son isn't going to the party, or
he hasn't left himself enough time to get ready.
A = 'Sam's son isn't going to the party'
r-A7= 'Sam's son is going to the party'
B = 'Sam's son hasn't left himself enough
time to get ready'
rBl= 'Sam's son has left himself enough
time to get ready'
C = 'Sam has a son' 52
Both r-Aland r-B? entail C. Therefore, (59) fails to
account for the fact that (79) can be appropriately
uttered only in contexts that entail that Sam has a son.
51For example, Wilson seems to believe that all negations are
external. On this view, (76) and (77) are true if and only if
their corresponding affirmatives are not.
52If there are no logically internal negations in English, then
[(i) and (ii)] and [(iii) and (iv)] ..are logically external negations
of one another.
(i) Sam's son is going to the party.
(ii) Sam's son isn't going to the party.
(iii) Sam's son has left himself enough time to get ready.
(iv) Sam's son hasn't left himself enough time to get ready.
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There is only one possibility left to consider,
Suppose there are both internal and external negations,
but that the negation mentioned in (59) is external.
(59) would then account for (79),53 however, there
are other disjunctions that it could not handle. Which
disjunctions are counterexamples depends on whether or
_ true -
not It is not { the } that S shares the k-presup-the case
positions of S. If the negative sentence does share
the k-presuppositions of S, then (80) is a counter-
example to (59).
.80. Either it is not true that Sam's son is
intelligent, or it is not true that he is a
skeptic about the external world.
A = 'It is not true that Sam's son is
intelligent'
1
-A = 'Sam's son is intelligent'
B = 'It is not true that Sam's son is a
skeptic about the external world'
53
If (ii) is an internal negation of (i), then the external
negation of (ii) is not equivalent to (i).
(i) Sam's son is going to the party.
(ii) Sam's son is not going to the party.
For example, where '%' is internal negation and '-' is external negation
and S bears logical presuppositions, S is not logically equivalent to
r"-S7 . r-.%S does not entail what S logically presupposes. Thus, the
logically external negation of (ii) does not entail that Sam has a son.
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r'B7 = 'Sam's son is a skeptic about the
external world'
C = 'Sam has a son'
Given that A and B can be appropriately uttered only in
contexts that entail C, we must assume the same is true
of (80). (59) fails to predict this.
On the other hand, if 'It is not {true } that S-the case
does not share the k-presuppositions of S, then (81) is
a counterexample to (59).
81. Either Sam's son is a fool, or it is not true
that he is a skeptic about the external world.
A = 'Sam's son is a fool'
rCA. = 'It is not true that Sam's son is a fool'
B = 'It is not true that Sam's son is a
skeptic about the external world'
'=-B= 'Sam's son is a skeptic about the
external world'
C = 'Sam has a son'
r-B' entails C. If B is satisfied by every context,54
then (59) fails to predict-that (81) can be appropriately
uttered only in contexts that entail that Sam has a son.
i.e., if it does not k-presuppose anything.
• s " ¢ . "•. ' t I • -
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(75) and (79-81) show that no matter what assump-
tion is made about negation, there are counterexamples
to (59).' This suggests that (59) should be replaced
by (82).55
82. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
tEither A or B if and only if
(i) X U r-A' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B;
(ii) X U r-B' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A;
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by all contexts that satisfy both A
and B, then X entails S.56
With the possible exception of example (81), (82)
handles all the cases discussed in this section regardless
of what we say about negation.
(81) is not so clear.
55Similarly, if the principle for conjunctions is symmetric,
then it should. be (i) rather than (ii).
(i) A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of 'A and B"
if and only if
(a) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B;
(b) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A;
(c) For all sentences S, if S is entailed by all contexts
that satisfy both A and B, then X entails S.
(ii) A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of rA and B1
if and only if
(a) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B;
(b) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A.
56Where A and B are simple sentences, clause (iii) is equivalent
to (iv).
(iv) X entails all the k-presuppositions that are common to both A and B.
350
81. Either Sam's son is a fool, or it is not
true that he is a skeptic about the external
world.
If rt is not {true that S shares the k-presupposi-the case
tions of S, then there is no problem. Since both disjuncts
share the same presuppositions, clause (iii) correctly
predicts that (81) can be appropriately uttered only in
contexts that entail that Sam has a son. But if
It is not true that S does not share the k-the case
presuppositions of S, then clause (iii) is irrelevant.
On this assumption, (82) fails to predict that (81)
can be appropriately uttered only in contexts that
entail that Sam has a son.
B in (81) is 'It is not true that Sam's son is a
skeptic about the external world'. Thus, negations of
B entail that Sam has a son.5 7 Consequently, for any
context X, X U r-B' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A.
A = 'Sam's son is a fool'
On this analysis, B does not k-presuppose that Sam has a
son. Thus, (82) incorrectly predicts that (81) can be
57This is the case no matter whether the relevant negation of
B is internal or external.
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appropriately uttered in any context.
To avoid this problem, Karttunen might claim that
?It is not {tru e  } that S" shares the k-presupposi-the case
tions of S. If this is so, then clause (iii) in (82)
comes into play and (81) ceases to be problematic.
Moreover, Karttunen can then argue that there is no
need to posit logical presupposition at all. (83)
does not logicalty presuppose (84).
83. It is not rue that Sam's son is a skepticthe case
about the external world.
.84. Sam has a son.
If (83) k-presupposes (84), then the clause for negation
in Karttunen's recursive definition must be (85) rather
than (86).
85. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of a
negation of S if and only if X satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of S.
86. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of a
negative sentence if and only if X entails
all of its logical presuppositions.
This does not prove that negative sentences do
not bear logical presuppositions. However, it eliminates
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the main motivation for claiming that they do. If (95)
is needed independently, we do not require any further
device to explain the presuppositions of negative
sentences.58
V. Symmetry vs. Asymmetry
I have already argued that the filtering principle
for disjunctions should be symmetric. In this section
I will argue that the condition for conjunctions is also
symmetric and that the condition for conditionals may be
symmetric as well, Karttunen disputes this. In "Presuppo-
58I think that this is the strongest argument that can be based
on Karttunen's theory for rejecting logical presupposition entirely.
It rests on four claims.
(i) The filtering principle for disjunctions is (82).
(ii) A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of ~It is not
{true that S' if and only if X satisfies-the-presuppositions-
the case
of S.
r iso true t(iii) {It is not true ) that S does not logically presupposethe case
what S presupposes.
(iv) (81) can be appropriately uttered only in contexts that
entail that Sam has a son.
I am not certain that (ii) is correct. Thus, I am not completely
convinced that Karttunen's theory provides a reason for abandoning
logical presupposition. Moreover, if (ii) is false, and (iii-iv) are
true, then (8.1) is a problem for (i). This is a loose end I have not
been able to tie up.
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sitions of Compound Sentences" he considers (87) and (88).
87. a. If Jack has children, then all of Jack's
children are bald.
b. If all of Jack's children are bald, then
Jack has children.
88. a. Jack has children and all of Jack's children
are bald.
b. All of Jack's children are bald and Jack
has children.
He says
. . . in [87a] the presupposition of the consequent clause gets
filtered away, since [87a] as a whole does not presuppose that
Jack has children. [87b] is a somewhat peculiar example. There
would be no point in uttering such trivial tautologies unless
one were engaged in some painstaking deductive reasoning,
trying to track down all of the logical consequences of "all of
Jack's children are bald." What concerns us here is that unlike
[87a], [87b]56s similar to . . . in presupposing that Jack
has children. (my emphasis)
He says the same thing about (88).
[88b] is even stranger than [87b]; since the second conjunct is
a consequence of the first, why bother at all? One may want to
rule out such conjunctions as violations of some pragmatic
principle. ("Thou shalt not be utterly pointless") However, the
only thing that matters for us here is that (88b] as a whole seems
to share the presuppositions of its first conjunct.60 (my emphasis)
59Karttunen, "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences," Linguistic
Inquiry 4, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 177
60
Ibid, p. 178.
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This is all that Karttunen says to justify his
claim that the filtering conditions for conjunctions and
conditionals are asymmetric, but it is not enough. The
fact that C87b) and (88b) would be odd in normal
conversation has nothing to do with presupposition.
The (a) and (b) sentences below are odd in the same way
even though the (a) sentences do not bear presuppositions
on Karttunen's account.
89. a. If Susan left early, then someone left early.
b. If it is Susan who left early, then someone
left early.
'90. a. Susan left early and someone left early.
b. It is Susan who left early and someone
left early.
91. a. If John correctly claimed that Mary won the
election, then Mary won the election.
b. If John knew that Mary won the election, then
Mary won the election.
92. a. John correctly claimed that Mary won the
election and Mary won the election.
b. John knew that Mary won the election, and
Mary won the election.
Karttunen seems to have recognized that the oddity
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of (87b) and (88b) is independent of presupposition.
Even so, he claims that (87b) and (88b) k-presuppose
that Jack has children. 61 It seems to me that this is
wrong. A speaker who assertively utters these sentences
doesn't take it for granted that Jack has children.
In the case of (88b) he explicitly asserts that Jack
does. In the case of (87b) the speaker indicates that
the claim that all of Jack's children are bald is
sufficient grounds for asserting that Jack has children.
Similar remarks apply to (89-92).
It is not easy to find additional evidence that
bears on this; however, there is some. For example,
someone might assertively utter (93a) knowing full well
that (93b) is controversial.
93. a. Our saviour has never broken a promise, and
make no mistake, we really do have a saviour.
b. We have a saviour.
The whole point of adding the second conjunct is to make
it clear that (93b) is not being tacitly assumed, but
61Karttunen's discussion of these examples occurs within the
context of his first stage theory. Thus, he talks about compound
sentences bearing k-presuppositions rather than contexts satisfying-
the-presuppositions-of compound sentences. The difference between
Karttunen's first and second stage theories is irrelevant to the
issue at hand. The issue of symmetry arises in exactly the same
way for both theories.
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rather is being explicitly asserted.
Further evidence is provided by 'but'. This
conjunction behaves like 'and' in (94a-96a).
94. a. There is a King of France, but the King of
France is in hiding.
b. There is a King of France.
95. a. Sam has children, but all of his children
are at school.
b. Sam has children.
96. a. Harry voted for Nixon, but he regrets doing so.
b. Harry voted for Nixon.
A context X may satisfy-the-presuppositions-of one of
these conjunctions even if X does not entail the k-presup-
position of the second conjunct (i.e., even if X does not
entail (b)). This can be shown by embedding (94a-96a)
in larger contexts.
94. c. It may be that there is a King of France, butthat
the King of France is in hiding.
d. If there is a King of France, but the King of
France is in hiding, then the French are
in trouble.
95. c. It may be that Sam has children but that all of
his children are at school.
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d. If Sam has children but all of his children
are at school, then Susan won't have anyone
to play with.
96. c. It may be that Harry voted for Nixon but that
he regrets doing so.
d. If Harry voted for Nixon but he regrets
doing so, then Harry isn't all bad.
A speaker may appropriately utter (c) or (d)
even if he does not believe (b). To account for this,
Karttunen must maintain that X may satisfy-the-presup-
positions-of (a) without entailing (b).62 In this
respect, 'but' behaves exactly like 'and'.
Now consider (97-100).
97. a. The King of San Martin isn't well-known,
but San Martin has a king.
b. San Martin has a king.
98. a. It wasn't Bill who told the cops about us,
but someone did.
b. Someone toll the cops about us.
99. a. Sam didn't know that the experiment was a
success, but it was.
6 2Karttunen's principle for 'It may be .. .' is (i).
(i) X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of rIt may be that S iff
X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S.
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b. The experiment was a success.
100. a. Not all of Bill's novels are well-done, but
he has written two masterful novels.
b. Bill has written some novels.
These sentences are not odd. Moreover, a speaker uttering
the (a) sentences does not take the (b). statements for
granted. Notice also that a speaker may appropriately
utter (97c) and (98c) even if he does not believe
(97b) and (98b).
97. c. If the King of San Martin isn't well-known,
but San Martin has a king, then the people
of San Martin are lucky.
98. c. If it wasn't Bill who told the cops about
us, but someone did, then we are in trouble.
To account for this Karttunen must hold that a context X
may satisfy-the-presuppositions-of (97a) or (98a)
even though X does, not entail (97b) or (98b).
(94-100) indicate that the condition for 'but' is
symmetrical.
101. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rA but B' if and only if
(i) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
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(ii) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then X
entails S.
Clause (i) accounts for (94-96). Clause (ii) accounts
for (97-100). Clause (iii) accounts for sentences like
(102).
102. The King of France is wise, but he is also weak.
The reason that (97-100) are better with 'but'
than' 'and' is that 'but' is used when there is a con-
trast between the two conjuncts. This difference
seems to be independent of the question of symmetric
versus asymmetric filtering. Consequently, I propose
that the condition for 'and' is identical with (101)
except for containing 'and' where (101) contains 'but'.
The principle for conditionals is the hardest to
establish. Certainly Karttunen hasn't shown that it must
be asymmetric. In fact, I don't see any evidence that
supports his conclusion. Moreover, if the other principles
are symmetric, then it is most natural to handle conditio-
nals in the same way. In any case, Karttunen can make all
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his conditions symmetric without damaging his system. 63
63
This point has not always been clearly recognized. For
example, Wilson says that
"Karttunen's most important claim is that there is an
asymmetry between the behavior of presuppositions on the first
and second clauses of conditionals, conjunctions and disjunc-
tions. Presuppositions on the first clauses can never be
cancelled, but presuppositions on the second clauses can.
If this asymmetry can be established, the entailment analysis
I have proposed will automatically be disproved, since it
predicts symmetrical behavior. However, Karttunen's claim
seems to be false. ( Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Functional
Semantics, (London: Academic Press, 1975) p. 37)"
I agree with Wilson that Karttunen's conditions should be
symmetric. However, I disagree with her about the importance of
this question. Karttunen's system can accommodate either symmetric
or asymmetric principles. In fact, the question of symmetry
vs. asymmetry is not crucial to Wilson's "entailment analysis"
either.
.What leads Wilson astray is that she fails to distinguish
between filtering and cancellation. Karttunen's asymmetric
principles concern the former; he has little to say about the
latter. Wilson's confusion can be seen by comparing her claims
(i) and (ii).
(i) If Karttunen's asymmetric principles are right, then
presuppositions of first clauses can never be cancelled
whereas presuppositions of second clauses can.
(ii) If there is asymmetric cancelling, then Wilson's "entailment
analysis" is wrong since it predicts symmetric cancelling.
If Wilson's use of 'cancelling' is the same as mine, then (ii)
may be true, but (i) is false. On her analysis, all non-cancellable
presuppositions are entailments, and rA or IB is logically equivalent
to rB or A. Since these sentences have the same entailments, she
believes they must have the same non-cancellable presuppositions.
However, Karttunen's conditions involve filtering, not entailment or
cancellation. Thus, Wilson's claim (i) is false.
On the other hand, if by 'cancellation' she means 'filtering'
then (i) is true, but (ii) is false. Her "entailment analysis"
acknowledges that some presuppositions are defeatable suggestions
rather than entailments. Nothing in her analysis requires the
principles that give rise to these suggestions to be symmetric. Since
Karttunen's filtering principles are responsible for such suggestions,
Wilson has nothing to fear from asymmetric filtering conditions.
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VI. Filtering and Conversation
6.1 The Problem
The last problem that I will take up is the most
serious one. The filtering conditions for Karttunen's
second stage theory are based on the incorrect filtering
conditions (1-3) of his first stage theory. They differ
from (1-3) in allowing the conversational context of an
utterance to play a role in entailing, and hence, in
"filtering out", the presuppositional requirements
carried by constituents of compound sentences. This
difference is the fundamental one and is independent of
the issues involving symmetry, asymmetry, and negation
that I have just discussed. The question at issue is
this: does the introduction of context allow Karttunen's
second stage filtering conditions to handle the counter-
examples to (1-3) cited in Section II, or do these
examples also falsify his second stage theory?
6.1.1 The First Set of Data
In Section II I considered conditionals in which the
k-presupposition of the consequent entails, but is not
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entailed by the antecedent. One such conditional is
(31).
31. If John has children, then all of John's
sons are bald.
A = 'John has children'
C = 'John has sons'
Since a speaker assertively uttering (31) does not
take C for granted, this example falsifies filtering
principle (1).
What about (103)?
103. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rlf A, then B if and only if
(i) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
(ii) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then X
entails S.64
According to (103), a context X satisfies-the-presuppo-
sitions-of (31) only if X U (104) entails (105).
64(103) is a symmetric principle for conditionals. However,
the issue of symmetry vs. asymmetry is irrelevant to the question at
hand.
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104. John has children.
105. John has sons,
In other words, X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
(31) only if X entails (106).
106. If John has children, then he has sons.
This means that a speaker may appropriately utter (31)
only if (i) he assumes (106) and
(ii) his audience already assumes (106) or
is willing to grant this assumption.
This prediction seems plausible. Thus, (31) does
not falsify (103). However, it is not clear to me that
(103) explains why (31) requires (106). Note, (107)
seems to require the same thing independently of pre-
supposition.
107. If John has children, the he has bald sons.
First consider the claim that a speaker assertively
uttering (31) or (107) must believe (106). These
examples entail (106).65 Thus, someone asserting them
must believe (106).
Next consider the claim that (31) and (107) are
inappropriate in contexts in which the audience is not
65
I take it that 'All of John's sons are bald' entails 'John has
sons'.
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prepared to grant (106). This claim is vague and hard
to evaluate. However, it seems to me that if it is true
66
of (31), then it is also true of (107). Since (107)
does not involve presuppositional requirements on
Karttunen's account, whatever explanation is invoked
for it must be independent of his theory of presuppo-
sition. But this suggests that the explanation of (31)
is also independent of presupposition. Thus, I conclude
that although (31) does not falsify Karttunen's analysis,
it does not provide any additional evidence for it
either.
66erhaps a better comparison can be made between (i)
and (ii).
(i) If John has children, then at least two of his sons
are bald.
(ii) If John has children, then he has at least two bald
sons.
It seems to me that (i) and (ii) stand in the same relation
to (106). Nevertheless, on Karttunen's account, (iii) pre-
supposes that John has sons whereas (iv) does not.
(iii) At least two of John's sons are bald.
(iv) John has at least two bald sons.
This can be seen by comparing (v) and (vi).
(v) It may be that at least two of John's sons are bald.
(vi) It may be that John has at least two bald sons.
(v) but not (vi) suggests that John has sons. Thus, for Karttunen,
(iii) presupposes this, but (iv) does not.
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6.1.2 The Second Set of Data
One sentence that does falsify Karttunen's analysis
is (45).
45. John has children and his sons are bald.
According to the filtering principle for conjunctions,
a context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of (45)
only if X U (104) entails (105)--i.e., only if X
itself entails (106).
104. John has children.
.105. John has sons.
106. If John has children, then he has sons.
Naturally a speaker sincerely asserting (45) believes
(106), but this has nothing to do with presupposition.
Moreover, it does not seem necessary that one's audience
be prepared to grant (106) in order for an utterance of
(45) to be appropriate.67 If this is right, then
Karttunen's analysis is incorrect.
This conclusion is strengthened by (108) and (109).
108. It may be that John has children and his sons
are bald.
67An assertion does not have to be accepted in order to be
appropriate.
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109. If John has children and his sons are bald,
then baldness is hereditary.
Karttunen's principle for 'may' is (110).
110. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
•It may be that Sý if and only if X satisfies-
the-presuppositions-of S.68
This principle, together with the principle for conjunc-
tions, predicts that X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of (108)
only if X entails (106). Since a speaker assertively
uttering (108) does not suggest and need not believe
(106), Karttunen's theory is incorrect.
The same point can be made using (109). Karttunen's
principle for conditionals [(103)] predicts that X
satisfies-the-presuppositions-of (109) only if X U (111)
satisfies-the-presuppositions-of (45).
111. Baldness is hereditary.
X U (111) satisfies-the-presuppositions-of (45) only if
X U (111) U (104) entails 'John has sons'. In other words,
Karttunen's theory predicts that a speaker may appro-
priately utter (109) only if he believes (112).
68
Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context," Theoretical
Linguistics 1, no. 1/2 (1974): 188.
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112. If John has children and baldness is hereditary,
69then John has sons,
Since this prediction is false, Karttunen's theory is
wrong.
Finally, the kind of argument that is here applied
to conjunctions can also be applied to disjunctions and
conditionals. For example, a speaker assertively
uttering (113) and (114) does not suggest and need
not believe (106).
113. It may be that if John has children, then all
of his sons are bald.
114. It may be that either John has no children, or
all of his sons are bald.
Hence, the interaction of Karttunen's principle for
modals and his principles for conjunctions, disjunctions,
and conditionals leads to false predictions.
6.1.3 The Third Set of Data
A different kind of counterexample is provided by (115).
69
If the principle for conditionals is asymmetric, then Karttunen's
theory predicts that a speaker asserting (109) must believe (106).
This prediction is false.
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115. Either Bill met Susan's only son, or he met
the oldest of her sons,
According to Karttunen's first stage theory, (115)
k-presupposes both (116) and (117).
116. Susan has only one son.
117. Susan has more than one son.
Since (116) and (117) are incompatible, Karttunen's
first stage theory incorrectly predicts that someone
assertively uttering (115) makes inconsistent sugges-
tions.
"What does the second stage theory say about (115)?
In "Presupposition and Linguistic Context" Karttunen
answers this question in discussing a similar example.
He says,
As a final example, consider a case of the kind first
discussed in Liberman (1973).
(28) Bill has met either the King or the President of Slobovia.
The two disjuncts that constitute (28) have conflicting presup-
positions [sic]: Slobovia is a monarchy/Slobovia is a republic.
Yet, (28) as a whole is not contradictory. It seems to assert
that Bill has met the Slobovian Head of State and indicates that
the speaker does not know much about Slobovia. What sort of
context does it take to satisfy-the-presuppositions-of (28)?
Assuming that the condition for "or" is symmetric . . ., we
find that, according to our principles, (28) can be admissible at
70.Note, however, that principle (3#) avoids this incorrect
prediction.
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least in contexts which entail the logical forms of the
three sentences in (29),
(29) (a) Slobovia is either a monarchy or a republic.
(b) If Slobovia is a monarchy, Bill has met the King
of Slobovia,
(c) If Slobovia is a republic, Bill has met the President
of Slobovia.
Such a context can satisfy the presuppositions of (28) for
the following reason, By incrementing it with the negation of
the first disjunct, "Bill has not met the King of Slobovia", we
get a context which entails that Slobovia is a republic,
which is what the second disjunct presupposes. By incrementing
the original context with the negation of the second disjunct,
we get a context which entails that Slobovia is a monarchy,
which is a presupposition for the first disjunct. Given that
both constituent sentences in (28) are admissible in theýi
respective local contexts (28) as a whole is admissible.
O.ne problem with Karttunen's example [his (28)] is
that its disjuncts do not have conflicting presuppositions--
i.e., a country can have both a king and a president.
Thus, it is more convenient to concentrate on (115).
Karttunen's remarks indicate that this sentence is
admissible in a context that entails (ll8a-c).
118. a. Either Susan has only one son or she has
more than one son.
b. If Susan has only one son, then Bill met
him.
c. If Susan has more than one son, then Bill
met the oldest of her sons.
But this is not helpful. (115) is logically equivalent
71Karttunen, "Presupposition and Linguistic Context," pp. 192-193.
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to the conjunction of (ll8a-c). Naturally, a speaker
assertively uttering (115) believes the propositions
expressed by these sentences. Moreover, he cannot assume
that his audience takes these propositions for granted,
since, if they did, then there would be no point in
uttering (115) at all. Thus, if Karttunen's theory
predicts that (115) requires a context that entails (118a-
c), then this prediction is a reductio ad absurdum of the
theory.
Unfortunately, his theory does predict this. The
principle for disjunctions is (119).
119. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
%ither A or B' if and only if
(i) X U -A'1 satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
(ii) X U rB' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then
X entails S.
According to this principle, a context X satisfies-the-
presuppositions of (115) only if
(i) X U 'Bill didn't meet the oldest of Susan's sons'
entails 'Susan has only one son'; and
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(ii) X U 'Bill didn't meet Susan's only son'
entails 'Susan has more than one son'; and
72(iii) X entails that Susan has at least one son.
This means that X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
(115) only if X entails (120a-c).
120. a. If Bill didn't meet the oldestof Susan's
sons, then Susan has only one son.
b. If Bill didn't meet Susan's only son, then
Susan has more than one son.
c. Susan has at least one son.
Since the conjunction of (120a-c) is logically equivalent
to the conjunction of (118a-c), Karttunen's theory
predicts that (115) is admissible only in contexts
that entail (118a-c).73 I have already argued that this
72(iii) results from the fact that both disjuncts presuppose
that Susan has at least one son.
73It follows from this that (115) is logically equivalent to
the conjunction of (120a-c). This can also be demonstrated indepen-
dently.
First, suppose that (115) is true. Then (120c) is true. If
Bill met Susan's only son, then (120b) is true by falsity of the
antecedent and (120a) is true because of the truth of the consequent.
If Bill met the oldest of Susan's sons, then (120a) is true by
falsity of the antecedent, and (120b) is true because of the truth of
its consequent. Thus, (115) entails the conjunction of (120a-c).
Next suppose that (120a-c) are true. If, in addition, (115)
isn't true, then either Susan has only one son and Bill didn't meet
him, or Susan has more than one son and Bill didn't meet the oldest.
The first alternative contradicts the assumption that (120b) is
true. The second alternative contradicts the assumption that (120a)
is true. Thus, the conjunction of (120a-c) entails (115). In short,
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is absurd.
To make sure that (115) does not require contexts
that entail (118a-c)--and hence that entail (115)
itself--one needs only to embed it in another compound
sentence.
121. If Bill met Susan's only son or the oldest of
her sons, then he must know what a fine mother
she is.
A speaker assertively uttering this sentence need not
assume that (118a-c) are true and hence that the antecedent
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of (121) is true. For example, he may not assume
that Bill met anyone. Thus, (115) shows that
Karttunen's theory is incorrect.75
(115)is logically equivalent to the conjunction of (120a-c).
Note: for those who have qualms about the logical form of English
conditionals, it can also be shown that a context X entails (115) iff
(i) X U 'Bill didn't meet the oldest of Susan's sons' entails
'Susan has only one son'; and
(ii) X U 'Bill didn't meet Susan's only son' entails 'Susan has
more than one son'; and
(iii) X entails that Susan has at least one son.
This result is a reductio ad absurdum of Karttunen's account.
74
He also need not assume that X U 'Susan is a fine mother'
satisfies-the-presuppositions-of the antecedent of (121).
Another environment that makes the same point is 'It may be that'.
A speaker may assertively utter (i) in contexts that do not entail (ii).
(i) It may be that either Bill met Susan's only son or he met
the oldest of her sons.
(ii) Bill met Susan's only son or he met the oldest of her sons,
Karttunen's theory does not account for this.
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6.2 An Attempted Solution
6.2.1 An Undesirable Alternative
The counterexamples discussed in 6.1 were based
on the sentences discussed in Section II. In each
case (rIf A, then B1 , Either A or BEP, and rA and B')
A and B were simple positive sentences, and B k-presupposed
a sentence C. In the case of conditionals and con-
junctions, C entailed but was not entailed by A. In
the case of disjunctions, C entailed, but was not
entailed by r-A'.76
-One way to handle these counterexamples would be
to give up trying to directly characterize the contexts
that satisfy-the-presuppositions-of a sentence and to
return to the notion of "relative presupposition" dis-
cussed in footnote 37. On this account, simple positive
sentences and their negations k-presuppose their standard
presuppositions in all contexts. The filtering principle
for disjunctions would then be (122).
122. a. If A k-presupposes C with respect to X,
and neither X Ur-B' entails C nor C
entails -B7 , then 7Either A or B k-presup-
76
In. the case of (115), A also k-presupposed a sentence D where D
entailed but was not entailed by r-B'. Note, r-A; and r-Blare here
taken to be logically external negations.
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poses C with respect to X.
b. If B k-presupposes C with respect to X,
and neither X U r-A7 entails C nor C
entails r-Al, then rEither A or B k-presup-
poses C with respect to X.
c. If both A and B k-presuppose C with respect
to X, then rEither A or B1 k-presupposes
C with respect to X.
The principles for conjunctions and conditionals would
be analogous. 77
.Although this is a possible approach, it is
certainly not an attractive one. Thus, it is worthwhile
to look for other alternatives. I will sketch such
an alternative in 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Conversation and Presupposition
The disjunctions that I will consider are ones in
which B k-presupposes C, and C entails but is not entailed
by r-A'. The conjunctions and conditionals are similar
77Principle (ii) of footnote 37 could be invoked to give these
principles empirical content.
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except that C entails but is not entailed by A. Why
doesn't a speaker assertively uttering FEither A or B1,
'A and B , or r1f A, then B take C for granted?
First consider r-A . By hypothesis, the speaker
recognizes that C entails r-A .78 Hence, if he took
C for granted, then he would also assume that A is
untrue. But then the first disjunct of FEither A or B7
would be pointless and misleading. A cooperative
speaker would not utter rEither A or B1 in such a case,
but rather would assert the stronger, more informative
statement expressed by B. Thus, if he does utter
Either A or Bý we assume that he is not taking C for
granted.
The same reasoning can be applied to conditionals.
Since C entails A, a speaker assuming C would have no
need for the antecedent of rIf A, then B . Instead of
uttering the conditional, he would assert the stronger
statement expressed by B. Thus, if a speaker does
utter rjf A, then B1, then the presumption that he is
being cooperative and not misleading implies that he
is not taking C for granted.
Next consider conjunctions. If a speaker takes C
78See Section 1.2.3.
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for granted and knows that his audience does too, then
there is no point in uttering 9A and B . Rather he
would assert the statement expressed by B. The issue
becomes clearer when 7A and BE is embedded in compound
sentences. A speaker who takes C (and hence A) for
granted would not utter ~rf A and B, then 1D . Rather
he would utter rIf B, then D1. For example, if one
assumed (123) and knew that one's audience either already
shared this assumption or was prepared to grant it,
then it would be misleading to use (124). Rather one
would use (125).
S123. Mary has daughters.
124. If Mary has children and her daughters are
intelligent, then intelligence is hereditary.
125. If Mary's daughters are intelligent, then
intelligence is hereditary.
If this analysis is correct, then Karttunen's
filtering conditions can remain as they are. What must
be modified is (74).
74. If X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions~of S,
then it is inappropriate for a speaker to
assertively utter S in X unless
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(a) there is a proposition Q such that X U Q
satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S, and
Q is uncontroversial--i.e., the audience
is prepared to grant it; or
(b) there is a proposition Q, such that
X U Q satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S,
and the speakeer explicitly indicates
that he is not assuming Q.
This principle gives Karttunen's theory empirical
content. Clause (b) was introduced to cover cases of
explicit cancellation. 7 9 If the analysis given in this
section is correct, then an additional clause covering
cases of impticit cancellation must be added.
Intuitively, a speaker cancels the inference to Q
if he explicitly indicates or conversationally implicates
that he is not taking Q for granted. This suggests
that (c) be added to (74).
74. (c) There is a proposition Q, such that
X U Q satisfies-the-presuppositions-of S,
and the speaker conversationally impli-
cates that he is not assuming Q.
(74) can now be simplified and reformulated as (126).
79
See Section 3.3.
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126. If X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-of
S, then it is appropriate for a speaker to
assertively utter S in X only if there is a
proposition Q such that X U Q satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of S and either
(i) Q is uncontroversial; or
(ii) the speaker explicitly indicates
or conversationally implicates that
he is not assuming Q.
.If the analysis in this section is correct, then
Karttunen's modified filtering conditions together
with (126) account for all of the data that I have
considered. What makes this analysis seem plausible
is the obviousness of much of the phenomena. Why
doesn't FEither A or BP require a context in which C
(and hence r-10) is assumed? To answer this, one
does not need to know anything about presupposition.
If the speaker were taking r-A" for granted, then
he would never have uttered the disjunction at all.
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6.2.3 Conversation, Filtering, and "the Cumulative
Hypothesis"
The argument in 6.2.2 has interesting consequences.
I see no other way for Karttunen to accommodate the
counterexamples to his second stage theory mentioned
in 6.1. If, for any reason, my argument should turn
out to be incorrect, then his theory is seriously
inadequate.80 On the other hand, if the argument in
6.2.2 is correct, then the amount of data supporting
Karttunen's filtering conditions is drastically dimi-
nished.
S81I will illustrate with conditionals. I have
argued that if B k-presupposes C and C entails A, then
someone assuming C would not assertively utter rIf A,
then B . A speaker who did assertively utter this
would conversationally implicate that he is not assuming
C. But this means that we don't need a filtering
principle to explain why C is not assumed.
The only cases for which we do need such a principle
are those in which A entails but is not entailed by C--
80I have some reservations about the argument, For
example, I am not sure exactly which Gricean maxims are relevant
in each case,
81
Analogous remarks apply to conjunctions and disjunctions.
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cases like (26).82
26. If Sam paid the bill promptly, then his
payment is in the mail.
A = 'Sam paid the bill promptly'
B = 'Sam's payment (of the bill) is in
the mail'
C = 'Sam paid the bill'
It seems to me that a speaker assertively uttering (26)
would not normally implicate C. Grice's conversational
principles do not explain this. Karttunen's filtering
principles do. If it weren't for such examples, one
could simply propose that all conditionals inherit the
k-presuppositions of their constituents.8 3 The inference
to these k-presuppositions would remain in force only
if they were not defeated by conversational principles.
Fortunately for Karttunen, the existence of examples like
(26) undermines this simple theory and provides some
motivation for his more complex account.
82Note, this is compatible with my statement of Karttunen's
filtering conditions.
83This is a special case of "the cumulative hypothesis".
The hypothesis states that compound sentences always inherit
the presuppositions of their constituents.
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VII. Summary of Part 5
In Part 5 I have examined Karttunen's theory
of presupposition and have proposed several modifica-
tions. In particular I have argued that his theory
should be modified to include the following principles.
127. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
andA { but B if and only ifbut
(i) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
(ii) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then
X entails S.
128. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rIf A, then B1 if and only if
(i) X U A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
(ii) X U B satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then
X entails S.
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129. A context X satisfies-the-presuppositions-of
rEither A or B1 if and only if
Ci) X U r-Al satisfies-the-presuppositions-of B
(ii) X U r-B' satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A
(iii) For all sentences S, if S is entailed
by every context that satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of both A and B, then
X entails S.
130. If X does not satisfy-the-presuppositions-of
S, then it is appropriate for a speaker to
utter S assertively in X only if there is a
proposition Q such that X U Q satisfies-the-
presuppositions-of S and either
(i) Q is uncontroversial; or
(ii) The speaker explicitly indicates or
conversationally implicates that he
is not assuming Q.
Although many questions remain unanswered, reformulating
Karttunen's theory to include these principles results
in a strengthening of his account.
PART 6
FINAL SUMMARY
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In this essay I have tried to do two things. First
I separated the arguments for (1) and (2) and critically
evaluated them.
1. Theories of natural language require an account
of non-logical presupposition.
2. The notion of logical presupposition should be
eliminated from theories of natural language.
In Parts 1-3, I argued that (1) is correct, but that (2)
has not been established. Although I see no conclusive
evidence in favor of a theory of logical presupposition
for simple sentences and their negations, I also see
no conclusive evidence against such a theory.1
Second I examined two positive accounts of non-logical
presupposition. I showed that Wilson's account is incor-
rect. Negative sentences do not conversationally impli-
cate their presuppositions, and compound sentences do not
W-implicate theirs. In Karttunen's case, I showed that
several modifications of his theory need to be made. Al-
though his modified theory is by no means the final word
regarding the presuppositions of compound sentences, it
seems to be the most promising account developed so far.
However, see the argument in Part 5, Section IV.
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